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← ExitStobaeus, Volume II

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Book II Chapter 7

Helping Others

For all who save others are disposed toward their neighbors in such a way that they do most things not according to worth, but on the basis of what is choiceworthy for its own sake.⁵³² Who, seeing a human being overpowered by a wild beast, would not rescue him if he could? Who would not show the way to someone lost? Who ⟨would⟩ not assist someone perishing from want? Who, coming upon a spring in a waterless desert, would not mark it with signs for those traveling the same road?⁵³³

Sayings Contrary to Human Nature

Who does not care greatly for a good name after his life is over? Who does not loathe such sayings as these, as contrary to human nature:

When I am dead, let earth be mingled with fire. Nothing concerns me, for my own affairs are well.⁵³⁴

Natural Goodwill and Affection

It is clear, then, that we have natural goodwill and affection toward all, showing what is choiceworthy for its own sake and what accords with reason:

For one is the race of men, one the race of gods; from one mother we both draw breath,

namely, nature.⁵³⁵

Friendship Praise and Good Reputation

Since we have a shared love of humanity, it is far clearer that familiar friends are choiceworthy for their own sakes. If the friend is choiceworthy for his own sake, so too are friendship, goodwill, the goodwill of all who share our life, and ⟨that⟩ of most people. Hence praise too is choiceworthy for its own sake, for we feel an affinity with those who praise us.⁵³⁶ If praise is choiceworthy for its own sake, so is good reputation. For in the outline we have accepted good reputation as nothing other than praise from the many.⁵³⁷

External Goods and What Is within Us

Thus it has been clearly shown in this way that the goods arising from outside are naturally choiceworthy for their own sakes. How much more, then, must this be true of what pertains to us and is within us? I mean what concerns body and soul.⁵³⁸

Body Soul and the Human Being

For if the human being is choiceworthy for his own sake, the parts of the human being would also be choiceworthy for their own sakes. In the broadest division, the parts of a human being are body and soul. Hence the body too would be choiceworthy for its own sake. For how could another person’s body be choiceworthy to us for its own sake, while our own was no longer so? Or how could another human being be choiceworthy for his own sake, while each of us was not also choiceworthy to himself for his own sake?⁵³⁹

The Excellences of the Body

Or how could this be so, while the parts of the body, the excellences of its parts, and the excellences of the whole body were not also choiceworthy? Hence health, strength, beauty, speed of foot, good bodily condition, and keenness of the senses are choiceworthy to us for their own sakes: in general, virtually all ⟨the bodily excellences⟩.⁵⁴⁰

Beauty and Ugliness

For, generally, no one thinking soundly would accept being ugly and disfigured in appearance, even if no difficulty of use whatever were going to follow from such unsightliness. Thus it seems reasonable to avoid ugliness even apart from difficulty of use.⁵⁴¹ If ugliness is to be avoided for its own sake, beauty too is choiceworthy not only for its usefulness but also for its own sake. For it is evident that beauty has ⟨something⟩ intrinsically attractive. Everyone, at any rate, naturally feels an affinity with beautiful people apart from any usefulness, and is readily disposed to treat them well and confer benefits on them. Hence beauty also seems productive of goodwill. On this account too, beauty belongs among things choiceworthy for their own sakes, and ugliness among things to be avoided for their own sakes.⁵⁴²

Goods of Body and Soul

The same account applies to health and disease, strength and weakness, speed of foot and slowness, sensation and impairment. Hence, if bodily goods too have been shown choiceworthy for their own sakes, and their contrary evils to be avoided for their own sakes, the parts of the soul must also be choiceworthy for their own sakes, along with their virtues and ⟨those⟩ of the soul as a whole.⁵⁴³

Virtue Turning toward Itself

For virtue, having taken its point of entry from bodily and external goods, as we indicated, turned toward itself. Seeing that it too accords with nature, far more than the excellences of the body, it came to feel an affinity with itself as choiceworthy for its own sake, and indeed a greater affinity with itself than with bodily excellences. Hence ⟨the⟩ virtues of the soul are far more worthy of honor.⁵⁴⁴

532.Σῴζοντας is taken transitively as “who save others,” with the following examples specifying rescue and help. Πρὸς ἀξίαν is rendered “according to worth,” understood here as assessment of the recipient’s worth or desert. The precise force of the contrast is compressed. Wachsmuth prints this correction of the transmitted τὰς πράξεις, “the actions,” and records other proposals; the printed wording is retained.

