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Book II Chapter 7

On Indifferent Things

Having discussed sufficiently goods and evils, choiceworthy and avoidable things, and the end and happiness, we considered it necessary also to go through what is said about indifferent things in its proper order.³⁰⁹

Two Senses of Indifferent

They say that indifferent things lie between goods and evils, explaining that “indifferent” is understood in two senses. In one sense it means what is neither good nor evil, and neither choiceworthy nor avoidable. In the other it means what stimulates neither impulse nor aversion; in this sense some things are also said to be altogether indifferent.³¹⁰ Examples are ⟨having an even number of hairs on one’s head or an odd number, or⟩ extending a finger this way or that, or picking up something lying in the way, a piece of straw or a leaf.³¹¹

Selection and Rejection

It must therefore be said that, according to those of this school, things between virtue and vice are called indifferent in the former sense, but not with regard to selection and rejection. Hence some have value for selection and others disvalue for rejection, but no value that contributes to the happy life.³¹²

In Accordance with and Contrary to Nature

Some are in accordance with nature, others contrary to nature, and others neither contrary to nor in accordance with nature. In accordance with nature are such things as health, strength, soundness of the sense organs, and things like these. Contrary to nature are such things as disease, weakness, impairment, and the like. Neither contrary to nor in accordance with nature is the condition of soul and body in which the soul is receptive to false impressions and the body susceptible to wounds and impairments, and things like these.³¹³

In What Respect They Are Indifferent

They say that the account of these things is to be made ⟨from⟩ the primary things in accordance with and contrary to nature. For what makes a difference and what is indifferent belong among things spoken of in relation to something.³¹⁴ Thus, they say, even when we call bodily and external things indifferent, we say they are indifferent in relation to living becomingly, in which living happily consists; by Zeus, not in relation to being in a condition in accordance with nature, nor in relation to impulse and aversion.³¹⁵

Preferred and Dispreferred Things

Further, among indifferent things some have more value and others less. Some have it in themselves, others through what they produce. Some are preferred, others dispreferred, and others neither.³¹⁶ Preferred things are those which, though indifferent, have much value, as value is reckoned among indifferent things. Dispreferred things are those which similarly have much disvalue. Neither preferred nor dispreferred are those which have neither much ⟨value nor⟩ disvalue.³¹⁷

Preferred Things of Soul Body and Externals

Of preferred things, some concern the soul, others the body, and others are external. Those concerning the soul include natural aptitude, progress, memory, sharpness of thought, a state in which people persevere in appropriate actions, and such arts as can contribute further to a life in accordance with nature.³¹⁸ Preferred things concerning the body include health, keenness of perception, and the like; external ones include parents, children, moderate possessions, and acceptance among people.³¹⁹

Dispreferred Things

Of dispreferred things, those concerning the soul are the opposites of the things just mentioned. Those concerning the body and external things are likewise the opposites of the bodily things just mentioned and of the external preferred things.³²⁰

Neither Preferred nor Dispreferred

Neither preferred nor dispreferred among things concerning the soul are impression, assent, and the like. Among bodily things are whiteness, blackness, brightness of the eyes, all pleasure and pain, and anything else of this kind.³²¹ Among external things, neither preferred ⟨nor dispreferred⟩ are such things as, being of little worth and offering nothing useful, provide altogether little service in themselves.³²²

The Value of Things Concerning the Soul

Since the soul has greater authority than the body also in relation to living in accordance with nature, they say that preferred things concerning the soul and in accordance with nature have more value than bodily and external things. For example, the soul’s natural aptitude for virtue surpasses the body’s natural aptitude, and the same holds in the other cases.³²³

What Stimulates Impulse and Aversion

Further, they say that some indifferent things stimulate impulse, others aversion, and others neither impulse nor aversion. What stimulates impulse is precisely what we said was in accordance with nature; what stimulates aversion is what is contrary to nature. What stimulates neither impulse nor aversion is what is neither, such as having an odd or an even number of hairs.³²⁴

Primarily Natural and Natural by Participation

Of indifferent things that are in accordance with nature, some are primarily in accordance with nature and others by participation. Primarily in accordance with nature is an activity or condition arising in accordance with the seminal principles, such as ⟨soundness and⟩ health, perception (I mean apprehension), and strength.³²⁵ In accordance with nature by participation are things that participate in activity and condition in accordance with the seminal principles, such as a sound hand, a healthy body, and unimpaired senses. The same holds by analogy for things contrary to nature.³²⁶

309.The first-person “we” belongs to the exposition preserved in the anthology. Wachsmuth questions whether “and choiceworthy and avoidable things” was added by a copyist from an earlier heading, but prints the words without deletion brackets; they are therefore translated here. “Indifferent” is a technical classification, explained in the following sentences, rather than an instruction to feel unconcerned.

