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← ExitStobaeus, Volume II

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Book II Chapter 7

Compulsion Force and Deception

For this reason he is neither compelled by anyone nor compels anyone, is neither hindered nor hinders, is neither forced by anyone nor himself forces anyone, neither acts as master nor is mastered, neither does evil to anyone nor suffers evil himself, neither falls into evils ⟨nor causes another to fall into evils⟩.⁴¹⁹ He is neither deceived nor deceives another, neither mistaken nor ignorant, neither unaware of himself nor, in general, believes anything false.⁴²⁰

Blessedness and the Wise Person’s Capacities

He is supremely happy, fortunate, blessed, prosperous, pious, loved by the gods, and of high standing; fitted for kingship, generalship, and public affairs, and skilled in household management and acquiring money.⁴²¹ Base people possess all the opposite qualities.⁴²²

All Goods and a Complete Life

In general, all goods belong to virtuous people, and all evils to base people. But one should not suppose them to mean that, if certain things are goods, those things belong to virtuous people, and likewise with evils. Rather, the former have so many goods that nothing is lacking to make their life complete ⟨and happy⟩; the latter have so many evils that their life is incomplete and unhappy.⁴²³

Names and Etymologies of Virtue

They call virtue by many names. They call it good, because it leads us toward the right life; pleasing, because it is approvable without misgiving; of great worth, ⟨because⟩ its value is unsurpassable; worthy of earnest pursuit, because it deserves much earnest attention; praiseworthy, because one might reasonably praise it; and noble, because it naturally calls to itself those who desire it.⁴²⁴

Advantageous Useful and Necessary

And advantageous, because it brings things that contribute to living well; useful, because it is beneficial in use; choiceworthy, because from it arise things that it is reasonable to choose; necessary, because when present it benefits, and when absent it is impossible to be benefited; and profitable, because the benefits arising from it outweigh the effort directed toward them.⁴²⁵

Self-Sufficient Without Need and Sufficient

And self-sufficient, because it suffices for its possessor; without need, because it releases one from every need; and sufficient, because it is adequate in use and extends to every requirement of life.⁴²⁶

Goods Benefits and Harms

Base people participate in none of the goods, since the good is virtue or what participates in virtue. The things corresponding to goods, which belong among the things one should do, are benefits and occur only to virtuous people. Likewise, the things corresponding to evils, which belong among the things one should not do, occur only to the bad, for they are harms.⁴²⁷ Hence all good people are free from harm in both senses, being capable neither of harming nor of being harmed; base people are the opposite.⁴²⁸

True Wealth and Freedom

They say that true wealth is a good and true poverty an evil; true freedom a good and true slavery an evil. Hence only the virtuous person is rich and free; the base person, on the contrary, is poor, lacking the resources for being rich, and a slave because of the submissive disposition within him.⁴²⁹

Common Goods and Mutual Benefit

All goods are common to virtuous people, and evils to base people. Hence whoever benefits someone is himself also benefited, while whoever harms another also harms himself.⁴³⁰

A Friendly Disposition toward Those Unknown

All virtuous people benefit one another, without necessarily being one another’s friends, well-disposed, ⟨or⟩ held in esteem, or accepting one another, because they neither know one another nor live in the same place. Nevertheless, they are disposed toward one another with goodwill, friendship, approval, and acceptance. Foolish people are in the opposite condition.⁴³¹

Lawful and Skilled in Law

Since law is virtuous, as we said, being right reason that commands what is to be done and forbids what is not to be done, they say that only the wise person is lawful: he carries out what the law commands and alone can interpret it, which is why he is also skilled in law. Stupid people have the opposite qualities.⁴³²

Rule and Obedience

They also assign to the morally excellent the oversight belonging to rule and its kinds: kingship, generalship, naval command, and similar offices. In this respect only the virtuous person rules—even if not necessarily in actual exercise, certainly in disposition.⁴³³ Only the virtuous person is also obedient, being capable of following a ruler. No foolish person is like this: the fool is capable neither of ruling nor of being ruled, being self-willed and undisciplined.⁴³⁴

419.The supplied clause “nor causes another to fall into evils” is Meineke’s addition, printed by Wachsmuth. The reciprocal claims belong to this account of the virtuous person’s ethical invulnerability. In particular, “evils” retains the strict moral vocabulary developed earlier; the wording is not a claim that a wise body cannot be physically restrained or injured. The translation nevertheless preserves the source’s categorical assertions.

420.Διαψεύδεται is “is mistaken,” distinct from deliberately deceiving another, ἐξαπατᾷ. Wachsmuth records a proposal to insert an additional active verb before it but does not print that addition; the Greek and English follow his text. The final clause broadens the series to holding a false belief in general.

