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Book II Chapter 7

Quality Quantity and Equality

(For the mean determines a position of quality, not of quantity; hence it is also complete, by being of this character and being so to the highest degree.⁶⁴⁴ The contraries are in a way opposed both to one another and to the mean. Deficiency and excess are contraries; the mean stands toward each as the equal stands toward the unequal, being greater than the lesser and less than the greater.)⁶⁴⁵

Theophrastus on the Right Occasion

The mean relative to us, then, is best. For example, Theophrastus says, in conversations one person has gone through many things and chattered at length; another has dealt with few things and not even the necessary ones; but this person has dealt only with precisely what was needed and seized the right moment.⁶⁴⁶ This mean relative to us is ⟨best⟩, for it is determined in our case by reason.⁶⁴⁷

The Definition of Virtue

Hence virtue is a state involving choice, consisting in a mean relative to us, determined by reason and as the practically wise person would determine it.⁶⁴⁸ Then, having set out certain groupings, he followed his teacher in examining the particulars and attempted to present them in the following way.⁶⁴⁹

Virtues and Opposing States

The following were selected as examples: self-control, licentiousness, insensibility; gentleness, irascibility, callousness; courage, rashness, cowardice; justice [text missing];⁶⁵⁰ generosity, prodigality, illiberality; greatness of soul, smallness of soul, vanity;⁶⁵¹ magnificence, pettiness, ostentation.⁶⁵²

Self-Control and Reason as a Rule

Of these states, some are base because they exceed or fall short in relation to passions, while others are excellent, evidently because they are means. For neither the person entirely without desire nor the person full of desire is self-controlled. (The former, like a stone, desires not even what accords with nature; the latter is licentious through excess in his desires.)⁶⁵³ But the person between them, who desires what he should, when he should, and as much as he should, and determines the appropriate limit by reason as by a measuring rule, is both called self-controlled and is so in accordance with nature.⁶⁵⁴

Gentleness as an Intermediate State

Gentle is ⟨neither the callous person who never becomes angry with anyone⟩ nor the person who becomes angry at everything, however trivial, but the person who possesses the intermediate state.⁶⁵⁵

Courage and Proportionate Justice

Courageous is neither the person who fears nothing, even if a god is advancing against him, nor the person who fears everything and, as the saying goes, a shadow [text missing].⁶⁵⁶ Just is neither the person who allots himself more nor the person who allots himself less, but the person who allots himself an equal share. Equal here means proportionately equal, not numerically equal.⁶⁵⁷

Generosity and Its Extremes

⟨Generous⟩ is neither the person who gives things away haphazardly nor the person who gives nothing away [text missing].⁶⁵⁸

Greatness of Soul and Magnificence

Great of soul is neither the person who thinks himself worthy of every great thing nor the person who thinks himself worthy of nothing at all, but the person who takes what is due in each case, according to worth.⁶⁵⁹ Magnificent is neither the person who displays splendor always, even where he should not, nor the person who never does so anywhere, but the person who fits each occasion as the right moment requires.⁶⁶⁰

Ethical Virtues and Practical Wisdom

Such is the form of the ethical virtues: concerned with passions and considered in terms of a mean. It also has a relation of reciprocal accompaniment ⟨with practical wisdom⟩, though not in the same way: practical wisdom accompanies the ethical virtues in its own distinctive character, while they accompany it incidentally.⁶⁶¹ For the just person is also practically wise, since reason of this kind gives him his form. Yet the practically wise person is not also just by virtue of practical wisdom’s own distinctive character, but because he is, in general, disposed to do what is noble and good and nothing base.⁶⁶²

644.Ποσόν and ποιόν are quantity and quality. The supplied article τοῦ before ποιοῦ is retained in Greek and conveyed by the English construction, without a separate bracketed English word. Τέλειον is complete or perfect. The compressed explanation allows the mean to represent excellence at its highest degree; it does not call excellence mediocre.

645.Πως, in a way, qualifies the opposition. The equality comparison expressly preserves both relations: the mean exceeds the lesser and falls short of the greater. This mathematical analogy illustrates its position between extremes; the preceding sentence has already distinguished the ethical standard from quantity alone.

646.The source reads ἐν ταῖς ἐντυχίαις, in conversations or encounters. It does not print εὐτυχίαις, good fortunes. Wachsmuth records Heeren’s proposed alteration to a reference to a work On Good Fortune but retains the transmitted phrase. The English follows that decision. The third speaker’s construction is compressed: dealt with is understood from the preceding comparison, while ἔλαβεν governs τὸν καιρόν, seized the right moment.

647.The supplied ἡ is conveyed by the English construction; supplied ἀρίστη remains bracketed as best. Καιρός concerns the right moment or occasion, not a fixed amount of speech. The example illustrates a mean determined by what is required in the circumstances.