533.The questions appeal to ordinary acts of assistance. The condition “if he could” is explicit in the first example, and the signs make a discovered water source known to later travelers. Wachsmuth supplies ἄν in the third question, expressed by the bracketed “would.” The argument concerns help valued beyond expected usefulness to the helper; it does not require prior personal friendship with the person helped.

534.The two verse quotations are printed as anonymous tragic fragments, Nauck, fragmenta tragica adespota 430.1–2; their author and dramatic setting are not supplied here. They are examples rejected by the argument, not maxims endorsed by the epitome’s speaker. The preceding concern for posthumous good report continues the appeal to interests extending beyond one’s present advantage. The source’s references are transferred to this note rather than inserted into the verse.

535.The quotation is from Pindar, Nemean VI.1–2. The final “namely, nature” belongs to the epitome’s prose explanation of the mother, not to Pindar’s quoted verse. The wording “one … one” is retained without changing it to “the same race.” The argument uses the common mother to support natural goodwill; its immediate conclusion concerns affection toward all human beings. The next paragraph resumes with the clearer intrinsic worth of familiar friends; II.7.13 continues.

536.The argument moves from the common love of humanity, φιλανθρωπία, to familiar friends, then to friendship, goodwill, praise, and good reputation. The repeated article after εὔνοια is understood as continuing goodwill received from others; the supplied ἡ before “from most people” is expressed by the bracketed “that.” Οἰκειοῦσθαι again expresses affinity or attachment. The English preserves “most people” and “the many” as distinct expressions.

537.Εὐδοξία is good reputation or being well spoken of. The speaker refers to a definition already accepted “in the outline.” Wachsmuth notes that Stobaeus has not reproduced the earlier place in Didymus where this was stated. The reference therefore points back within the epitomist’s fuller discussion; it does not mean that a preceding portion of this English installment has been accidentally omitted.

538.The opening construction τὰ γινόμενα τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἔξωθεν is compressed. The English takes it as the goods arising from outside, referring back to friendship, goodwill, praise, and reputation. Wachsmuth records uncertainty about the placement of τῶν ἀγαθῶν. The following body and soul clause identifies the subjects of the next comparison; the argument now moves from external goods to goods of the person.

539.The questions extend the value acknowledged in another person to oneself and to body and soul. “In the broadest division” renders ὁλοσχερέστατα: the passage has not yet begun an anatomical enumeration. The repeated “for his own sake” or “for its own sake” preserves the argument’s claim of intrinsic worth, rather than substituting usefulness or pleasure.

540.Ἀρεταί here names the excellences of the body and its parts, while the subsequent discussion uses the same word for virtues of the soul. The list retains speed of foot, ποδώκεια, and distinguishes good condition, εὐεξία, from keenness of sensation, εὐαισθησία. The qualifying ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν is rendered “virtually.” Wachsmuth supplies the concluding τὰς σωματικὰς ἀρετάς; the English equivalent remains bracketed.

541.The argument expressly separates appearance from δυσχρηστία, difficulty or disadvantage in use. It asks whether the former would still be rejected if the latter did not follow. Εἰδέχθεια is unsightliness, and λελωβημένος describes being marred or disfigured. These are the physical descriptions used by the ancient argument; the passage is discussing bodily beauty, before turning to beauty of soul.

542.Προσκλητικόν describes an attractive or inviting quality; “something” renders the supplied τι. The appeal to others’ goodwill adds a social consequence to the preceding claim about beauty itself. The generalization about everyone’s response belongs to the epitome’s argument. Καλοῖς here refers to beautiful people in the bodily context, rather than silently changing its meaning to morally good people.

543.The opposed pairs carry the preceding argument into other bodily qualities. The source’s αἴσθησις and πήρωσις pair sensation with impairment; it does not specify a particular sense or injury. The inference then extends to the parts of the soul, their virtues, and the virtues of the whole soul. “Those” expresses the supplied article τὰς with its repeated noun understood. Wachsmuth records proposals to insert an additional pair for bodily good and bad condition; no such pair is added to the printed text.

544.Virtue is personified as entering through concern for bodily and external goods, then recognizing its own naturalness and worth. The earlier indication points to the account beginning on printed p. 118, represented here by II.7.13.5–9; the editor’s page reference is transferred to this note. The English takes the compressed τῶν κατὰ φύσιν as classing virtue among things in accordance with nature, to a greater degree than bodily excellences. The comparative valuation remains explicit. Wachsmuth supplies the final article τὰς, expressed by the bracketed “the.”