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Book II Chapter 7

Goods as Ends and Goods That Produce Happiness

Of goods, some are final, some productive, and some both. The wise person and the friend are productive goods only. Joy, gladness, confidence, and wise walking are final goods only.²⁶⁶ All the virtues are both productive and final goods: they both bring happiness into being and complete it by becoming parts of it.²⁶⁷

Evils as Ends and Evils That Produce Unhappiness

Correspondingly, of evils, some produce unhappiness, some are final, and some both. The foolish person and the enemy are productive evils only. Distress, fear, theft, a foolish question, and similar things ⟨are evils only⟩ of the final kind.²⁶⁸ The vices are both productive and final evils: they bring unhappiness into being and complete it by becoming parts of it.²⁶⁹

What Is Choiceworthy for Itself and What Is Productive

Again, of goods, some are choiceworthy for themselves and some productive. Whatever enters into reasonable choice for the sake of nothing else is choiceworthy for itself. Whatever does so by furnishing certain other things is described in respect of its productive role.²⁷⁰

Choiceworthy and Pleasing

Every good is choiceworthy, for it is pleasing, approvable, and praiseworthy; every evil is to be avoided. A good is choiceworthy insofar as it moves reasonable choice; pleasing insofar as it enters into choice without misgiving; ⟨and insofar as [text missing], approvable⟩.²⁷¹ Again, insofar as one might reasonably judge it to be among the things that proceed from virtue, it is ⟨praiseworthy⟩.²⁷²

Goods in Activity and Goods in a Condition

Again, of goods, some are in activity and some in a condition. Those in activity include joy, gladness, and temperate association. Those in a condition include orderly quiet, undisturbed repose, and manly attentiveness.²⁷³ Of those in a condition, some are also in a state, such as the virtues; others are in a condition only, like the examples just given. Not only the virtues are in a state, but also the arts that have been transformed by virtue in the virtuous person and have become unalterable, for they become, as it were, virtues.²⁷⁴

Cultivated Pursuits and the End of Life

They say that the so-called pursuits also belong among goods in a state: for example, love of music, love of letters, love of geometry, and similar things. For a pursuit is a certain way of selecting what in these arts is congenial to virtue and referring it to the end of life.²⁷⁵

Goods in Themselves and Goods in Relation

Again, of goods, some are in themselves, while others stand in a certain relation to something. Knowledge, just action, and the like are goods in themselves; honor, goodwill, friendship, and ⟨concord⟩ are goods in relation to something.²⁷⁶

Knowledge and Apprehension

Knowledge is a secure apprehension, unalterable by argument. In another sense, knowledge is a system of such apprehensions, as is logic, one of the particular branches, existing in the virtuous person.²⁷⁷ In another sense, it is a system of technical forms of knowledge that has its certainty from itself, as the virtues do. In another, it is a state receptive of impressions and unalterable by argument, which they say consists in tension and power.²⁷⁸

Friendship and Concord

Friendship is a sharing of life; concord is agreement in beliefs about the affairs of life.²⁷⁹ Among forms of friendship, acquaintance is friendship between people known to one another; familiarity, friendship between people accustomed to one another; companionship, friendship by choice, as between people of the same age; and guest-friendship, friendship between people of different lands. There is also a kind of kinship friendship arising from kin, and erotic friendship arising from love.²⁸⁰

Names of Virtues in Relation

Freedom from distress and good order are the same as temperance; intellect and understanding, the same as practical wisdom; readiness to share and readiness to give, the same as kindness. They have received these names, however, because they stand in a certain relation to something. This should also be observed in the case of the other virtues.²⁸¹

Unmixed and Mixed Goods

Again, of goods, some are unmixed, such as knowledge, and some mixed, such as flourishing in one’s children, a good old age, and a good life.²⁸² Flourishing in one’s children is a worthy possession of children in accordance with nature; a good old age is a worthy use of old age in accordance with nature; and a good life is similar.²⁸³

The Corresponding Divisions of Evils

In these cases it is always clear that evils too will have the corresponding divisions.²⁸⁴

Choiceworthy and To Be Taken

They say that what is choiceworthy differs from what is to be taken. What is choiceworthy moves an impulse complete in itself; ⟨what is to be taken is what we reasonably select⟩.²⁸⁵ As what is choiceworthy differs from what is to be taken, so what is choiceworthy ⟨for⟩ itself differs from what is to be taken for itself, and, in general, the good differs from what has value.²⁸⁶

266.“Final” renders τελικά, goods that belong to the end; “productive” renders ποιητικά, goods that bring happiness about. The examples are those of this source. In particular, θάρσος is confidence, not the virtue ἀνδρεία, courage, and walking retains the qualification “wise.”

267.The virtues have both roles: they produce happiness and constitute parts of its completion. “Productive” therefore does not mean that every productive good is merely an external instrument. Compare the corresponding classification in Diogenes Laertius VII.96–97, while retaining the examples printed here.

268.The supplied μόνον ἐστὶ κακά completes the predication after τελικά. Its English equivalent remains bracketed, although English word order places it before “of the final kind.” The source lists theft, κλοπή, and a foolish question, ἄφρων ἐρώτησις; neither has been replaced by an example from the good series.

