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Book II Chapter 7

Divisions of the Soul

One part of the soul is rational and the other nonrational: the rational is the faculty of judgment, the nonrational the faculty of impulse. Of the rational part, what contemplates eternal and divine things is called scientific; what acts concerning human and ⟨perishable⟩ things is called deliberative.⁵¹⁸ Of the nonrational part, what desires things within our power is called appetitive; what acts toward others as a sort of defensive faculty is called spirited.⁵¹⁹

Moral Virtue and Choice

Thus the form of the virtues too is twofold, one rational and the other nonrational, since contemplation and action naturally fall along these divisions. Hence moral virtue is not knowledge, but a ⟨state⟩ disposed to choose noble things.⁵²⁰

Nature Habit and Reason

Virtue comes to perfection through three things: nature, habit, and reason.⁵²¹ For the human being differs from the other creatures in both body and soul. Standing between immortals and mortals, he is linked in fellowship to both: to rational beings through what is divine in his soul, and to nonrational beings through what is mortal in his body. He therefore aims, in due proportion, at perfection in both.⁵²²

Affinity with Oneself and Natural Goods

First he desires to exist, for by nature he has an affinity with himself. Hence he fittingly welcomes things in accordance with nature and is distressed by things contrary to nature.⁵²³ He strives to secure health, has a longing for pleasure, and lays claim to life, because these are in accordance with nature and choiceworthy ⟨for⟩ their own sakes and good. Conversely, he wards off and avoids disease, pain, and destruction because they are contrary to nature, to be avoided for their own sakes, and bad.⁵²⁴

What Is Dear and Unerring Selection

Our body is dear to us, and so is our soul; their parts, capacities, and activities are dear as well. ⟨Through⟩ these, in our concern for preservation, arise the beginnings of impulse, appropriate action, and virtue. For if no error whatever occurred in choosing and avoiding the things just mentioned, and we continually possessed the goods and were free of the bad things, we would never have sought correct and unerring selection among them.⁵²⁵

Judgment and Virtue

But since ignorance often deceived us in choosing and avoiding, and we passed over good things while encountering bad things as though they were good, we necessarily sought secure knowledge for making judgments. Finding this knowledge consonant with nature, we called it virtue because of the grandeur of its activity; and, marveling at it exceedingly, we honored it above everything else.⁵²⁶

Selection and Appropriate Actions

Actions and what are called appropriate actions have their beginnings in the selection of things in accordance with nature and the rejection of things contrary to nature. Hence successful actions and errors occur among and concern these things. For almost the whole outline of the school takes its starting point from them, as I shall show very briefly.⁵²⁷

Children Valued for Their Own Sakes

That children are choiceworthy to their parents not only for their usefulness but also for their own sakes is known from plain experience. No one, surely, is so cruel and beastlike by nature that he would not care that, after his own death, his children should be happy and continue to live well, rather than the contrary.⁵²⁸ From this parental affection, those about to die make wills and care even for children still in the womb. They leave guardians and protectors, entrust the children to their dearest friends, and ask them to give assistance. Some, indeed, die along with their children when the children die.⁵²⁹

Kinship and Affection

Since children are thus loved as choiceworthy ⟨for⟩ their own sakes, parents, brothers, the partnership of the marriage bed, relatives, other members of one’s circle, and fellow citizens must also receive affection for their own sakes. For by nature we have certain affinities with them too: the human being is a creature that loves others and lives in community.⁵³⁰

Affection toward All Human Beings

If some affections are more distant and others closer to us, that makes no difference to the argument: every affection is choiceworthy for its own sake, and not only for its usefulness. If affection toward fellow citizens is choiceworthy for its own sake, affection toward those of the same nation and the same stock must be so too, and consequently affection toward all human beings.⁵³¹

518.The distinction within the rational part concerns contemplation of the eternal and divine, and practical deliberation about human and perishable things. “Perishable” renders the supplied φθαρτά. Compare Nicomachean Ethics VI.1, 1139a6–15, where the scientific and calculative parts are distinguished by their objects. “Scientific” here describes a kind of knowledge, not the methods of modern experimental science.

519.The source divides the nonrational part into appetitive and spirited functions. The qualifying οἷον, “a sort of,” remains in the description of defense, and τῶν ἐφ’ ἡμῖν remains “things within our power.” Wachsmuth notes that this division is Platonic and that ὁρμητικόν, “faculty of impulse,” is not Aristotle’s own terminology. The heading’s reference to the Peripatetics therefore does not warrant replacing these words with a different Aristotelian scheme.

