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Book II Chapter 7

The Chorus of Virtues

With matters standing thus, beneficence, favor, gratitude, love of humanity, love of children, and brotherly love will be established; and besides these, love of country, love of one’s father, and love of one’s kin; and, as is fitting, good sociability, goodwill, friendship, equality, justice, and the whole divine chorus of virtues.⁵⁶⁰ Those who neglect this chorus clearly err in their choices of goods and avoidance of evils, and in acquiring and using goods. They admittedly go astray in choice because of their judgment, in acquisition because of their character, and in use because of their ignorance.⁵⁶¹

Errors in Choice and Acquisition

They err in choice, then, when they choose what is not good at all, or choose the lesser good more vehemently than they should. This happens to most people: they prefer the pleasant to the beneficial, and the beneficial to the noble, and go beyond measure in their impulses. They err in acquisition when they have not first determined from what sources, in what manner, or to what extent they should procure these goods.⁵⁶²

Use and the Guidance of Virtue

As for use, every use has reference either to itself or to another. In its relation to itself, they err when they do not deal with things proportionately; in its relation to another, when they do not preserve the due worth of what is fitting.⁵⁶³ If the base err in these matters, the virtuous invariably act rightly in the opposite ways, having virtue as the guide of their actions.⁵⁶⁴

Judgment Choice and Action

At any rate, judging, choosing deliberately, and acting seem to be common to all the virtues. For virtue is neither without judgment, nor without deliberate choice, nor without action. Practical wisdom takes the lead, as though governing both the matters under itself and those under the other virtues: what is to be chosen or avoided, done or not done, and what is more or less so. Each of the other virtues marks off only the matters in its own sphere.⁵⁶⁵

Virtue and the Best Disposition

Virtue is the name given to the best disposition, or to that by which its possessor is in the best condition.⁵⁶⁶ This is clear from induction: a shoemaker’s excellence is said to be that by which he can produce the best shoe, and a builder’s that by which he is best disposed to build a fine house. That disposing something in the best way belongs to excellence is agreed.⁵⁶⁷

Reason Passion and Harmony

There are, as it were, two principles of the virtues: reason and passion. At times these agree with one another in concord, and at times they disagree in rebellion. Their opposition arises through pleasures and pains. Accordingly, reason’s victory bears the name self-control, a name derived from mastery; the victory of the nonrational part is called lack of control, because of the disobedience of impulse.⁵⁶⁸ But the harmony and concord of the two are virtue: reason leads toward what it should, and the other follows obediently.⁵⁶⁹

Choice Avoidance and the Good

What moves impulse toward itself is called choiceworthy; what moves impulse away from itself is to be avoided, when reason concurs.⁵⁷⁰ For, just as the object of wish takes its name from wish, so the choiceworthy takes its name from choice.⁵⁷¹ The ancients held the choiceworthy and the good to be the same. In outlining the good, at any rate, they defined it thus: “The good is what all things desire.”⁵⁷²

Noble and Necessary Goods

Of goods, they said that some are choiceworthy for our sake, and others for the sake of those around us. Of those that are for our sake, some are noble and others necessary.⁵⁷³ Noble are the virtues and the activities proceeding from them: practical wisdom and exercising practical wisdom, justice and acting justly, and likewise for the rest.⁵⁷⁴ Necessary are living and the things that contribute to it and serve a productive role: the body, its parts and their uses, and, among the things called external, noble birth, wealth, reputation, peace, freedom, and friendship. For each of these contributes something toward the exercise of virtue.⁵⁷⁵

560.Χάρις and εὐχαριστία are distinguished as favor and gratitude. The printed neuter expressions φιλόπατρι, φιλόπατορ, and φιλοίκεον name attachment to country, father, and kin or one’s own people. They are Wachsmuth’s corrections of the transmitted forms; the Greek retains his unusual φιλόπατορ rather than silently normalizing it. Εὐκοινωνησία is a good disposition for shared life. The “divine chorus” is the source’s image for the virtues together.

561.The three kinds of failure are distinguished by their causes: κρίσις, judgment; τρόπος, character or way of behaving; and ἀμαθία, ignorance. The next sentences specify what these failures consist in. Κτῆσις is acquiring or procuring goods, while χρῆσις concerns using them; neither is reduced to choosing them.

562.The first error concerns a false judgment of goodness; the second concerns excessive pursuit of a lesser good. The two preferences are kept in order: pleasant over beneficial, beneficial over noble. Προεκφοίτωντας describes going beyond bounds, with ταῖς ὁρμαῖς specifying their impulses. The acquisition clause separately asks about source, manner, and extent. The source’s elliptical construction carries “they err” forward from choice to acquisition.

