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← ExitStobaeus, Volume II

Reading language

Book II Chapter 7

Diseases and Infirmities

A disease is an opinion associated with craving that has developed into a settled state and become hardened, in accordance with which people suppose that things not choiceworthy are exceedingly choiceworthy—for example love of women, love of wine, and love of money.³⁸⁰ There are also conditions opposite to ⟨these⟩ diseases, arising through aversion, such as hatred of women, hatred of wine, and hatred of humanity.³⁸¹ Diseases occurring together with weakness are called infirmities.³⁸²

Correct Action and Error

They say that a correct action is an appropriate action complete in every detail, or, as we said before, a complete appropriate action.³⁸³ An error is what is done contrary to right reason, or an act in which a rational animal has omitted something appropriate.³⁸⁴

Common Goods and Concord

They say that all the goods of virtuous people are ⟨common⟩, in accordance with which a person who benefits someone close to him also benefits himself.³⁸⁵ Concord is knowledge of common goods. Hence all virtuous people are in concord with one another, because they agree about the affairs of life; base people, disagreeing with one another, are hostile, harmful to one another, and at enmity.³⁸⁶

Justice and Participation in Public Life

They say that what is just exists by nature and not by convention.³⁸⁷ It follows from these claims that the wise person participates in public life, especially in constitutions that show some progress toward complete constitutions.³⁸⁸

Legislation Education and Country

Legislating, educating people, and writing works capable of benefiting their readers are proper to virtuous people. So too are consenting to marriage and to having children, both for one’s own sake and for one’s country, and enduring toil and death on its behalf, if it is moderate.³⁸⁹

Demagoguery and Harmful Writings

Alongside these stand base counterparts: acting as a demagogue, practicing sophistry, and writing things harmful to their readers. Such things would not befall virtuous people.³⁹⁰

Three Senses of Friendship

Friendship is spoken of in three senses. In one sense it is friendship for common benefit, in accordance with which people are said to be friends. They say that this is not among goods, because according to them nothing composed of separate parts is a good.³⁹¹ Friendship in the second sense, a friendly disposition on the part of those close to one, is counted among external goods. Friendship concerning oneself, in accordance with which one is a friend to those close to one, they declare to be among goods concerning the soul.³⁹²

Common Goods and Equal Benefit

Goods are common in another sense too. For they hold that anyone who benefits anyone at all receives an equal benefit by that very fact, while no base person either receives or confers benefit.³⁹³ For to benefit is to hold in accordance with virtue, and to be benefited is to be moved in accordance with virtue.³⁹⁴

Household Management and Acquiring Money

They say that only the virtuous person is skilled in household management and a good household manager, and also skilled in acquiring money. For the art of household management is a state concerned with the theory and practice of what benefits a household. Household management itself is the ordering of expenditure and work, and care of property and of those working in the fields.³⁹⁵ The art of acquiring money is expertise in obtaining money from the sources one ought, and a state that makes one act consistently in collecting, preserving, and spending money with a view to having ample resources.³⁹⁶

Acquiring Money and the Virtuous Person

Some said that acquiring money is intermediate, others that it is morally excellent.³⁹⁷ No base person becomes a good head of a household or can provide a well-managed home. Only the virtuous man is skilled in acquiring money, knowing from what sources it is to be acquired, when, how, and until when.³⁹⁸

Pardon and One’s Own Vice

They say ⟨further⟩ that pardon is not granted ⟨to anyone by a person who has understanding; for it belongs to the same person both to grant pardon⟩ and to think that the person who erred did not err through his own fault, whereas all who err do so through their own vice. Hence the refusal to grant pardon to those who err is appropriately stated.³⁹⁹

Leniency and Punishment

They say that the good man is not lenient. For the lenient person seeks to set aside punishment according to desert; being lenient, supposing that the punishments prescribed by law for wrongdoers are too harsh, and thinking that the lawgiver assigns punishments contrary to desert belong to the same person.⁴⁰⁰

380.The account distinguishes a susceptibility, a passion, and an opinion hardened into a settled state, ἕξις. “Disease” translates its ethical and psychological term νόσημα, not a modern diagnostic category. The defining error is to suppose something not choiceworthy to be exceedingly choiceworthy; the examples are governed by that qualification.

381.The supplied τούτοις remains bracketed as ⟨these⟩. Προσκοπή denotes aversion or repugnance here. The opposite hatreds are included in the account, rather than offered as remedies for the corresponding loves.

382.Ἀρρώστημα retains “infirmity,” as at II.7.6d. The final distinction adds weakness to disease. Compare Diogenes Laertius VII.115, which also distinguishes diseases, infirmities, and tendencies to passions.

