Correct Actions and Benefits Expressed as Predicates
II.7.8a.1 · Wachsmuth pp. 86
Of correct actions, some belong among things one ought to do, and others do not. What one ought to do consists of benefits expressed as predicates, such as thinking wisely and exercising temperance. Things not of this kind do not belong among what one ought to do.343 The same technical classification applies similarly to things contrary to appropriate action.344
Error and the Completion of Appropriate Action
II.7.8a.2 · Wachsmuth pp. 86
Everything contrary to appropriate action that occurs in a rational ⟨animal⟩ is an error; appropriate action, when brought to completion, becomes a correct action.345 Intermediate appropriate action is measured against certain indifferent things, selected from among things contrary to and in accordance with nature, which afford such prosperity that, if we did not take or reject them when no special circumstances intervene, we could not be happy.346
Impression and Impulse
II.7.9.1 · Wachsmuth pp. 86-87
They say that what sets impulse in motion is nothing other than an impression of what is appropriate that directly prompts impulse; impulse, considered generically, is a movement of the soul toward something.347 Under this genus are considered, as species, both the impulse occurring in rational animals and that in nonrational animals; these do not have names of their own. For desire is not rational impulse itself, but a species of rational impulse.348
Rational Impulse and Aversion
II.7.9.2 · Wachsmuth pp. 87
One could properly define rational impulse as a movement of thought toward something in the sphere of action. Opposed to it is aversion, a movement ⟨of thought away from something in the sphere of not acting⟩.349
Impulsion and the Impulsive State
II.7.9.3 · Wachsmuth pp. 87
They also call impulsion, which is a species of practical impulse, “impulse” in a special sense; impulsion is a movement of thought toward something future.350 Thus, up to this point, “impulse” is used in four senses and “aversion” in two. With the addition of the impulsive state, which they also call “impulse” in a special sense and from which acting on impulse results, ⟨“impulse”⟩ is used in five senses.351
Kinds of Practical Impulse
II.7.9a.1 · Wachsmuth pp. 87
Practical impulse has several species, including intention, initiative, preparation, undertaking, ⟨choice,⟩ choice in advance, wish, and willingness.352 They say that intention is a marking out of what is to be accomplished; initiative is an impulse before an impulse; preparation is an action before an action; undertaking is an impulse concerning something already in hand.353
Choice Wish and Willingness
II.7.9a.2 · Wachsmuth pp. 87
Choice is wish arising from reflection; choice in advance is choice before a choice; wish is reasonable desire; willingness is voluntary wish.354
Assent and Predicates
II.7.9b · Wachsmuth pp. 88
All impulses are assents, but practical impulses also contain the element that moves to action. Assents are directed to one thing, impulses toward another: assents to certain propositions, impulses toward predicates somehow contained in the propositions to which assent is given.355 Since passion is a species of impulse, let us next speak about passions.356
Passion and Agitation
II.7.10.1 · Wachsmuth pp. 88
They say that passion is an excessive impulse disobedient to reason which chooses, or an ⟨irrational⟩ movement of the soul contrary to nature. (All passions belong to the ruling part of the soul.) Hence every agitation is a passion, ⟨and⟩ conversely ⟨every⟩ passion is an agitation.357
The Four Primary Passions
II.7.10.2 · Wachsmuth pp. 88
Since passion is of this kind, we must understand that some passions are primary and fundamental, while the others are referred to these. The four primary genera are craving, fear, distress, and pleasure.358 Craving and fear come first: craving is directed toward an apparent good, fear toward an apparent evil. Pleasure and distress follow upon them: pleasure when we attain what we craved or escape what we feared; distress when we fail to attain what we craved or encounter what we feared.359
Opinion and Freshness
II.7.10.3 · Wachsmuth pp. 88-89
In the case of all the soul’s passions, since they say that these are opinions, “opinion” is to be understood as a weak supposition, and “fresh” as capable of bringing about an irrational contraction ⟨or⟩ uplift.360
Irrationality and the Disobedient Horse
II.7.10a.1 · Wachsmuth pp. 89
“Irrational” and “contrary to nature” are not used in their ordinary sense: “irrational” is equivalent to “disobedient to reason.” For every passion exerts force. Often people in the grip of passions see that it is advantageous not to do something, yet are carried away by the passion’s intensity, as by a disobedient horse, and driven to do it. Hence people often acknowledge this by repeating the familiar saying:361
Though I have judgment, my nature compels me.
For “judgment” here means awareness and knowledge of what is right.362