563.The Greek construction is compressed. Wachsmuth prints feminine αὐτήν and ἑαυτήν, following Heeren’s corrections of masculine manuscript forms; the English accordingly retains the reference of use to itself, rather than silently substituting “oneself.” The supplied article τῇ is expressed through the grammatical phrase “in its relation.” The clause τὸ κατ’ ἀξίαν … τοῦ πρέποντος combines due worth with what is fitting; “the due worth of what is fitting” keeps that relation visible without supplying an unexpressed beneficiary.

564.Κατορθοῦσιν is acting rightly or succeeding in right action, opposed to the preceding errors. The statement gives virtue the role of guiding action; it does not merely credit the virtuous with possessing goods. The different errors in choice, acquisition, and use provide the opposites in which the virtuous are said to act rightly.

565.Προαιρεῖσθαι is deliberate choice, distinguished here from judging and acting; the supplied τὸ makes the final infinitive parallel to the others and needs no independent English word. Φρόνησις, practical wisdom, leads across the spheres of the other virtues as well as its own. The compressed “more and less” is taken to qualify the preceding distinctions, without adding a new list of objects. The other virtues each delimit their particular sphere. This completes source section II.7.14; II.7.15 next defines virtue.

566.The rejected heading reads “On virtue.” Wachsmuth brackets it as one of the later summary headings discussed in the note to II.7.14.1. It remains in the Greek and is translated here rather than incorporated into the English main text. Διάθεσις is disposition or condition, as elsewhere in the edition. The alternative formulation introduced by ἢ, “or,” is retained.

567.Ἀρετή is the common Greek term rendered “virtue” in the ethical definition and “excellence” in the examples of crafts. The shoemaker and builder illustrate being well disposed for a particular function. Ἐπαγωγή is induction, the move through such examples toward the general account. The final active διατιθέναι concerns disposing something well; it is not silently replaced by the passive διάκεισθαι of the opening. Wachsmuth compares Eudemian Ethics II.1, 1218b37–1219a2, and Nicomachean Ethics II.5, 1106a14–24.

568.The source connects ἐγκράτεια, self-control, with κράτος, mastery or power. Its opposite here is ἀκρασία, lack of control, when the nonrational element prevails. The printed ὁμονοητικῶς and στασιαστικῶς give concord and rebellion as contrasting images. “As it were” preserves the qualification on calling reason and passion principles of the virtues.

569.Virtue is identified with harmony between reason and passion, whereas self-control describes reason’s victory in a conflict. The leading and obediently following roles remain distinct within the harmony. Πάθος is passion or feeling in this account. Here ἐγκράτεια has the same English rendering as σωφροσύνη in some earlier passages, but it is a different Greek term with the specific definition just given. Compare the earlier Stoic definition of ἐγκράτεια at II.7.5b2.4; the anthology preserves the schools’ different accounts.

570.The rejected heading reads “On things to be chosen and avoided.” It receives the same treatment as the heading of section 15. The second definition understands “moves impulse” from the first. Reason’s concurrence, σύμψηφος, is an explicit qualification; the definition does not merely equate any attraction or aversion with a sound choice.

571.The Greek pairs βουλητόν with βούλησις, the object of wish with wish, and αἱρετόν with αἵρεσις, the choiceworthy with choice. The English retains both pairs, although it cannot reproduce their grammatical forms exactly. Αἵρεσις here means choice, rather than the philosophical school named by the same word at II.7.14.4.

572.“The ancients” is the source’s attribution; no individual author is named here. Wachsmuth compares Nicomachean Ethics I.1, 1094a3, where this definition is already cited as traditional. Πάντα is retained as “all things”; it is not narrowed to rational beings. Compare the earlier definitions of good in II.7.3a.1.

573.The source announces goods chosen for our sake and for the sake of those around us, then subdivides only the former. Wachsmuth records a conjecture that a fuller account of the latter category has fallen out, but observes that even the former category is only subdivided, not fully described; he thinks such omissions are better attributed to Stobaeus than to the copyists. No conjectured paragraph is inserted into the Greek or English.

574.The paired examples distinguish a virtue from its exercise: φρόνησις and φρονεῖν, practical wisdom and exercising it; δικαιοσύνη and δικαιοπραγεῖν, justice and acting justly. Καλός is noble in this ethical classification. The same word described a fine house in the preceding craft example.

575.“Necessary” retains ἀναγκαῖα, while the explanation assigns these goods a productive or contributory role in the exercise of virtue. The body, its parts, and their uses remain separate, as do all six external items. Εὐγένεια concerns noble birth and δόξα reputation here. The printed καὶ τὰς χρήσεις αὐτῶν follows Wachsmuth’s repair of the transmitted wording; no additional adjective describing the uses is inserted.