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Book II Chapter 7

Virtue and Happiness in Accordance with Nature

Since a human being is a mortal rational animal, social by nature, they say that all human virtue and happiness are a life of consistency and agreement with nature.²⁸⁷

Zeno and Cleanthes on the End

Zeno defined the end thus: “to live in agreement.” This means living according to a single, harmonious rational principle, since those who live in conflict are unhappy.²⁸⁸ Those after him made the formulation more explicit: “to live in agreement with nature,” taking the predicate stated by Zeno to be incomplete. For Cleanthes, the first to succeed him in the school, added “with nature” and defined it thus: “The end is to live in agreement with nature.”²⁸⁹

Chrysippus Diogenes and Archedemus on the End

Chrysippus, wishing to make this clearer, expressed it thus: “to live in accordance with experience of what happens by nature.” Diogenes said: “to reason well in selecting and rejecting things in accordance with nature.”²⁹⁰ Archedemus said: “to live carrying out all appropriate actions.”²⁹¹

Antipater on the End

Antipater said: “to live continually selecting what is in accordance with nature and rejecting what is contrary to nature.”²⁹² They also frequently defined it thus: “continually and unswervingly to do everything in one’s power toward obtaining the things preferred in accordance with nature.”²⁹³

Three Senses of the End

Those of this school use “end” in three senses. In learned usage the final good is called an end, as when they say that agreement is the end.²⁹⁴ They also call the target an end, for example the life in agreement, speaking by reference to the corresponding predicate. In the third sense they call the end the ultimate among the objects of desire, to which all the others are referred.²⁹⁵

End and Target

They hold that end and target differ. The target, they say, is the body set before one, which those who aim at happiness strive to attain [text missing],²⁹⁶ since every virtuous person is happy and, conversely, every base person is unhappy.²⁹⁷

Goods Necessary for Happiness

Of goods, some are necessary for happiness and some are not. All the virtues and the activities that exercise them are necessary; joy, gladness, and cultivated pursuits are not necessary.²⁹⁸

Evils Necessary for Unhappiness

Similarly, of evils, some are necessary, as evils, for unhappiness, and some are not necessary. All the vices and the activities based on them are necessary; all the passions, the infirmities, and similar things are not necessary.²⁹⁹

Being Happy as the End

They say that the end is being happy, for the sake of which everything is done, while it itself is done for the sake of nothing else. This consists in living in accordance with virtue, in living in agreement, and further, since it is the same thing, in living in accordance with nature.³⁰⁰ Zeno defined happiness thus: “Happiness is a good flow of life.”³⁰¹

Happiness and Its Attainment

Cleanthes too used this definition in his own writings, as did Chrysippus and all their successors. They say that happiness is no different from the happy life, although they also say that happiness is set before one as the target, while the end is attaining happiness, which is the same as being happy.³⁰²

Living in Accordance with Nature and Virtue

It is therefore clear from these points that “living in accordance with nature,” “living nobly,” and “living well” are equivalent; and likewise “the noble and good” and “virtue and what participates in virtue.”³⁰³ Every good is noble, and similarly every shameful thing is evil. Hence the Stoic end is equivalent to the life in accordance with virtue.³⁰⁴

Choiceworthy and To Be Chosen

They say that what is choiceworthy differs from what is to be chosen. Every ⟨good⟩ is choiceworthy; every benefit is to be chosen, and is considered in connection with having the good.³⁰⁵ We therefore choose what is to be chosen, for example thinking wisely, which is considered in connection with having practical wisdom. We do not choose what is choiceworthy; if anything, we choose to have it.³⁰⁶

Endurance and Adherence

Similarly, all goods are worthy of being endured and held to, and the same analogy applies to the other virtues, even if they have not been named. All benefits, however, are to be endured and held to.³⁰⁷ The same account applies to the other cases concerning the vices.³⁰⁸

287.Πολιτικός describes the human being as social or fitted for civic life. The compressed sentence predicates a consistent life, in agreement with nature, of human virtue and happiness. It does not introduce bodily health, wealth, or success as additional requirements for happiness. The following formulations explain the agreement in different ways.

288.The first formula is simply ὁμολογουμένως ζῆν, “to live in agreement.” “With nature” is not silently inserted into Zeno’s words. The explanatory λόγος is rendered “rational principle”; ἕνα and σύμφωνον qualify its unity and harmony. The opposing condition is living in conflict, μαχομένως, not merely disagreement in conversation.

289.The account explicitly attributes the addition τῇ φύσει to Cleanthes and presents it as making an incomplete predicate more explicit. This is the history given by the source. Compare Diogenes Laertius VII.87, whose report associates the fuller formula with Zeno; that parallel has not replaced the wording or attribution printed here.

290.Diogenes is the Stoic Diogenes of Babylon, as at II.7.5b6. In his formula, both selection and rejection govern “things in accordance with nature.” The English does not replace this with selecting natural things and rejecting unnatural things, the explicit contrast in Antipater’s following formula. Compare Diogenes Laertius VII.88 for the related formulations.

