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Book II Chapter 7

Things To Be Taken in Themselves

All things in accordance with nature are to be taken, and all things ⟨contrary to⟩ nature are not to be taken. Of things in accordance with nature, some are to be taken in themselves, others for the sake of other things.³²⁷ Those to be taken in themselves stimulate impulse by urging us toward themselves or toward holding on to them, such as health, keenness of perception, freedom from pain, and bodily beauty.³²⁸

Things To Be Taken for the Sake of Others

Productive things, in contrast, stimulate impulse by allowing movement toward other things, rather than by urging it ⟨toward themselves⟩, such as wealth, reputation, and the like.³²⁹ Similarly, of things contrary to nature, some are not to be taken in themselves, and others because they produce things that are not to be taken in themselves.³³⁰

Three Senses of Value

All things in accordance with nature have value, and all things contrary to nature have disvalue. “Value” is used in three senses: contribution and worth in itself; an exchange equivalent determined by an appraiser; and the third, which Antipater calls “selective” value. In accordance with this third sense, as circumstances allow, we choose certain things rather than others, for example health rather than disease, life rather than death, and wealth rather than poverty.³³¹ By analogy, they say that “disvalue” too is used in three senses, the meanings being opposed to what was said concerning the third sense of value.³³²

Diogenes on Contribution and the Appraiser

Diogenes says that contribution is an assessment of how far something is in accordance with nature or of how far it provides a service to nature.³³³ “Appraiser” is to be understood, not in the sense in which things are said to be approved, but as we call the person who tests things an appraiser. He says, then, that such a person appraises the exchange equivalent.³³⁴

Value and What Is Due to Each

These are the two senses of value in accordance with which we say that certain things have been advanced in value. He says there is a third, in accordance with which we say that someone has standing and worth; this does not concern indifferent things, but only things of moral excellence.³³⁵ He says that we sometimes use the word “value” for what is due, as in the definition of justice, when it is called a state that distributes to each according to worth. For this means, as it were, what is due to each.³³⁶

Much and Little Value

Of things that have value, some have much value and others little. Similarly, of things that have disvalue, some have much disvalue and others little. ⟨Therefore⟩ those with much value are called preferred and those with much disvalue dispreferred, Zeno having been the first to give these names to the things. They say that a preferred thing is something which, ⟨being⟩ indifferent, we select on the basis of a predominant reason. The same account applies to a dispreferred thing, and the examples correspond by analogy.³³⁷

The King and Those Ranked After Him

None of the goods is preferred, because goods have the greatest value. A preferred thing, occupying the second place and rank in value, comes in some way close to the nature of goods. For at a royal court the king is not among those preferred, but those ranked after him are.³³⁸

Preference and Happiness

They are called preferred, not because they make some contribution to happiness and help to bring it about, but because it is necessary to select them in preference to dispreferred things.³³⁹

Definition of Appropriate Action

Following the account of preferred things comes the topic of appropriate action. Appropriate action is defined as “what is consistent in life and, when done, admits of a reasonable defense”; what is contrary to appropriate action is the opposite.³⁴⁰ This extends also to nonrational animals, for they too do something consistently with their own nature. For rational animals it is formulated thus: “what is consistent in a way of life.”³⁴¹

Correct Actions and Intermediate Appropriate Actions

Some appropriate actions, they say, are complete, and these are also called correct actions. Correct actions are activities in accordance with virtue, such as thinking wisely and acting justly. Those which are not of this kind are not correct actions; they call them intermediate appropriate actions, rather than complete ones, such as marrying, serving as an ambassador, engaging in discussion, and the like.³⁴²

327.Ληπτά and ἄληπτα are “to be taken” and “not to be taken,” distinct from the choiceworthiness of goods at II.7.5o. The supplied article τὰ is expressed by “things”; the consequential supplied παρά, “contrary to,” remains bracketed. Without that supplement, the opening contrast would be lost.

328.Προτρεπτικῶς describes impulse urged directly toward the things themselves or their retention. Ἀπονία is freedom from pain, distinct from freedom from distress, ἀλυπία. These are still natural indifferents; “in themselves” does not reclassify them as the final good.