520.The source prints λογικόν and ἄλογον, “rational” and “nonrational,” qualifying the twofold form of virtue. Wachsmuth expressly warns against changing them to genitives meaning virtues “of the rational” and “of the nonrational.” The connection of this distinction with contemplation and action is compressed; the English preserves it rather than silently reconstructing it. Wachsmuth supplies ἕξιν, “state.” The definition of moral virtue through choice differs from the preceding Stoic definitions of virtues as kinds of knowledge; compare Nicomachean Ethics II.6, 1106b36–1107a2.

521.The opening names three contributions to perfected virtue, rather than attributing it to nature alone. Wachsmuth compares Magna Moralia I.35, 1197b38 onward, and the earlier account in this chapter at printed p. 51. Nature, habit, and reason are retained as separate terms.

522.The English takes ἀμφοῖν as referring to body and soul, the two respects in which the human being has just been described, and κατὰ λόγον as “in due proportion.” The Greek also uses paired expressions for immortals and mortals and for rational and nonrational beings. The sentence presents human affinity with both sides; it does not identify the mortal body with immortality or supply a doctrine of the soul’s fate after death.

523.ᾨκειῶσθαι expresses being made akin or attached to oneself, the relation discussed as οἰκείωσις, affinity or appropriation. Wachsmuth notes the Stoic vocabulary and compares Diogenes Laertius VII.85 and Cicero, On Ends III.16 and V.21. Its appearance in this Peripatetic account is retained. The welcome and distress are expressly tied to what accords with or opposes nature.

524.The passage calls health, pleasure, and life good and choiceworthy for their own sakes, and the contrary things bad. This differs from the earlier Stoic classification of such things as indifferent; the translation preserves the difference. Wachsmuth supplies δι’ in the first “for their own sakes”; its English equivalent is bracketed. The terms for destruction and avoidance do not specify a particular medical or practical course of action.

525.The sentence moves from affection for body and soul to concern for their preservation, then to impulse, appropriate action, and virtue. “Through” renders the supplied δι’. The hypothetical freedom from error is a condition contrary to the failures described next, not an assertion that human beings already choose without error. Ἐκλογή is selection among the things in question; it is kept distinct from the preceding αἱρέσεις, choices.

526.The relative ἣν refers back to εἴδησιν, the knowledge sought for judgment, as Wachsmuth notes. The passage calls this knowledge virtue, although the earlier definition of moral virtue denies that it is ἐπιστήμη and calls it a state involving choice. The two formulations are preserved rather than made identical by changing the Greek. “Exceedingly” renders the emphatic δαιμονίως, without introducing a separate divine agent.

527.Ἀπεκλογή is rejection, paired with selection. Καθήκοντα, κατορθώσεις, and ἁμαρτίαι retain the vocabulary of appropriate actions, successful actions, and errors that also appeared in the Stoic account. Wachsmuth calls attention to that overlap. Αἵρεσις in “the school” means the philosophical school or position, rather than an individual act of choosing. The first-person promise belongs to the epitome’s speaker.

528.The argument contrasts usefulness to parents with the children’s own worth, using concern for their future after the parent’s death as evidence. Wachsmuth’s printed ἔτι διάγειν is rendered “continue to live”; his apparatus identifies it as his correction of the transmitted ἐπανάγειν and records Meineke’s alternative ἐπιδιάγειν. The English follows the printed correction.

529.Φιλοστοργία is affectionate attachment, here parental affection. The subjects of making wills and leaving guardians are the parents approaching death; the final clause instead concerns some parents dying when their children die. The passage reports that extremity of affection as evidence. It does not state a cause or method of death, and the translation supplies none. Wachsmuth compares Cicero, On Ends III.65 for the concern extending beyond the parent’s life.

530.The sequence extends beyond children without reducing the other relationships to their usefulness. “Partnership of the marriage bed” retains τοῦ λέχους κοινωνίαν, the shared marital relation; “members of one’s circle” renders οἰκείους, those belonging or close to one. Φιλάλληλον means disposed to love one another, and κοινωνικόν disposed to community. Wachsmuth supplies δι’ in the opening formula, expressed by the bracketed “for.”

531.Φιλία ranges here over affectionate relationships, not only intimate friendship. The difference in closeness is admitted while the intrinsic worth of each relation is asserted. The argument proceeds from fellow citizens through shared nation and stock to all human beings; the final extension remains explicit. The supplied article τὰς has no independent English equivalent here; the phrase about usefulness is rendered idiomatically. Wachsmuth’s apparatus records substantial corrections in the preceding conditional sentence; the English follows the printed text.