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← ExitStobaeus, Volume II

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Book II Chapter 7

Every Error as an Impious Act

They also hold that every error is an impious act. For something’s being done contrary to the will of god is evidence of impiety.⁴⁵⁴ Since the gods are favorably disposed toward virtue and its deeds, and alienated from vice and what is accomplished through it, and since an error is an activity in accordance with vice, it followed that every error is displeasing to the gods—and that is an impious act. For in each error the base person does something displeasing to the gods.⁴⁵⁵

Impiety as a State

Further, since every base person does whatever he does in accordance with vice, just as the virtuous person does in accordance with virtue, a person who has one vice has them all. Impiety too is found among these—not impiety classified in terms of activity, but the state opposed to piety.⁴⁵⁶ What is done in accordance with impiety is an impious act; ⟨therefore⟩ every error is an impious act.⁴⁵⁷

Enmity toward the Gods

They also hold that every foolish person is an enemy to the gods. For enmity is disagreement ⟨about⟩ the affairs of life and discord, just as friendship is agreement and concord. Base people disagree with the gods about the affairs of life; hence every fool is an enemy to the gods.⁴⁵⁸ Again, if everyone considers those opposed to him to be enemies, and the base person is opposed to the virtuous person, while god is virtuous, the base person is an enemy to the gods.⁴⁵⁹

Errors Equal but Not Alike

They say that all errors are equal, but not alike. For they naturally flow, as it were, from a single source, vice, the judgment being the same in every error. But because of the external cause, as the intermediate things about which the judgments are formed differ, the errors differ in quality.⁴⁶⁰

The Analogy of Falsehood

You could obtain a clear illustration of the point by attending to this: every falsehood is equally a falsehood, for one is not more false than another. That it is ⟨always⟩ night is a falsehood, just as that a centaur is alive is a falsehood; neither can be said to be more a falsehood than the other.⁴⁶¹ But is not what is false equally false, and are not those who are mistaken equally mistaken?⁴⁶²

Neither More Nor Less in Error

Nor is it possible to err more or less, for every error is committed through being mistaken. Further, it is not the case that a correct action cannot be greater or smaller while an error can. For all are complete, and hence could neither fall short of nor exceed one another. Therefore all errors are equal.⁴⁶³

Aptitude and Good Birth

As for being well endowed by nature, and also well born, some members of the school inclined to say that every wise person is such, while others did not.⁴⁶⁴ The former think that aptitude for virtue arises not only by nature but, in some people, through training. They accepted this proverbial saying:

Practice, with time, becomes nature.⁴⁶⁵

Definitions of Aptitude and Good Birth

They took the same view of good birth. Thus aptitude is, in general, a state arising by nature or through training that is congenial to virtue, or a state in virtue of which some people can readily acquire virtue; good birth is a state arising from lineage or through training that is congenial to virtue.⁴⁶⁶

The Virtuous Person in Company

The virtuous person, being sociable and tactful, able to exhort others and to win goodwill and friendship through his company, is as adaptable as possible to a multitude of people.⁴⁶⁷ Hence he is also charming, gracious, and persuasive; further, he is winning, apt, timely, quick witted, straightforward, free from meddlesomeness, simple, and unfeigned. The base person is subject to all the contrary qualities.⁴⁶⁸

Dissembling and Sarcasm

They say that dissembling belongs to base people, for no free and virtuous person dissembles. The same holds of sarcasm, which is dissembling accompanied by a measure of ridicule.⁴⁶⁹

Friendship and Concord

They reserve friendship for the wise alone, since among them alone is there concord about the affairs of life; concord is knowledge of common goods.⁴⁷⁰ For true friendship, deserving its name, cannot exist without trust and constancy. Among base people, who are untrustworthy and inconstant and possess hostile beliefs, there is no friendship; instead, there arise other entanglements and connections, held together from outside by necessities and opinions. They also say that cherishing, welcoming, and loving belong to the virtuous alone.⁴⁷¹

Only the Wise Person Is King

Only the wise person is king and kingly; no base person is. For kingship is rule that answers to no higher authority, the highest rule and the one set over all the others.⁴⁷²

454.Ἁμάρτημα retains “error,” the wrong action defined at II.7.11a; ἀσέβημα is an impious act, distinguished from ἀσέβεια, impiety. The source first uses singular τοῦ θεοῦ, “of god,” then plural “the gods”; the English preserves the change.

455.Οἰκειουμένων and ἀλλοτριουμένων contrast affinity and alienation toward virtue and vice. The inference proceeds from the ethical character of action to its displeasing the gods. Wachsmuth brackets καί before the final explanatory sentence for deletion; it remains visible in the Greek but is not translated.

456.The printed sentence is compressed: it moves from action according to vice to possession of all the vices. The distinction within impiety is explicit, between its classification by activity and the ἕξις, state, opposed to piety. The English keeps the state/activity distinction rather than making the second argument simply repeat the first.

