Diotimos Reading Desk

Tap the page, move to the top or bottom edge, swipe down, or press Tab to reveal reading controls. Use the arrow keys or swipe sideways to turn pages.

← ExitStobaeus, Volume II

Reading language

Book II Chapter 7

Opinion and Precipitate Assent

He believes nothing weakly, but rather securely and firmly; hence the wise person does not hold opinions. For there are two kinds of opinion: assent to something not apprehensible, and weak belief. ⟨But⟩ these are alien to the wise person’s disposition.⁴⁸⁸ Hence rushing ahead before apprehension ⟨and⟩ assenting in the manner of a precipitate person is base, and does not befall the well endowed, complete, and virtuous man.⁴⁸⁹

Unawareness Conviction and Knowledge

Nor does anything escape his notice; for unawareness is a belief in something false that makes an assertion about a matter.⁴⁹⁰ In keeping with this, he does not lack conviction, for lack of conviction is belief in something false. Conviction is a thing of moral excellence, for it is a strong apprehension that confirms what is believed. Likewise knowledge cannot be overturned by argument. For these reasons, they say, the base person neither knows anything nor has conviction.⁴⁹¹

Deception and Miscounting

Following from these points, the wise person is neither cheated, nor led astray, nor taken in; he neither miscounts nor is cheated in counting by someone else.⁴⁹² For all these involve deception and acceptance of the falsehoods belonging to the subject in question.⁴⁹³

Sense Perception and False Assent

No morally excellent person misses a road, a house, or a target. They also think that the wise person neither sees nor hears amiss, nor errs at all in any of the senses, for they consider each of these failures to depend on false assents.⁴⁹⁴

Conjecture and Changing One’s Mind

They also say that the wise person does not conjecture, for conjecture too is, in its kind, assent to something not apprehensible. Nor do they suppose that the person of understanding changes his mind, for a change of mind too depends on false assent, ⟨as⟩ in someone who had previously gone wrong.⁴⁹⁵

Firmness of Beliefs

Nor does he change in any way, shift his position, or stumble; for all these belong to people who are unstable in their beliefs, a condition alien to the person of understanding. In keeping with what has been said, they also deny that anything merely seems true to him.⁴⁹⁶

Wisdom and the Interval before Its Recognition

They think that someone can become wise without realizing it, at first neither desiring anything nor believing himself to be wishing in one of the specific forms of wish, because, in his judgment, what is required is not present to him.⁴⁹⁷ Such intervals will occur not only in practical wisdom but also in the other arts.⁴⁹⁸

Equality and Difference among Errors

All errors are equal, and so are correct actions; all fools too are equally foolish, having the same and an equal disposition. Yet, although errors are equal, there are some differences among them, insofar as some arise from a hardened disposition that is difficult to cure, while others do not.⁴⁹⁹

Differences among the Virtuous

Some virtuous people are more effective at exhortation and persuasion than others, and also quicker witted, as intensifications occur in the intermediate qualities involved.⁵⁰⁰

Children Old Age and Dying Well

Only the morally excellent person is blessed in his children, though not simply by having children who are all excellent; for one who is blessed in his children must make use of them as such.⁵⁰¹ Only the virtuous person ages well and dies well. For aging well is passing through an old age of a certain quality in accordance with virtue; dying well is ending one’s life in accordance with virtue with a death of a certain quality.⁵⁰²

488.The distinction is between two defective forms of assent or belief, not between every everyday use of “opinion” and knowledge. The first concerns the object as not apprehensible, the second the weakness of the belief. The supplied δ’ remains “but.”

489.Προπίπτειν, rushing ahead, and προπετής, precipitate, link the action with the agent’s manner. Wachsmuth prints φαῦλον, “base,” in the predicate, and supplies καί before assenting. The English retains this supplement and the temporal qualification “before apprehension.”

490.The printed λῆσις, rendered “unawareness,” is linked to λανθάνειν, escaping notice. The definition is compressed: Wachsmuth prints ἀποφαντικήν, “assertive,” qualifying the belief, rather than a word meaning negative or denying. The English preserves this assertion about a matter without inventing an example of what escapes notice.

491.Πίστις here concerns firm conviction and is defined as strong apprehension; in the friendship paragraph its social context called for “trust.” Ἀπιστία is its contrary. The definitions govern the categorical claims about wise and base people. The source calls knowledge ἀμετάπτωτος ὑπὸ λόγου, unable to be overturned by argument, a qualification retained in English.

