What is choiceworthy for its own sake is also spoken of in three senses: that for whose sake we do certain things, as an ultimate end; that for whose sake we do everything; and, third, what becomes a part of these.610 Of things choiceworthy for their own sake, some serve as ends and others are productive means. Those serving as ends are preferred actions in accordance with virtue; productive means are the material things used by the virtues.611
Honor Praise Powers and Usefulness
II.7.19.3 · Wachsmuth pp. 134
Of goods, some are worthy of honor, some praiseworthy, some powers, and some useful. Worthy of honor are, for example, a god, a ruler, and a father; praiseworthy are justice and practical wisdom; powers are wealth, office, and authority.612 Useful things are those that produce and preserve these goods—for example, things that produce or preserve health and good condition.613
For Themselves and for Other Things
II.7.19.4 · Wachsmuth pp. 135
Again, some goods are choiceworthy for themselves, and others for the sake of other things. Things worthy of honor, praiseworthy things, and powers are choiceworthy for themselves.614 (For powers too belong among goods in themselves—for example, wealth and offices, which a good man might use ⟨well⟩ and seek. Things that a good man can use well are naturally goods in themselves, like healthful things, which a doctor might seek and be able to use.) Useful things are choiceworthy for other things: they belong among choiceworthy things because they produce and preserve other things.615
Ends and Things That Are Not Ends
II.7.19.5 · Wachsmuth pp. 135
Another division: of goods in themselves, some are ends and others are not ends. Justice, virtue, and health are ends, as are, generally, all things constituted as a sum of particular results, as health is.616 But what is conducive to health is not an end, nor is treatment of the sick person. Natural aptitude, recollections, and acts of learning are not ends.617
Goods for Everyone and Goods Depending on Use
II.7.19.6 · Wachsmuth pp. 135-136
Another division: among ends, some are good for everyone, and others are not good for everyone. Virtue and practical wisdom are good for everyone, since they benefit anyone in whom they occur. But wealth, offices, and powers are not good for just anyone, since their being good is determined by the good man’s use of them.618 Apparently these are also to be sought and benefit their users.619
Using Things Well and Badly
II.7.19.7 · Wachsmuth pp. 136
What the good person uses well, the bad person uses badly, just as what a trained musician uses well, someone untrained in music uses badly. At the same time, someone who uses things badly is harmed, just as a good horse benefits a skilled rider but harms an unskilled rider considerably.620
Goods of Soul Body and External Life
II.7.19.8 · Wachsmuth pp. 136
Again, some goods concern the soul, some the body, and some are external. Goods concerning the soul include natural aptitude, art, virtue, wisdom, practical wisdom, and pleasure.621 Those concerning the body include health, keenness of sensation, beauty, strength, integrity, and all its parts together with their faculties and activities. External goods include wealth, reputation, noble birth, political power, friends, relatives, and one’s homeland.622
Nature Cultivation and Full Development
II.7.19.9 · Wachsmuth pp. 136
Of goods concerning the soul, some are always present by nature, such as sharpness, memory, and natural aptitude as a whole. Others arise from cultivation, such as preliminary studies and liberal ways of life.623 Others result from full development, such as practical wisdom, justice, and, last, wisdom.624
Acquisition and Loss
II.7.19.10 · Wachsmuth pp. 136-137
Again, some goods can both be acquired and lost, such as wealth. Some can be acquired but not lost, such as stoutheartedness and freedom from astonishment.625 Some can be lost but not acquired, such as sensation and living; some can neither be acquired nor lost, such as noble birth.626