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Book II Chapter 7

His Own Physician

They also say that the virtuous man is his own best physician. For, being attentive to his own constitution, he observes it and knows what is beneficial for health.⁴⁷³

Intoxication and Error

It is not possible for the person of understanding to become drunk. For intoxication involves error, being rambling under the influence of wine; the virtuous person errs in nothing, and hence does everything according to virtue and the right reason that proceeds from it.⁴⁷⁴

Three Preferred Ways of Life

There are three preferred ways of life: the kingly, the political, and, third, the life of knowledge.⁴⁷⁵

Income and Social Life

Likewise there are three preferred means of acquiring money. One is from kingship, by which he will either be king himself or have access to royal funds. The second is from political life, for he will engage in politics according to the course preferred in the first instance.⁴⁷⁶ He will also marry and have children, ⟨for⟩ these follow from the ⟨nature⟩ of an animal that is rational, social, and affectionate toward its fellows. Thus he will acquire money both from political life and from friends who occupy positions of prominence.⁴⁷⁷

Payment and the Meaning of Sophistry

As to whether he will act as a sophist and obtain money from sophistry, members of the school differed over the meaning of the term. For they agreed that he will acquire money from educational activities and sometimes receive payment from those who love learning.⁴⁷⁸ But a dispute arose among them about the meaning: some called precisely this “acting as a sophist”—imparting the doctrines of philosophy for payment. Others suspected that acting as a sophist involved something base, as though one were peddling arguments. They said that one should not earn money by education from whoever happened to come along, for this way of acquiring money fell below the dignity of philosophy.⁴⁷⁹

Life and Death Judged by Appropriate Action

They say that departure from life too sometimes ⟨occurs⟩ appropriately for the virtuous in many ways; ⟨but⟩ for the base, remaining in life may be appropriate, even for those who are not going to become wise. For virtue does not keep one in life, nor does vice drive one out of it. Both life and death are measured by appropriate actions and by what is contrary to appropriate action.⁴⁸⁰

Outrage and Harm

They also say that the wise person is beyond outrage: he neither suffers nor commits it, because outrage is injustice that brings shame, and is harm. The virtuous person is neither wronged nor harmed—though some do treat him unjustly and outrageously—and in this too he acts justly.⁴⁸¹ Moreover, outrage is not just any injustice, but one that brings shame and is outrageous. The person of understanding is not subject to these things and is in no way put to shame. For he has the good and divine virtue within himself, and hence is free from every vice and harm.⁴⁸²

Kingship and Political Participation

The person ⟨possessed⟩ of understanding will sometimes be king and will live with a king who displays both aptitude and love of learning.⁴⁸³ We said that it is possible for him to engage in politics according to the course preferred in the first instance, but that he will not participate if something ⟨prevents him⟩, especially if he is going to do his country no good and considers that great and grievous dangers will follow from political participation.⁴⁸⁴

Falsehood and Lying

It is said that the wise person does not lie but speaks truth in everything. For lying consists not in saying something false, but in saying the falsehood while mistaken and with a view to deceiving one’s neighbors.⁴⁸⁵ Yet they think that he will sometimes employ falsehood in many ways without assenting to it: in military command ⟨against⟩ his opponents, in foreseeing what is beneficial, and in many other arrangements of life.⁴⁸⁶

False Belief and Ignorance

They say that the wise person never believes a falsehood, nor assents at all to anything not apprehensible, since he neither holds an opinion nor is ignorant of anything. For ignorance is assent that is liable to change and weak.⁴⁸⁷

473.Ἰδία φύσις is the person’s own nature or bodily constitution in this context. The explanation rests on attentive observation and knowledge of what benefits health. The source is describing the ideal wise person’s care of himself; it does not here enumerate treatments or offer a general account of medical practice.

474.Λήρησις is rambling or delirious talk, and παρὰ τὸν οἶνον makes wine its cause. The inference rests on the definition of intoxication as involving error. Wachsmuth supplies γάρ, “for,” within the explanation. The Greek preserves the supplied particle; its explanatory connection is expressed through “being” in the English sentence.