329.Ἀνετικῶς marks the permissive or enabling relation to other things, contrasted with the directly urging προτρεπτικῶς. The supplied δέ is expressed by “in contrast”; the supplied ἐφ’ ἑαυτά remains bracketed. Δόξα means reputation here, alongside wealth, rather than a belief or opinion.

330.The final distinction parallels things taken in themselves and things taken for what they produce. Wachsmuth does not print an explanatory expansion found in scholia on Lucian after the wealth/reputation examples; it has not been added to the translation.

331.The compressed first expression is δόσις καὶ τιμὴ καθ’ αὑτό, “contribution and worth in itself.” The following paragraph explains δόσις and the appraiser. The third sense is explicitly attributed to Antipater and concerns selection among indifferents. “As circumstances allow” preserves διδόντων τῶν πραγμάτων; the examples do not state that health, life, or wealth must be selected under every possible condition.

332.Wachsmuth prints τρίτης, “third,” in the concluding comparison, correcting the transmitted πρώτης, “first,” recorded in his apparatus. The English retains the printed wording, including its compressed reference from the three senses of disvalue to the third sense of value. Diogenes’s following classification is not identical to Antipater’s.

333.Diogenes is the Stoic Diogenes of Babylon. The text defines δόσις through κρίσις, an assessment or judgment, and relates it to naturalness and service to nature. The awkwardness of the terminology is not removed by replacing this definition with the different threefold account in Diogenes Laertius VII.105.

334.The explanation distinguishes the person who tests or assesses, δοκιμαστής, from the adjective δοκιμαστός applied to an approved or tested thing. It thus explains the personal sense of the preceding genitive τοῦ δοκιμαστοῦ. Ἀμοιβή concerns an equivalent in exchange here, rather than an emotional reward or moral recompense.

335.The singular “he says” continues the report of Diogenes. His third sense concerns moral worth, whereas Antipater’s preceding third sense concerned selection among indifferents. Both reports remain distinct. Ἀξίωμα here is standing or dignity, not the logical “proposition” encountered below at II.7.9b.

336.Ἐπιβάλλον is what falls to or is due to someone. The closing sentence explains the use of ἀξία in the definition of justice rather than introducing a further preferred indifferent. Compare the earlier discussion of justice at II.7.5b1 and the related definition in the Platonic Definitions, 411E, cited in Wachsmuth’s apparatus.

337.Προηγούμενος λόγος is a leading or predominant reason for selection, not necessarily a reason stated earlier in the exposition. The supplied οὖν and ὄν remain bracketed. The source credits Zeno with the terminology. The following royal-court analogy explains why “preferred,” literally advanced in rank, does not name the highest good.

338.The apparent paradox depends on the technical sense of προηγμένον. The king occupies the highest position; those “advanced” or “preferred” stand below him. Thus preferred indifferents have a subordinate rank, while goods are not merely preferred. Compare Cicero, On Ends III.16.52–53, which preserves the same analogy.

339.The necessity concerns selection in the comparison with dispreferred things. The text explicitly denies a contribution to happiness; it has not been softened into saying that preferred things make a small contribution. Circumstances were already acknowledged at II.7.7f.1.

340.Καθῆκον retains “appropriate action,” used earlier in this edition. Its definition includes both consistency in life and a reasonable defense of what is done. Ἀπολογία means a defense or justification, not an expression of regret. Compare Diogenes Laertius VII.108 and Cicero, On Ends III.17.58.

341.The source first uses ζωή and then βίος in its formulation for rational animals; “life” and “a way of life” preserve that shift. The extension to nonrational animals is stated explicitly. The supplied δέ structures the contrast and is expressed through the English sentence division.

342.Κατόρθωμα is a correct action in the technical Stoic sense of an activity in accordance with virtue. The intermediate examples name kinds of activity without themselves specifying the agent’s virtue. Πρεσβεύειν is serving on an embassy, rather than simply being older. Compare Cicero, On Ends III.18.59, on correct action as appropriate action perfectly performed.