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← ExitStobaeus, Volume II

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Book II Chapter 8

Iamblichus continued

To the extent that the soul has taken into itself a pure rational principle that subsists of itself, moves itself, acts from itself, and is perfect, it is free from everything external.⁹⁰³ But to the extent that it also puts forth other modes of life inclining toward coming into being and shares in the body, it is enmeshed in the ordering of the cosmos as well.⁹⁰⁴

From the same work

If anyone thinks that by introducing spontaneity and fortune he abolishes order, let him learn that nothing in the universe is disorderly, an isolated episode, without a cause, indeterminate, random, intruding out of nothing, or accidental. Accordingly, the order and continuity of causes are not abolished, nor the unity of principles, nor the dominance of the first principles that extends through everything.⁹⁰⁵

Iamblichus continued

It is better, then, to define it thus: fortune is an overseeing and unifying cause of the more numerous orders, or indeed of certain other things, prior to the things that come together. We have come to recognize it as a cause that we call at one time a god, ⟨at another a daimon⟩.⁹⁰⁶ For when the causes of the things that come together are higher, a god is their overseer; when they are causes within nature, a daimon. Everything, then, is always accomplished with a cause, and nothing whatsoever disorderly intrudes among things that come to be.⁹⁰⁷

From the same work

Why, then, are distributions made contrary to merit? Or is it not even proper to raise this question in the first place?⁹⁰⁸ For good things depend on nothing else, but on the human being himself and his choice; it is in deliberate choice alone that these are most strictly defined. The matters that trouble most people are disputed through ignorance. Virtue, therefore, has no fruit other than itself.⁹⁰⁹

Iamblichus continued

Nor is any good person diminished by Fortune, for greatness of soul makes him superior to every circumstance.⁹¹⁰ Nor does this occur contrary to nature: the soul’s highest excellence and perfection suffice to complete the best nature of the human being. Indeed, the very things that seem contrary train and sustain virtue and will increase it; it is impossible to become noble and good without them.⁹¹¹

Iamblichus continued

This disposition of the good person, therefore, gives special honor to the noble and counts only the perfection of reason as belonging to a blessed life; everything else it disregards and disdains as of no account.⁹¹²

⟨From the same work⟩

Since, then, the human being is in the soul, and the soul is intellectual and immortal, the soul’s nobility, good, and end are therefore inherent in divine life. Nothing of a mortal kind has power either to contribute anything to perfect life or to deprive it of happiness.⁹¹³ In general, our blessedness lies in intellectual life; none of the intermediate things makes this life advance or can take it away.⁹¹⁴ It is in vain, then, that people have gone on talking about turns of fortune and Fortune’s unequal gifts.

903.Λόγος is a rational principle here, described as καθαρός, pure; αὐθυπόστατος, subsisting of itself; and αὐτοκίνητος, moving itself. Its activity from itself is separately stated. These are the grounds of the freedom from external things claimed in this clause.

904.The repeated to the extent ... to that extent preserves the qualifications καθ’ ὅσον ... κατὰ τοσοῦτον. The same soul is considered in its relation to the pure rational principle and in the other modes of life it puts forth in contact with becoming and the body. Συμπλοκή is an interweaving or entanglement, here enmeshed in the cosmic ordering.

905.Τὸ αὐτόματον, here in the contracted form ταὐτόματον, is spontaneity or chance occurrence; τύχη is fortune. The successive negatives retain the full scope of the claim. An isolated episode renders ἐπεισοδιῶδες, suggesting something disconnected from an ordered sequence. The argument does not introduce fortune as an exception to causation, but places it within an account of causal order.

906.The opening definition is textually uncertain. Wachsmuth leaves the more numerous orders, τῶν πλειόνων τάξεων, and or indeed of certain other things unresolved rather than printing a proposed replacement such as higher orders. Rejected [ἤ], or, remains in Greek and is omitted from English. Supplied ⟨τότε δὲ δαίμονα⟩ is shown as ⟨at another a daimon⟩. Fortune is presented as prior to the things brought together, rather than as their accidental product.

907.The contrast distinguishes higher causes from causes operating within nature, with a god or a daimon as overseer respectively. Daimon retains the Greek category of divine being. The supplied completion ⟨όντων⟩ is within συνιόντων, of the things that come together; the English translates the completed word as a whole. The Greek construction is compressed, and the concluding claim expressly keeps all occurrences within causal order.

908.The question concerns διανομαί, distributions or allotments, and ἀξία, merit or worth. Ὅσιον carries the sense of religious propriety: the reply questions whether it is permissible even to begin from the assumption that the distribution of genuine goods is unjust. The argument will locate those goods in the agent’s choice.

909.Αἵρεσις is choice; προαίρεσις is deliberate choice. The good is located in this activity rather than in the external allotments that prompted the question. Ἐπικαρπία is fruit, yield, or profit: virtue itself is the return it produces, without requiring a further prize from Fortune.

910.Μεγαλοψυχία is greatness of soul, the disposition that makes the good person superior to συντυχίαι, circumstances or encounters of fortune. The claim concerns his standing in virtue; the text’s answer is that Fortune does not diminish that good.

911.Ἀκρότης is the soul’s highest excellence, joined here to τελειότης, perfection. Apparent adversities become occasions for exercising virtue. The English retains the sequence of present γυμνάζει and συνέχει, trains and sustains, followed by future συναύξει, will increase. Καλοὶ κἀγαθοί, noble and good, describes the resulting moral character.

912.Τὸ καλόν is the noble, the object of moral esteem here. Λόγος is reason, whose perfection is placed at the center of the blessed life, μακαρία ζωή. The contrasting judgment on everything else continues the refusal to make virtue’s value depend on Fortune’s gifts.

913.Wachsmuth separates this paragraph as a new excerpt and supplies From the same work; the heading stays bracketed in both languages. The printed ἐν ψυχῇ, in the soul, is retained rather than adopting a proposed alteration of the opening. It locates the human being in the soul for the argument that follows. Θεία ζωή is divine life, as printed; the apparatus proposes perfect instead of divine, but that is not substituted here.

914.The intermediate things, τὰ μέσα, are the indifferents considered apart from moral good and evil. The feminine ταύτην most directly resumes intellectual life, νοερὰ ζωή, rather than the neuter blessedness, τὸ μακάριον; this life makes that reference explicit. Τέλος is the end or final aim, while εὐδαιμονία, happiness, and τὸ μακάριον, blessedness, describe the fulfillment located in that life.