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← ExitStobaeus, Volume II

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Book II Chapter 8

Porphyry continued

All such things, then, have come to depend ⟨on⟩ choice, but their attainment is not altogether up to us; once we obtain one of them, we must follow its order.⁸⁵⁰ Yet in practically all lives occupying a middle position and not already classed as vicious, it is granted to use the lives one pursues either badly or well. For some advanced to tyrannies have proved gentle and mild, and kingships have been used badly.⁸⁵¹

Porphyry continued

⟨Now⟩, this being so, the choice of the primary lives belongs in the first instance to souls outside bodies. Once one had been chosen, Necessity ratified its inescapable character and the daimon followed, each as protector and supervisor of the particular life, compelling the souls to remain in what has been chosen and not look beyond it.⁸⁵² The Fates spun such a life for each, ⟨as⟩ events bear witness throughout all time.⁸⁵³

Porphyry continued

For a man would never become a woman, even if he becomes extremely effeminate through licentiousness and his choice reshapes all his outward traits ⟨into⟩ those customary for a woman; nor would a woman, attempting to do what men do, ever become a man.⁸⁵⁴

Porphyry continued

Souls therefore live this life under necessity and pass through it in forgetfulness, having completely forgotten that its choice was once up to them.⁸⁵⁵ In the human case, voluntary action comes into play most freely with regard to matters of the soul, considering the soul on its own and not as fettered in a body; with regard to matters of the living creature and the composite, the human being is released ⟨for⟩ actions under his own control. For each of us passes through human life with this, together with the impulse appropriate to the composite’s actions under its own control.⁸⁵⁶

From the same work

For each living creature is governed according to the mode of life appropriate to it here. Human life has within itself the self-government appropriate to a human being. Therefore, even if someone is led by natural inclinations toward one of the ways of life available for choice here, he still has it in his power not to enter it, even if in fact he does enter it.⁸⁵⁷ For in all cases in which we assent to a persuasive impression because it is persuasive, withholding assent is nevertheless also up to us, since the impression does not drag us toward itself or pull us like a puppet.⁸⁵⁸

From the same work

For Plato’s overall meaning seems to be this: before entering bodies and different lives, souls have self-government in choosing ⟨this⟩ life or that, which each soul is to complete with a certain kind of existence and a body suited to that existence (for it is up to them to choose a lion’s life as well as a man’s).⁸⁵⁹ That self-government has been constrained at the very moment of falling into one of these kinds of life.⁸⁶⁰

Porphyry continued

Once they have descended into bodies and have become souls of living creatures instead of unattached souls, they bring with them a self-government suited to the living creature’s constitution. In some cases it is varied in thought and movement, as in a human being; in others it has few movements and only one way of acting, as in almost all other living creatures.⁸⁶¹ This self-government depends on the constitution: it moves from itself, but is carried along in accordance with the inclinations arising from the constitution.⁸⁶²

From the same work

Everywhere we should avoid extremes and pursue the mean, unless what is up to us, already bound by incurable passions of vice, is enslaved and subjected to them.⁸⁶³

Porphyry continued

It is also acceptable to hold that souls are not assigned lives by lot and receive them in a disorderly way, but in order, as the cycle leads them. For the soul that first came to rest in the first cycle will arrive first, and the second ⟨second⟩, to draw its lot in the second cycle. For they are turned by the universe and, coming to the end of their course with its movement, are carried round into a kind of order, the lots signifying first and second place.⁸⁶⁴ That is also why the prophet takes the lots of Lachesis, who is named from obtaining a lot and being allotted one. Many have said that Lachesis is the revolution of the universe.⁸⁶⁵

Porphyry continued

It is also acceptable to hold that the self-government of souls is defiled by the prior life lived here, while the self-government of human beings is defiled by the inclination toward one of the lives here of the ⟨soul⟩ while it is still outside the body, which Plato calls choice.⁸⁶⁶

850.Προαίρεσις is deliberate choice. Supplied ⟨ἐκ⟩ is represented by ⟨on⟩ with depend. The sentence distinguishes choosing a pursuit, attaining it, and the order or conditions that accompany it once attained. Οὐ πάντως means not altogether; it does not remove every role for the agent in attaining the object.

851.The middle position describes lives not already classified as vicious, so that good and bad uses remain distinguishable. The printed relative οὗ in the clause about the lives one pursues is compressed and has been questioned by editors; the English conveys the contextual sense without changing that Greek. The tyranny and kingship examples distinguish the name of a position from the use made of it. The subject of the kingship example is not expressed, and the English leaves it unspecified.

852.The primary lives are the kinds of existence distinguished in II.8.39.5–6, such as human or animal life. The souls outside are those choosing before embodiment in the myth. Porphyry applies Necessity and the daimon’s guardianship to that primary choice. Wachsmuth retains προβλέπειν, to look ahead; look beyond it keeps the image in the context of remaining within the selected life, rather than adopting an editorial replacement meaning to abandon it.