457.Heeren’s supplied οὖν, “therefore,” marks the conclusion and remains bracketed. This is a second argument for the same claim: acting according to vice involves the vice of impiety, and hence produces an impious act.

458.The definition of enmity uses ἀσυμφωνία and διχόνοια, disagreement and discord, opposed to συμφωνία and ὁμόνοια, agreement and concord. Meineke’s supplied περί, “about,” remains bracketed. The affairs of life are explicitly the subject of disagreement; compare the earlier accounts of friendship and concord at II.7.5l and II.7.11b.

459.The final argument retains its conditional opening, “if everyone considers,” and its shift from singular god to plural gods. The conclusion is drawn from the opposition of virtue and vice, not from a reported conflict with a particular cult or community.

460.The source distinguishes equality from qualitative likeness. Its shared ground is vice and the same character of judgment; its difference lies in the external cause and the intermediate things judged. Μέσα retains “intermediate things,” the category distinguished from goods and evils earlier. The argument does not erase differences among the objects or circumstances of wrong actions.

461.Heeren supplies ἀεί, “always,” in the night example. The claim is therefore not that “it is night” is invariably false. Ἱπποκένταυρος is the horse-centaur. Wachsmuth brackets τε for deletion; it remains visible in the Greek and is omitted in English. The analogy concerns the status of a proposition as false, rather than degrees of resemblance between its subject and an existing thing.

462.The repeated οὐχί is read as introducing questions expecting affirmation; the English question marks make this interpretation explicit. Wachsmuth prints these words without question marks and records conjectures in the apparatus. Reading both as simple denials would conflict with the preceding assertion and the following inference. The Greek remains as printed, and the interpretive choice is not concealed.

463.The opening connects ethical error with διάψευσις, being mistaken. The next sentence denies an asymmetry between correct and erroneous acts: the absence of greater and lesser degree does not apply only to correct actions. Τέλεια is “complete” in this argument; when applied to an error it does not make it morally perfect. The conclusion repeats equality, while the preceding passage has already allowed differences in quality.

464.Εὐφυής and εὐγενής are initially rendered through their ordinary associations with natural endowment and good birth. The following definitions extend both to acquired states. The source explicitly reports disagreement within the school; the view that every wise person has these qualities must not be attributed without qualification to all Stoics.

465.Κατασκευή is preparation or cultivation, here rendered “training.” Wachsmuth identifies the verse as an unattributed tragic fragment, no. 227 in Nauck’s collection; this editorial reference is recorded in the note rather than inserted into the ancient sentence. Χρονισθεῖσ’ is the elided participle “continued over time.” The quotation explains how practice can come to function as nature.

466.Both definitions use ἕξις, “state,” and οἰκείαν πρὸς ἀρετήν, “congenial to virtue.” The alternative origin through training remains explicit even in the definition of good birth, alongside lineage. The printed εὐανάληπτοι is understood as readily able to acquire virtue. These are the definitions of the group just described, rather than a resolution of the reported disagreement.

467.Ὁμιλία is social intercourse or company. Θηρευτικός literally evokes hunting, here directed toward winning goodwill and friendship. The qualification ὡς δυνατόν, “as far as possible,” limits the claim about adaptability; it has not been turned into unlimited accommodation to others.

468.The succession of adjectives is retained rather than reduced to a general description of pleasantness. Αἱμύλος can have an unfavorable sense of wily or flattering, but here stands among the virtuous person’s qualities and is rendered “winning.” Εὔστοχος concerns hitting the mark, εὔκαιρος the right occasion, and ἄπλαστος being unfeigned.

469.Εἰρωνεύεσθαι here is dissembling or adopting a false pose, rather than every use of what modern English calls irony. Σαρκάζειν adds ἐπισυρμός, ridicule or mockery. The definition concerns a mode of treating others and should be read alongside the account of unfeigned company.

470.The restriction concerns friendship in the strict sense defined here through concord, trust, and constancy. Compare the accounts of friendship and concord at II.7.5l and II.7.11b. Κοινῶν ἀγαθῶν means common or shared goods; the definition is knowledge, not merely agreement of feeling.

471.The distinction between true friendship and other connections is explicit. Ἔξωθεν, “from outside,” qualifies what holds the latter together. The final three verbs, ἀγαπᾶν, ἀσπάζεσθαι, and φιλεῖν, are rendered separately as cherishing, welcoming, and loving; the passage does not assign them later theological classifications of love.

472.The text distinguishes being βασιλεύς, a king, from being βασιλικός, kingly or fitted to rule. Ἀνυπεύθυνος is unaccountable or not subject to being called to account. “Answers to no higher authority” expresses its place in the hierarchy of rule specified here. This definition belongs to the ethical claim that only the wise person is properly king.