421.The series retains the separate terms εὐδαίμων, εὐτυχής, μακάριος, and ὄλβιος rather than compressing them into a single “happy.” Ἀξιωματικός concerns standing or dignity here, not the logical proposition. The following adjectives express capacities: their presence does not say that the wise person actually holds each office. The next passage explicitly distinguishes disposition from actual exercise of rule.

422.Οἰκονομικός and χρηματιστικός resume the skills defined at II.7.11d.2–3. The contrast with the base is the source’s comprehensive ethical contrast. “Prosperous” in this series should be read with the subsequent distinction between true wealth and ordinary possessions at II.7.11i.2.

423.The source itself qualifies “all goods”: the claim concerns sufficiency for a complete life rather than possession of every particular good that exists. The parallel qualification applies to evils. Meineke’s supplied καὶ εὐδαίμονα, “and happy,” remains visible. This clarification prevents the opening generalization from being expanded beyond its stated meaning.

424.The explanations sometimes connect similar-sounding Greek words: ἀγαθόν with ἄγει, “leads”; σπουδαῖον with σπουδή, “earnest attention”; καλόν with καλεῖν, “calls.” These are the source’s word associations, not claims about the historical derivation of the English words. “Pleasing” retains the sense distinguished from pleasure at II.7.5i. Wachsmuth’s supplied ὅτι, “because,” remains bracketed. Compare the earlier list of names for good at II.7.5d.1.

425.The account continues the names of virtue. Συμφέρον is associated with φέρειν, “to bring,” and χρήσιμον with χρεία, “use.” The choiceworthy virtue is distinguished from the activities arising from it that one chooses, as at II.7.11f. “Profitable” concerns benefit exceeding the effort expended, not an explicit calculation of monetary return.

426.The three predicates are retained separately: αὔταρκες, ἀνευδεές, and ἀποχρῶν. They conclude the account of virtue’s sufficiency for living well. “Every requirement of life” renders πᾶσαν τὴν κατὰ τὸν βίον χρείαν; it does not silently change the subject from virtue to material supplies.

427.The compressed ὧν χρή and ὧν οὐ χρή are rendered through what one should and should not do, in continuity with the goods/benefits distinction at II.7.11f. The goods are virtue and what participates in it; the corresponding benefits and harms belong to the account of activity.

428.Ἀβλαβής includes both causing no harm and suffering none, as the source immediately explains. The claim uses “harm” in this moral account; it does not deny the possibility of bodily damage, loss of property, or other dispreferred events. Compare the classifications of indifferents at II.7.7–7e.

429.The repeated κατ’ ἀλήθειαν, “truly” or “in truth,” marks the sense in which wealth and freedom are being claimed as goods. The closing explanation locates slavery in a disposition, διάθεσις. These ethical uses should not be confused with the ordinary holdings or legal status of particular people. Ὑποπτωτική describes susceptibility to submission; “resources” renders ἀφορμαί without reducing them to money.

430.This resumes II.7.11b.1 and II.7.11d.1. The printed αὐτόν in the first consequence is rendered “himself,” while the second has the explicit reflexive ἑαυτόν. The reciprocity belongs to the ethical definitions of benefit and harm; it is not described as a subsequent repayment.

431.The passage distinguishes an existing personal relationship from a disposition toward another virtuous person. Πάντως is rendered “necessarily,” and the reason given is lack of acquaintance and shared residence. The contrast between εὔνους and εὐνοητικῶς, and between acceptance and being disposed to accept, is preserved rather than collapsed into a contradiction or replaced with an assertion that all have met. Wachsmuth prints Heeren’s supplied οὔτε before εὐδοκίμους; its English equivalent remains bracketed.

432.The definition resumes II.7.11d.6, Wachsmuth p. 96, lines 10–12; the editor’s parenthetical reference is transferred here. Νόμιμος, “lawful,” and νομικός, “skilled in law,” remain distinct. The definition of law as right reason governs the claim; it is not simply an assertion of obedience to every existing enactment. The source changes its designation of the unwise here to ἠλίθιοι, “stupid people.”

433.Ἀστεῖοι retains “the morally excellent.” The explicit distinction between ἐνέργεια, actual exercise, and διάθεσις, disposition, explains the claim to rule without requiring the wise person to hold office. The kinds named include ναυαρχία, command of a fleet.

434.The capacity to follow a ruler accompanies, rather than excludes, the capacity to rule. The Greek supplies τ’ to complete οἷός τε, “capable”; the supplement is expressed in the English construction. The final ἀνάγωγος describes lack of discipline or training, paired with self-will.