291.Καθήκοντα are appropriate actions, the term used in the earlier divisions of ethics at II.7.2. Archedemus’s formula is preserved separately from reasoning well in selection and from living according to experience. The shared subject does not make the three statements identical quotations.

292.The placement of διηνεκῶς, “continually,” makes the selection and rejection an ongoing manner of life. Both sides of the contrast, κατὰ φύσιν and παρὰ φύσιν, are explicit here. The wording therefore differs from the preceding Diogenes formula.

293.The following verb is plural, ἀπέδιδον, “they defined,” rather than a singular naming Antipater again. The English retains that shift. “Everything in one’s power” renders πᾶν τὸ καθ’ αὑτόν. The aim is obtaining naturally preferred things, but the formula defines the end through one’s continual, unswerving effort toward them; it does not state that every desired external result must be attained.

294.Φιλόλογος συνήθεια is learned usage here, rather than a modern discipline of literary criticism or merely an educated conversation. The first sense concerns the final good; its example is agreement, ὁμολογία. The paragraph describes three uses of a word rather than positing three different ultimate ends.

295.The target example is the life in agreement, ὁμολογούμενος βίος, related to the predicate “to live in agreement.” The third sense concerns the ultimate object to which the other objects of desire are referred. Compare the earlier target/end distinction at II.7.3c and the explicit attainment distinction below at II.7.6e.

296.The printed word is σῶμα, “body”; Wachsmuth records a conjectural σῆμα, “mark,” but does not print it. The English therefore preserves the corporeal expression instead of replacing it with an ordinary archery target. The asterisks mark a gap after ἐφίεσθαι, “strive,” before the Greek subject “those who aim at happiness.” English word order moves the subject before the verb while retaining the gap after “attain.”

297.The surviving explanation is incomplete. No missing definition of the end is reconstructed here. The closing contrast between every virtuous and every base person is the claim of this Stoic exposition; it concerns happiness in the ethical sense of a good life, not a guarantee that every virtuous person continually feels gladness.

298.Χρηστικαὶ ἐνέργειαι are activities that put the virtues to use. The distinction between necessary and unnecessary goods retains joy, gladness, and pursuits as goods while denying that they are requirements of happiness. Compare their earlier classifications at II.7.5a, 5c, and 5g.

299.“Necessary” specifies what constitutes the unhappy condition in this ethical account; it does not recommend acquiring an evil. The qualification ὡς ἂν κακά is retained as “as evils.” The source lists passions and infirmities among the unnecessary evils without replacing them by particular examples such as distress or fear. Ἐπ’ αὐτῶν is rendered “based on them,” referring to the vices.

300.The subject of the definition is τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν, the activity expressed by “being happy,” rather than simply the noun “happiness.” The three formulations explain the same activity through virtue, agreement, and nature. The Greek explicitly states their identity; the English does not add further conditions to the definition.

301.Εὔροια is a good or favorable flow, and βίου means “of life.” The image describes the course of a life rather than an isolated pleasant feeling. The following sentence reports that Cleanthes, Chrysippus, and their successors also used this definition.

302.The source distinguishes happiness as the target from attaining it as the end, while identifying attainment with being happy. Καίτοι γε marks the qualification, retained as “although.” The English preserves the distinction without treating it as a second, competing definition of the happy life. Compare the earlier formulation of target and attainment at II.7.3c.

303.The paired expressions distinguish virtue from what participates in virtue, rather than identifying virtue alone with every instance of good. The printed κἀγαθόν contracts καὶ ἀγαθόν. The English follows this source’s formulation and keeps the ethical sense of καλόν, “noble,” visible beside “good.”

304.The printed assertion is “every shameful thing is evil,” πᾶν αἰσχρὸν κακόν. It has not been silently reversed to “every evil is shameful.” The conclusion is an equivalence in meaning between the Stoic end and the life in accordance with virtue, expressed by ἴσον δύνασθαι.

305.The distinction is between αἱρετόν, “choiceworthy,” and the verbal adjective αἱρετέον, “to be chosen.” It differs from the αἱρετόν / ληπτόν distinction at II.7.5o. Ὠφέλημα is a benefit, distinguished here from ἀγαθόν, a good. The supplied ἀγαθόν remains bracketed in English.

306.The example makes the distinction concrete: practical wisdom is the good one has, while thinking wisely is the activity chosen in connection with having it. The apparently paradoxical final sentence is retained, including εἰ ἄρα, “if anything.” It does not silently become the simpler claim that all goods are chosen.

307.The pairs ὑπομενετά / ὑπομενετέα and ἐμμενετά / ἐμμενετέα extend the preceding distinction between what is choiceworthy and what is to be chosen. The translation uses “worthy of being” and “to be” to keep the verbal-adjective contrast visible. The Greek applies the first pair of descriptions to all goods, not just to hardships.

308.Wachsmuth prints ἀρετῶν, “virtues,” where his apparatus records αἱρετῶν, “choiceworthy things.” The English follows the printed reading, and retains the compressed concluding reference to the vices without inventing a list of opposite activities. His apparatus also notes that the discussion recurs later, on printed pp. 97–98.