310.Ὁρμή and ἀφορμή are rendered “impulse” and “aversion.” The first sense concerns good and evil, and the corresponding choiceworthy/avoidable distinction. The second concerns whether something stimulates movement toward or away from it. The following paragraph expressly denies that everything indifferent in the first sense is also indifferent for selection.

311.The angle brackets preserve Wachsmuth’s supplement, including the alternative connecting the hair example to the finger example. His apparatus cites Diogenes Laertius VII.104 and Sextus Empiricus, Against the Mathematicians XI.59–61 as parallels. The repeated ὡδί means “in this way”; “this way or that” expresses the contrast between the two gestures.

312.The former sense is explicitly the one defined through neither good nor evil. Ἐκλογή and ἀπεκλογή, “selection” and “rejection,” remain distinct from the technical choiceworthiness and avoidability of goods and evils. Value among indifferent things can guide selection without becoming an additional constituent of happiness. Compare Diogenes Laertius VII.105.

313.The third class concerns receptivity or susceptibility, not an actual false judgment or an actual wound. The Greek first names a condition of soul and body, then differentiates what each can receive. Πήρωσις denotes impairment or disablement; the examples classify bodily conditions without identifying them as moral vice.

314.“From” preserves the supplied ἀπό. The claim that these terms are relative requires the reader to ask “indifferent in relation to what?” It explains why the same bodily or external thing can be indifferent in one respect and make a difference in another.

315.Εὐσχημόνως ζῆν is living becomingly or properly; the parenthesis identifies this with living happily. Κατὰ φύσιν ἔχειν concerns being in a natural condition here, including bodily conditions. It is not silently substituted for the ethical end, “living in accordance with nature,” defined in II.7.6. The emphatic oath “by Zeus” is retained.

316.The compressed καθ’ αὑτά / ποιητικά distinguishes value in itself from value through production of something else. The English supplies “have it” from the preceding reference to value; it does not call the indifferent things goods. Προηγμένα and ἀποπροηγμένα are the terms rendered “preferred” and “dispreferred.”

317.“As value is reckoned among indifferent things” preserves ὡς ἐν ἀδιαφόροις, the explicit limit on this valuation. In the third class the supplied ἀξίαν μήτε remains bracketed. “Much” qualifies both sides of the comparison; the text need not be read as denying every small degree of value. Compare Diogenes Laertius VII.105–106.

318.Progress, προκοπή, and natural aptitude are listed among preferred indifferents, rather than identified with completed virtue. The arts are qualified: only those able to contribute to the natural life are included here. Καθήκοντα retains the translation “appropriate actions.”

319.Κτῆσις σύμμετρος means possessions in due or moderate measure; the source does not simply list unlimited wealth. Ἀποδοχή is acceptance or favorable reception among people. These items are still classified as preferred indifferents, despite the importance of family and social relations in ordinary life.

320.The source refers back to its preceding list rather than spelling out each opposite. Wachsmuth’s apparatus records a longer list in scholia on Lucian; it is not incorporated into the facing Greek or translated as though it belonged to this passage.

321.The source lists impression and assent without further qualification, and prints “all pleasure,” ἡδονὴν πᾶσαν. Those expressions are retained rather than narrowed to selected kinds. Χαροπότης denotes brightness or a light coloring of the eyes; “brightness of the eyes” keeps the bodily example distinct from joy or gladness. See Liddell and Scott, An Intermediate Greek–English Lexicon, s.v. χαροπότης.

322.The supplied μέν structures the contrast between soul and body and is expressed by the parallel English sentences. The more substantial supplement “nor dispreferred” remains bracketed. The final description distinguishes trivial external things from the family relations and possessions just listed as preferred.

323.The comparison ranks preferred indifferents; it does not turn aptitude for virtue into virtue itself. Wachsmuth prints “value,” ἀξίαν, where his apparatus records εὐεξίαν, “good condition.” The translation follows the printed comparison of value.

324.This restates the threefold distinction in terms of impulse and aversion. The hair example returns to the second sense of “indifferent” at II.7.7.2, where it was supplied by the editor; here it occurs in the unbracketed printed text. The order is now odd or even, as in the Greek.

325.Σπερματικοὶ λόγοι are the seminal principles already mentioned at II.7.3c: formative rational principles, not spoken arguments. Κίνησις and σχέσις retain “activity” and “condition,” as at II.7.5k. The parenthesis “I mean apprehension” belongs to the source and specifies its use of αἴσθησις; it is not an intervention by the translator. The supplied “soundness and” remains bracketed.

326.The distinction is illustrated by health and a healthy body, or soundness and a sound hand: the latter possess or participate in the former. The printed ὑγιεινόν is retained in the Greek. The closing analogy is not expanded into an invented list of contrary conditions.