648.Ἕξις προαιρετική is a state involving choice; προαίρεσις concerns deliberate choice in this account. The definition links the mean both to reason and to the practically wise person’s judgment. Wachsmuth inserts a Latin locator to Nicomachean Ethics II.6, 1106b36–1107a2, in the printed main text. That modern locator is given here rather than treated as ancient Greek prose.

649.The report continues from the named Theophrastus, and ὑφηγητής means his teacher or guide. Wachsmuth’s second inserted locator identifies the parallel as Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics II.7, 1107a28 onward; it too is relocated to this note. Συζυγίαι are groupings or linked sets, illustrated by the virtue and its opposing extremes below. This local reference does not establish Theophrastus as the author of the whole epitome.

650.The five asterisks after justice mark a gap in Wachsmuth’s text; they do not specify five missing words. No opposing states are invented to complete the group. The first three complete groups place the virtue first. Ἀναισθησία is insensibility in desire, while ἀναλγησία is callousness or lack of feeling in the anger group.

651.Ἐλευθεριότης is generosity or liberality, ἀσωτία prodigality, and ἀνελευθερία illiberality or lack of generosity. The order of the greatness-of-soul group is preserved: μεγαλοψυχία, μικροψυχία, χαυνότης. Χαυνότης suggests puffed-up vanity. The text is not reordered to put excess before deficiency in every group.

652.Μεγαλοπρέπεια is magnificence, μικροπρέπεια pettiness, and σαλακωνία ostentation or swagger. The last group’s printed order is also retained. Wachsmuth compares Aristotle’s different word for extravagant expenditure but prints σαλακωνία here. All seven named virtues remain in the list, including justice with its following gap.

653.The comparison is λίθου δίκην, like a stone. The absence of all desire is a deficiency, including the absence of desire for things according to nature. The parenthesis contrasts this with licentiousness through excessive desire. The English keeps the general opening description full of desire and lets the parenthesis specify its excess.

654.The source specifies the object, occasion, and amount of desire. Κανών is a rule or measuring rod: reason sets the fitting limit. The concluding κατὰ φύσιν εἶναι, to be so in accordance with nature, is retained alongside the naming of the person as self-controlled; it is not silently replaced with an assertion about habit or education.

655.The entire first extreme is supplied in Wachsmuth’s text and remains bracketed in both languages. It means neither the person without feeling and never angry with anyone. The supplied description restores the contrast with anger at everything; it is distinguished from the surviving wording, including the smallest or most trivial provocation.

656.The source now gives a god advancing against someone, rather than the earlier thunderbolt. Both comparisons are retained. Wachsmuth marks a gap after the shadow; the English signals it without supplying the missing description of the courageous mean.

657.Justice concerns allocation in this example. The explanation expressly distinguishes equality κατὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον, according to proportion, from equality κατ’ ἀριθμόν, by number. Thus equal share here cannot simply mean the same numerical quantity for every recipient. The criterion of proportion is not further specified in this sentence.

658.The supplied ἐλευθέριον remains bracketed as Generous. Προετικός concerns readiness to give away, qualified by ὅπως ἔτυχεν, haphazardly. Wachsmuth prints the corrected ἀπρόετον, someone unwilling to give away, rather than transmitted ἀπροαίρετον, without deliberate choice. The following gap is retained; no description of the mean is supplied.

659.Μεγαλόψυχος is great of soul or magnanimous. The two extremes concern a person’s estimate of his worth. The final construction, καὶ εἰς τὸ κατ’ ἀξίαν, is compressed; according to worth expresses its direction without adding a new object, such as offices or honors, that the Greek does not name.

660.Λαμπρός is splendid or brilliant in display. The source contrasts indiscriminate splendor with its complete absence, and again makes καιρός, the right occasion, decisive. Magnificence remains distinct from generosity and greatness of soul; the text does not merge their examples.

661.The supplied τῇ φρονήσει remains bracketed in both languages. Παθητικόν means concerned with passions here; it does not make virtue itself a passion. Ἀντακολουθία is reciprocal accompaniment or implication. The following contrast distinguishes κατὰ τὸ ἴδιον, in respect of a thing’s distinctive character, from κατὰ συμβεβηκός, incidentally. The asymmetry in how the qualities accompany one another is preserved.

662.Εἰδοποιεῖ means gives form or determines the kind of thing someone is; reason of this kind makes the just person what he is. The second sentence does not simply deny that the practically wise person is just. It distinguishes the basis on which justice belongs to him: his general disposition to do noble and good things rather than the distinctive account of practical wisdom alone. The final exclusion of every base thing remains explicit.