269.Κακοδαιμονία is unhappiness or a wretched condition of life, the counterpart of εὐδαιμονία. “Final” concerns a constitutive role in that condition; it does not say that unhappiness is an end one should seek. The source repeats the productive and constitutive roles when explaining the vices.

270.The Greek leaves the second clause compressed; “does so” carries forward entering into reasonable choice. The distinction concerns why a good is chosen. Compare Diogenes’s two senses of “choiceworthy for themselves” at II.7.5b6. Wachsmuth removes a transmitted heading on choiceworthy and avoidable things here; it is not restored as ancient running text.

271.The near-sounding αἱρετόν and ἀρεστόν are distinguished as “choiceworthy” and “pleasing.” The latter is explained through choice without misgiving, ἀνυπόπτως, rather than through a sensation of pleasure. Wachsmuth supplies the frame of the “approvable” clause while leaving its defining words missing. The English preserves both the supplied frame and the gap.

272.The printed καθυπολαμβάνοι is retained in the sense “might judge,” and τῶν ἀπ’ ἀρετῆς as “among the things that proceed from virtue.” The source makes the judgment reasonable, rather than claiming that any praise establishes goodness. Wachsmuth’s supplied final predicate remains bracketed.

273.Κίνησις is rendered “activity” in this classification, while σχέσις is “condition,” distinguished from ἕξις, “state.” Ὁμιλία can include intercourse or association; the Greek does not specify a narrower setting here. Προσοχὴ ἔπανδρος is rendered “manly attentiveness,” retaining the printed noun despite Wachsmuth’s doubt about it in the apparatus.

274.The examples just given belong to the condition-only class, while the virtues also belong to the state class. The statement about arts has two qualifications: transformation by virtue in the virtuous person and becoming unalterable. The concluding οἱονεί, “as it were,” is retained; the text does not simply identify every art with a virtue.

275.The definition specifies selection, ἐκλεκτική, and direction toward the end of life. It does not declare every element of every cultivated art good. The printed αὐτά refers back to the selected things congenial to virtue. Compare the earlier definition of a pursuit at II.7.5b11.

276.This division concerns whether a good is described in itself or in relation to something; it differs from the preceding question of why a good is chosen. “Concord,” συμφωνία, is supplied by Wachsmuth in view of its definition on the following printed page. The bracketed term is retained here.

277.Κατάληψις is apprehension, and λόγος here is argument. The compressed example names logic as a particular branch existing in the virtuous person. The repeated “in another sense” distinguishes definitions; it does not require them to be successive stages of learning. Compare Diogenes Laertius VII.47 for the apprehension and receptive-state formulations.

278.The system’s certainty is described by the reflexive ἐξ αὑτοῦ, “from itself.” Wachsmuth prints ἐπιστημῶν, “forms of knowledge,” although he questions that word in his apparatus; the English retains it. The final definition brings the receptive state into the account of tension and power, recalling the soul’s tension at II.7.5b4.

279.Κοινωνία βίου is a sharing of life, while ὁμοδογματία specifies agreement in beliefs or judgments. The definition of concord therefore concerns agreement about life, rather than musical harmony. Its presence here explains Wachsmuth’s supplied συμφωνία in the preceding list.

280.The terms distinguish relationships by acquaintance, habitual association, choice, foreign origin, kinship, and erotic love. Ξενία carries the sense of guest-friendship between people from different lands. The same-age example qualifies companionship; it is not added as a requirement for every form of friendship.

281.The Greek predicates sameness while explaining the different names through relation. “Freedom from distress” renders ἀλυπία, and “readiness to share” and “readiness to give” render the substantivized adjectives μεταδοτική and ἐπιδοτική. Wachsmuth relocates this paragraph from after II.7.5m to the discussion of relations; that placement is followed here.

282.“Mixed” and “unmixed” retain μεμιγμένα and ἄμικτα. The following definitions combine having children or old age with worthy possession or use. The translation does not silently turn the examples into the bare possession of numerous children, longevity, or prosperity.

283.Wachsmuth prints κτῆσις, “possession,” in the children definition and χρῆσις, “use,” in the old-age definition; the distinction is preserved. The final “similar” leaves the good-life definition compressed, as in the Greek, rather than supplying a full sentence not printed in the source.

284.This brief sentence extends the preceding classifications to evils without spelling out another set of examples. The English follows Wachsmuth’s printed wording and does not manufacture the omitted lists.

285.Αἱρετόν is “choiceworthy,” while ληπτόν is “to be taken.” The distinction is expressed through impulse and reasonable selection, not merely through two English synonyms for desire. The whole definition of what is to be taken is supplied by Wachsmuth and remains bracketed in both languages. “Complete in itself” renders αὐτοτελής without adding a separate object for the impulse.

286.The passage extends the distinction to what is choiceworthy for itself and what is to be taken for itself, then to good and value. The supplied καθ’ in the first expression is represented by bracketed “for.” Wachsmuth suspects missing material before this paragraph in his apparatus, but prints no gap marker in the running text; no invented continuation is inserted here.