Diotimos Reading Desk

Tap the page, move to the top or bottom edge, swipe down, or press Tab to reveal reading controls. Use the arrow keys or swipe sideways to turn pages.

← ExitStobaeus, Volume II

Reading language

Book II Chapter 7

Health and Strength of Soul

One could also infer this from the ground already covered. For if bodily health is choiceworthy for its own sake, health of the soul is so by far the more. ⟨Health of the soul is⟩ self-control, which releases us from the violence of the passions.⁵⁴⁵ And if bodily strength is among the goods, strength of soul would be far more choiceworthy for its own sake and good. Strength of soul is courage and endurance, making souls robust. Hence courage and endurance too would be choiceworthy for their own sakes.⁵⁴⁶

Beauty of Soul and Justice

By analogy, if bodily beauty is choiceworthy for its own sake, beauty of soul would also be choiceworthy for its own sake. Beauty of soul is justice, for

Doing no injustice makes us beautiful as well.⁵⁴⁷

Analogies among the Three Kinds of Goods

A similar account applies to the virtues too.⁵⁴⁸ For the three kinds of goods, despite their very great differences from one another, nevertheless seem to bear some analogy in respect of their account, which I shall now try to make clear.⁵⁴⁹

Goods of Body Soul and External Life

What we call health in the body is called self-control in the soul, and wealth among external goods; for wealth too checks most errors.⁵⁵⁰

What we call strength in the body is courage in the soul, and rule among external goods; what we call keenness of the senses in the body is practical wisdom in the soul, and good fortune among external goods; what we call beauty in the body is justice in the soul, and friendship among external goods.⁵⁵¹

The Higher Worth of Goods of the Soul

Hence there are three kinds of goods choiceworthy for their own sakes: those concerning the soul, those concerning the body, and external goods. Goods of the soul are far more choiceworthy than the others, since soul is both more governing and more choiceworthy than body.⁵⁵²

Virtue Community and Contemplation

It is clear, then, that the virtues of the soul are more choiceworthy than bodily excellences and external goods, alike having the advantage. ⟨But⟩ they also aim at the other goods, first as choiceworthy for their own sakes, and then as useful for political and social life, and indeed for the contemplative life too.⁵⁵³ For life is measured by political, social, and contemplative actions. According to this school, virtue is not self-loving, but social and political. Since we said that virtue has the greatest affinity of all with itself, it is clear that it necessarily also has a natural affinity with knowledge of truth.⁵⁵⁴

Remaining in Life and Departing from It

In accordance with this, remaining in life too is measured by social, political, and contemplative actions, and departures by the opposites. Thus it is wrong to regard departure from life as reasonable for the wise and remaining in life as reasonable for the base.⁵⁵⁵ For, among both the virtuous and the base, remaining in life is reasonable for those able to carry out social, political, and contemplative actions; for those unable to do so, release from life is reasonable.⁵⁵⁶

The End and the Other Goods

Since virtue greatly surpasses bodily and external goods both in productive power and in being choiceworthy for its own sake, according to this account the end is not an aggregate of bodily and external goods, nor the attainment of them all. It is rather living according to virtue amid bodily and external goods, either all of them or most and the most important.⁵⁵⁷

Happiness as Activity

Hence happiness is activity according to virtue in actions furnished as one would wish.⁵⁵⁸ Bodily and external goods are called productive of happiness because their presence contributes something to it. But those who think that these goods constitute happiness fail to understand that happiness is a life, and life is constituted by action. None of the bodily or external goods is itself either an action or, at all, an activity.⁵⁵⁹

545.Wachsmuth supplies ὑγίεια δὲ ψυχῆς, “health of the soul,” completing the equation with self-control; the English equivalent is bracketed, with “is” supplied by English grammar. Σωφροσύνη retains “self-control,” as elsewhere in the edition. The qualification concerns release from the σφοδρότης, violence or vehemence, of the passions, rather than an express assertion that all feeling is abolished.

546.Ἀνδρεία and καρτερία are courage and endurance. The comparison treats them as strength of soul and expressly calls them choiceworthy for their own sakes. The singular participle κατασκευάζουσα follows the combined expression for courage and endurance as strength. Wachsmuth compares this paragraph with the further analogies on printed p. 125.

547.The source quotes a line attributed to Menander, from an unidentified play: fragmenta fabularum incertarum 34, in the older collection cited as Comici IV, p. 244. Its argument turns from bodily to moral beauty. Wachsmuth brackets no omission here and does not supply an additional prose conclusion; his apparatus records a suggestion that a statement about justice’s intrinsic worth may have dropped out. The translation follows the printed text and adds no conjectured sentence. This completes section II.7.13; section II.7.14 continues the Peripatetic account with analogies among bodily, psychic, and external goods.