492.The printed διαιτᾶσθαι is difficult: its ordinary association is with arbitration, which does not fit the list readily. “Taken in” provisionally follows the context of deception; it is an interpretation, not a secure lexical equivalent. Wachsmuth records several conjectures, including Heeren’s διαπατᾶσθαι, “be thoroughly deceived,” and himself asks whether a word for being lured is intended. The printed Greek is retained. The final counting clauses distinguish making an error from being cheated by another.

493.Βουκολεῖσθαι literally evokes being herded and here means being led astray or duped. Πρόσθεσις, “acceptance,” is directed toward the relevant falsehoods; this explains why the list follows the denial of mistaken assent. The passage’s assertions concern the ideal wise person under these definitions.

494.The concrete list of road, house, and target remains intact. The explanation relates sensory failures to false assent; it has not been replaced by a modern theory of perception. Wachsmuth brackets ἀλλ’ before “hears amiss” and the suffix δε in τῶνδε for deletion. Both remain visible in Greek; the English omits the rejected connective and renders τῶν as “the,” without the demonstrative force of “these.”

495.Ὑπόνοια can mean conjecture or suspicion; here it is classified through its relation to assent and apprehension. Μετάνοια is a change of mind or repentance, explained by a prior error, rather than the earlier term μεταμέλεια, regret. The supplied ὡς remains bracketed. The source’s categorical denial is retained, together with its stated reason; it has not been rewritten as a general recommendation against reconsideration.

496.The sequence μεταβάλλεσθαι, μετατίθεσθαι, σφάλλεσθαι is kept distinct as changing, shifting position, and stumbling. Its explanation concerns instability in δόγματα, beliefs or doctrines. The final δοκεῖν αὐτῷ τι is literally “something seems to him”; “merely seems true” expresses its connection here with opinion and the preceding discussion of firm assent, rather than treating it as a denial of all appearances. This concludes the source’s II.7.11m; the numerical subdivisions in this edition serve layout only.

497.The printed wording after “without realizing it” is difficult. The English takes νομίζειν βουλόμενον as believing oneself to be wishing, and ἔν τινι τῶν … εἰδικῶν as referring to a specific form of wish. It takes κρίνοντι αὐτῷ as “in his judgment.” The syntax and the connection between these clauses are uncertain. Wachsmuth records proposals to delete νομίζειν or replace it with ἐπιποθεῖν, to alter the phrase about specific forms, and to change the wording about judgment and presence. None has been silently substituted for the printed Greek.

498.Διάληψις is an interval or break, here understood as the interval between acquiring wisdom and recognizing the acquisition. The extension to the other arts remains explicit. Wachsmuth compares Plutarch, On Stoic Self-Contradictions 19 and On Common Conceptions 9. In the latter, Plutarch criticizes the claim that someone can possess wisdom and happiness without yet recognizing the change. That parallel confirms the subject of the paradox without repairing this passage’s difficult wording.

499.Wachsmuth brackets the opening ἐκ for deletion; it remains visible in the Greek and is omitted in English. The passage again distinguishes equality of errors from differences among them, now through the hardened and difficult-to-cure disposition from which some arise. Compare II.7.11l for equality alongside qualitative differences. “So are correct actions” means that correct actions are equal to one another, not that errors and correct actions have equal moral value.

500.The comparative forms retain differences in exhortation, persuasion, and quickness of mind among the virtuous themselves. The compressed qualification places the intensifications in τὰ μέσα, intermediate things, here understood as the qualities involved. It does not say that one virtuous person possesses more virtue than another. The participle ἐμπεριλαμβανόμενα is rendered “involved”; the exact scope of what is included is not further specified in the source.

501.Εὐτεκνεῖν means being fortunate or blessed in one’s children. The clause οὔ τι μὴν … ἔχοντα is compressed. The English interprets it as denying that possession of excellent children is by itself sufficient, in light of the following requirement to use them as such; “simply” makes that interpretation explicit. The Greek has no separate word meaning “merely.” Χρήσασθαι is use or dealings with them; the source gives no further example of the conduct intended.

502.The repeated ποιοῦ, “of a certain quality,” qualifies both old age and death. Both definitions expressly require accordance with virtue. Εὐθανατεῖν means dying well here; the sentence does not specify a method of death. The three claims concern how a person lives with children, old age, and death under the ethical definitions being reported.