853.Supplied ⟨δὲ⟩ is rendered ⟨Now⟩, and ⟨οἷον⟩ as ⟨as⟩. The rejected [τε], and, remains visible in Greek and is omitted from the English sentence. The Fates’ spinning and the claim that events throughout time attest it belong to Porphyry’s interpretation; the following example gives his proposed evidence.

854.Porphyry offers this claim about male and female nature as evidence that a primary kind of life remains fixed. The words ἀσέλγεια, licentiousness, and μαλακίζεσθαι, to become effeminate or soft, carry the ancient author’s moral assessment of behavior; the passage is translated as his historical argument. Προαίρεσις is the subject of reshapes, so that deliberate choice is expressly acknowledged while its supposed limits are asserted. Supplied ⟨εἰς⟩ is shown as ⟨into⟩.

855.The necessity concerns the selected primary life just discussed, whereas the forgotten choice belongs to the soul before embodiment. Forgetfulness here explains why the agent living that life no longer remembers having chosen it. The conclusion still distinguishes this necessity from the voluntary actions considered in the next sentences.

856.The composite, συναμφότερον, is the embodied living creature constituted from soul and body; Wachsmuth compares Alcibiades I.130A, where body, soul, and their combination are distinguished. The concluding construction is compressed: it considers the soul on its own and also actions belonging to the composite. Rejected [ἐλεύθερον], free, and [δεδεμένην], bound, are omitted from the English body; unrestrained and fettered senses remain in the surviving ἀνειμένον and πεπεδημένην. Supplied ⟨πρὸς⟩ is shown as ⟨for⟩. Αὐτεξούσια describes actions under the agent’s own control, and ὁρμή the corresponding impulse to act.

857.Here refers to embodied life. Αὐτεξούσιον continues the term self-government, while προθυμίαι are inclinations or eager impulses. Being led toward a way of life is distinguished from being unable to refrain from entering it. The concession κἂν πάντως ἐμπέσῃ, even if in fact he does enter it, is retained: the occurrence of a choice is not itself described as unavoidable necessity.

858.Συγκατατίθεσθαι means to assent to or accept an impression, rather than merely to receive one. Πιθανός means persuasive; the passage does not thereby declare the impression true. Νευροσπαστεῖ introduces the image of a puppet moved by strings. The claim is that an impression can be persuasive without mechanically compelling the assent of the person who receives it.

859.Porphyry summarizes what he takes Plato to mean. Choosing a lion’s life or a man’s concerns primary kinds of life, distinguished from occupations at II.8.39.5–7. Ζωή here denotes the kind of living existence to which the body is suited; the choice is not simply that of a profession.

860.Supplied ⟨τοῦτον⟩ is shown as ⟨this⟩ in this life or that. The printed ἐμπεπόδισται means has been hindered or constrained: the freedom to choose a primary life is checked upon entry into that life. The following sentences distinguish the self-government that embodied creatures then possess, rather than saying that all self-government disappears.

861.Unattached souls renders ψυχαὶ ἀπόλυτοι, souls not yet joined to bodies. Here αὐτεξούσιον, self-government, has a range suited to each creature’s constitution: the contrast is between varied human activity and the restricted activity of almost all other animals, without making the latter claim universal. This is a more qualified use of self-government than the denial to nonrational animals at II.8.39.7.

862.Κινούμενον ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ describes movement originating from itself, while φερόμενον κατὰ τὰς… προθυμίας describes its direction according to inclinations arising from the constitution. Προθυμίαι are inclinations or eager impulses here. Both claims stand together: self-government is presented as self-moving while remaining dependent on the creature’s constitution.

863.Wachsmuth compares Republic X.619A, where the choice of lives is associated with seeking the middle and avoiding extremes. The qualification about passions remains explicit: the exhortation is not presented as though an agent’s capacity were wholly unaffected by vice. Incurable renders ἀνήκεστος within Porphyry’s ethical argument.

864.The lots are interpreted as positions in an ordered cycle, rather than an absence of order. The repeated first and second and the successive cycles follow the printed wording. Wachsmuth supplies the second occurrence of ⟨δευτέρα⟩; English retains ⟨second⟩. The account is Porphyry’s interpretation of the myth’s cosmic order, not a statement that drawing lots makes every later action involuntary.

865.Republic X.617D is Wachsmuth’s locator for the prophet and Lachesis’s lots. Porphyry connects her name with λαγχάνειν, obtaining by lot, and κληροῦσθαι, being allotted or drawing a lot. He then reports an identification of Lachesis with cosmic revolution. These explanations belong to his reading of the myth; the translation does not turn the etymological explanation into an independently established historical derivation.

866.Χραίνεσθαι, to be stained or defiled, preserves the passage’s image of an effect on self-government. The earlier life here affects the soul, while the inclination formed before embodiment affects the human being who subsequently lives the chosen life. Προβιοτή is rendered prior life; ῥοπή is inclination. Supplied ⟨ψυχῆς⟩ is shown as ⟨soul⟩, and outside is understood from the contrast with embodied life.