548.The square-bracketed heading reads: “That the three kinds of goods, those concerning body, those concerning soul, and external goods, bear an analogy to one another, although they differ.” Wachsmuth judges the headings throughout this Peripatetic exposition to be later additions: brief marginal summaries devised by a scribe, referring to nearby sentences rather than surveying the whole argument. His rejected heading remains visible in the Greek and is translated here instead of being incorporated into the English main text. The paired labels and final numbered subdivisions in this edition serve the layout.

549.Πρὸς τὸν λόγον, rendered “in respect of their account,” is difficult. Wachsmuth retains the manuscript wording, while recording Spengel’s deletion and Usener’s tentative πρὸς τὸ ὅλον, “in relation to the whole.” Neither proposal is silently adopted. The first-person promise “I shall now try” belongs to the speaker of the epitome; the English preserves that change of voice.

550.The correspondence is analogical, rather than an assertion that the three goods are identical. Τοῦτον refers to wealth: the text claims that wealth too restrains most errors. It does not say that wealth prevents every error or necessarily makes its possessor virtuous. The comparison with self-control recalls II.7.13.23.

551.Ἀρχή is rule or authority, and εὐτυχία good fortune. Εὐαισθησία retains “keenness of the senses,” distinguished from practical wisdom, φρόνησις. All four triples are preserved. Supplied articles before body or soul are expressed through ordinary English grammar; the three rejected instances of τὴν remain bracketed in Greek and have no separate English equivalent.

552.The claim of intrinsic worth applies to all three kinds; the higher ranking of psychic goods does not withdraw it from bodily or external goods. “More governing” preserves the comparative ἡγεμονικώτερον. The supplied article τὴν before soul is represented by the English article. The source’s sentence continues the preceding analogies.

553.The printed ὁμοίως, “alike,” is uncertain: Wachsmuth regards it as scarcely sound and records possible replacements, none adopted here. The subject of “aim at” is the virtues of the soul. Their concern for the other goods includes both those goods’ intrinsic worth and their usefulness. The supplied δὲ is represented by the bracketed connective. Θεωρητικός concerns contemplation, retained as a distinct activity alongside political and social action.

554.Αἵρεσις here names the philosophical school or position being reported. Φίλαυτος is literally self-loving; the following contrast concerns virtue’s social and political character. The next clause nevertheless retains virtue’s affinity with itself, recalling II.7.13.22, printed p. 123, lines 23–26. The editor’s cross-reference is transferred to this note. Wachsmuth follows Usener in moving the final sentence here from its manuscript position after “the opposites” on printed p. 126, line 5. The final αὐτῇ continues the reference to virtue; the English takes the claim to be its natural affinity with knowledge of truth.

555.Κακῶς, “wrongly,” is Wachsmuth’s correction of the transmitted καί, “and.” It makes the sentence reject the contrast that follows, rather than endorse it. His apparatus identifies the contrast as Stoic doctrine and refers back to printed p. 110, lines 9–15. The English follows the text he prints.

556.The Peripatetic account measures remaining or departing by the capacity for the listed activities, applying that measure to both moral classes. Μονή is remaining or staying; ἄφοδος, ἐξαγωγή, and ἀπαλλαγή give different expressions for departure or release from life. This paragraph reports the ancient school’s ethical criterion and its disagreement with the preceding Stoic account.

557.Τέλος is the end or ultimate aim. Συμπλήρωμα describes a composite or aggregate; the next paragraph explains why goods that contribute to happiness do not themselves constitute its activity. The alternatives “all” and “most and the most important” remain explicit. The printed κατὰ τὸν λόγον is retained as “according to this account”; Wachsmuth records uncertainty about the article and a proposed τὸν αὐτόν, “the same,” which is not inserted.

558.Χορηγουμέναις concerns being furnished with provision or support. “As one would wish” renders κατ’ εὐχήν. Wachsmuth prints χορηγουμέναις as his correction of προηγουμέναις, comparing printed p. 50, line 12. The English follows that printed correction and does not turn the sentence into an assertion that happiness consists merely in receiving whatever one desires.

559.Ποιητικά means productive or causally contributory. The distinction is between the contribution these goods make when present and the action or activity that constitutes the happy life. Πρᾶξις and ἐνέργεια remain distinct as “action” and “activity.” The source’s “or” between bodily and external goods is retained; the final sentence denies that an item in either class is itself an activity.