475.Προηγούμενος here is preferred or adopted in the first instance, rather than chronologically preceding. Ἐπιστημονικός is concerned with knowledge; “the life of knowledge” keeps its connection with ἐπιστήμη without limiting it to the modern natural sciences. The source continues directly into the corresponding means of acquiring money.

476.The subject remains the wise person. The first means of support includes two alternatives, personal kingship and access to a monarch’s resources. Political participation is qualified by the preferred course of reason, rather than asserted without exception; the source returns to circumstances preventing participation below, II.7.11m.14.

477.The description λογικόν, κοινωνικόν, φιλάλληλον retains rationality, sociability, and affection toward others. Wachsmuth’s supplied γάρ and φύσει remain bracketed in English. Friends in ὑπεροχαί are those in positions of prominence or superiority. The third means of acquiring money is taken up in the discussion of paid teaching that follows.

478.The source explicitly distinguishes agreement about receiving payment from disagreement over the meaning of σοφιστεύειν and σοφιστεία. “Sophistry” retains the disputed term; the first group defines it through paid instruction without necessarily assigning it a base character.

479.Καπηλεύειν is peddling or retailing, used here of λόγοι, arguments or discourses. The second group objects to taking money from indiscriminate customers, expressed by τῶν ἐπιτυχόντων, rather than simply reversing the stated agreement about all educational payment. Ἀξίωμα is philosophy’s dignity or standing in this sentence.

480.Ἐξαγωγὴ ἐκ τοῦ βίου is departure from life, the Stoic ethical topic of a deliberate exit. Ποτέ, “sometimes,” is essential. The compressed following clause takes appropriate occurrence from the first clause and applies it to remaining alive, even without future wisdom. In the next sentence virtue and vice are understood as the subjects of “keep” and “drive out,” with the person as the implied object. Mere possession of virtue or vice therefore does not settle the judgment. The supplied γίγνεσθαι and δέ remain bracketed in English; the supplied article τήν and prefix παρα- are expressed through ordinary grammar and “measured.”

481.Ὕβρις is outrage or humiliating treatment, rather than merely a spoken insult. The parenthesis admits that others can behave unjustly and outrageously toward the wise person, while denying that they achieve the harm defined here. In the printed punctuation the parenthesis ends after ὑβριστικῶς. The subject of δικαιοπραγεῖν, “acts justly,” therefore returns to the virtuous person, not to those mistreating him.

482.The claim rests on the location of good and virtue within the wise person. It is part of the source’s ethical account of harm and shame, not a denial that hostile treatment can occur. The supplied article τήν is preserved in the Greek and expressed in normal English grammar.

483.The supplied ἔχοντα is rendered by the bracketed “possessed.” The king with whom he lives is qualified by both aptitude and love of learning. “Sometimes” qualifies the wise person’s own kingship, rather than making it a necessary office held by every wise person.

484.Wachsmuth’s parenthetical reference is to printed p. 94, lines 8–11 and 15, translated at II.7.11b. The first-person “we said” belongs to the continuing account, not to this translator. The supplemented κωλύῃ, “prevents,” remains bracketed; absence of benefit to the country and anticipated serious dangers both remain explicit.

485.The source distinguishes ψεῦδος, a falsehood, from ψεύδεσθαι, lying. Its definition includes διεψευσμένως, being oneself mistaken, and the purpose of deceiving others. The English preserves these elements rather than replacing them with an ordinary modern definition of lying.

486.The qualification ἄνευ συγκαταθέσεως, “without assent,” is central: using a falsehood does not here mean accepting it as true. The text nevertheless includes its use against military opponents. The distinction should remain visible rather than be smoothed into a claim that the wise person never utters a false statement. The supplied κατά is “against”; προόρασις is foresight, and οἰκονομίαι are arrangements or management of life.

487.Συγκατάθεσις is assent, κατάληψις apprehension, and δόξα opinion in the technical distinctions developed below. The printed text defines ἄγνοια, ignorance, as weak and changeable assent. Wachsmuth discusses a reconstruction involving a definition of opinion in his apparatus, but does not insert it into the text. The English therefore retains “ignorance” and does not silently substitute that reconstruction. The assertions describe the school’s ideal sage.