383.Πάντας ἐπέχον τοὺς ἀριθμούς is literally “having all the numbers,” an expression for completeness in every detail. The cross-reference points back to the complete appropriate actions at II.7.8.2, Wachsmuth p. 85, line 19; the editor’s parenthetical page reference is transferred to this note.

384.The two formulations cover acting contrary to right reason and omitting something appropriate. The qualification “rational animal” is explicit. Ἁμάρτημα retains “error,” used earlier for a wrong action; the passage does not restrict error to a mistake in factual information.

385.Κοινά, “common,” is supplied by Wachsmuth. The following sentence and II.7.11d explain the reciprocity through benefiting and virtue. “Someone close to him” renders τῶν πλησίον; it need not denote a person living in the adjoining house. The claim concerns goods in this ethical account, rather than an explicit scheme for distributing property.

386.Ὁμόνοια is defined here as knowledge of common goods. Compare the earlier definition of συμφωνία as agreement in beliefs about life at II.7.5l.3. The general contrast between virtuous and base people is the source’s own claim, not a description of particular historical communities.

387.Φύσει / θέσει contrasts nature with convention or enactment. The claim about justice precedes the account of civic participation; it is not merely a claim that whatever has been enacted is just. Compare Diogenes Laertius VII.128.

388.Πολιτεύεσθαι is participation in civic or political life, and πολιτεία here is a constitution or political order. “Especially” and “some progress” preserve the qualifications. The text refers to constitutions approaching completeness without naming a particular existing state.

389.Συγκαταβαίνειν expresses willingness to enter into marriage and procreation. The final condition, ἐὰν ᾖ μετρία, is feminine and refers to the country, πατρίς. Its moderation qualifies the willingness to endure toil and death on its behalf; the condition is not omitted or transferred to the amount of toil. Compare the civic and family activities at Diogenes Laertius VII.121.

390.The contrast pairs civic participation, education, and beneficial writing with their base counterparts. Δημοκοπεῖν denotes courting popular favor as a demagogue; it does not mean simply participating in a democracy. The closing claim concerns the virtuous people of the account.

391.The first sense concerns the relationship for common benefit. The reason given invokes what is composed of separate parts, ἐκ διεστηκότων, rather than denying every ethical value to friends. The next two senses classify the friendly attitudes belonging to the respective persons.

392.Πρὸς τῶν πέλας uses the genitive to locate the friendly disposition on the side of the other people; περὶ αὑτόν locates the third sense in oneself. The distinction explains why one is an external good and the other a good concerning the soul. Compare the earlier classification of relational goods and the definition of friendship at II.7.5l.

393.This resumes the supplied “common” at II.7.11b.1. The equal return follows “by that very fact,” not from a further bargain or repayment. The exclusion of base people depends on the technical account of benefit through virtue; it does not say that a base person cannot receive money or practical assistance.

394.Wachsmuth prints ἴσχειν, “to hold,” in the active definition and κινεῖσθαι, “to be moved,” in the passive one. His apparatus considers adding “to move or” before ἴσχειν by comparison with Diogenes Laertius VII.104. The English follows the printed text, preserving its compressed formulation rather than silently supplying the proposed words.

395.Οἰκονομική names the art or capacity, whereas οἰκονομία names the management or arrangement itself. The household includes property, work, and agricultural workers, not merely a private spending budget. The source does not specify the workers’ legal status in this sentence.

396.Χρηματιστική concerns acquiring and managing money from proper sources, not obtaining the greatest possible sum by any means. Ὁμολογουμένως retains the ethical sense of acting consistently; εὐπορία is ample resources or means. Wealth remains an indifferent in the earlier account; the present claim concerns the agent’s expertise and conduct.

397.The report records a difference of classification and leaves the speakers unnamed. Μέσον is “intermediate,” while ἀστεῖον is “morally excellent” here. The disagreement is retained rather than resolved by making all acquisition of money virtuous.

398.The final knowledge includes limits of source, timing, manner, and duration. “Until when” preserves μέχρι πότε; the text does not simply endorse continued accumulation. The strong claim that only the virtuous person has the expertise is part of the account’s ethical use of skill.

399.The supplied δέ and the larger supplied passage remain bracketed. Wachsmuth restores the latter from the parallel Florilegium passage, as his apparatus explains. Συγγνώμη is pardon or allowance for an offense. The argument links granting it with judging that the offender’s error was not due to himself, then rejects that judgment by locating error in the offender’s own vice. The following paragraph turns to leniency in punishment.

400.Ἐπιεικής is “lenient” in the particular definition given here: setting aside punishment according to desert, κατ’ ἀξίαν. The paragraph argues against this leniency through its judgment about the lawgiver’s penalties. Compare Diogenes Laertius VII.123. “According to desert” preserves the role of what is due; the text has not been rewritten as a recommendation to impose the greatest possible penalty.