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Book II Chapter 7

Holiness and the Festival

Similarly, they say that the base are not holy. For they describe holiness as justice toward the gods. The base transgress many obligations of justice toward the gods, and are therefore unholy, unclean, impure, polluted, and without true festival observance.²⁴⁹

For they say that celebrating a festival belongs to the virtuous person, a festival being a time in which one should attend to the divine for the sake of honor and fitting commemoration. Hence the celebrant must join piously in such an observance.²⁵⁰

Ignorance and Madness

They further say that every base person is mad, being ignorant of himself and of what concerns him, which is madness. Ignorance is the vice opposed to practical wisdom; when it stands in a certain relation to something and makes the impulses unsettled and fluttering, it is madness.²⁵¹ They therefore describe madness in this way: fluttering ignorance.²⁵²

Goods That Are Always Present and Those That Are Not

Again, of goods, some belong to all wise people and always, while others do not. Every virtue, wise perception, wise impulse, and similar things belong to all wise people and at every time.²⁵³ Joy, gladness, and wise walking, however, belong neither to all wise people nor always.²⁵⁴

Evils That Are Always Present and Those That Are Not

Correspondingly, of evils, some belong to all foolish people and always, while others do not. Every vice, foolish perception, foolish impulse, and similar things belong to all foolish people ⟨and⟩ always. Distress, fear, and a foolish reply, however, belong neither to all foolish people nor at every time.²⁵⁵

Descriptions of Goods and Evils

All goods are beneficial, useful, advantageous, profitable, worthy, fitting, noble, and congenial. All evils, by contrast, have the opposite descriptions: harmful, difficult to use, disadvantageous, unprofitable, base, unfitting, shameful, and uncongenial.²⁵⁶

The Several Senses of Good and Evil

They say that “good” has several senses. The first occupies, as it were, the place of a source, and is defined thus: that from which, or by which, one comes to be benefited (the latter being a cause in the primary sense). ⟨And⟩ the second is that in accordance with which one comes to be benefited. A more general sense, extending also to the foregoing, is what is such as to benefit.²⁵⁷ Evil is likewise defined by analogy with good: that from which, or by which, one comes to be harmed; that in accordance with which one comes to be harmed; and, more generally than these, what is such as to harm.²⁵⁸

Goods Concerning the Soul and External Goods

Of goods, some concern the soul, some are external, and some neither concern the soul nor are external. Those concerning the soul are the virtues, ⟨the⟩ worthy states, and, generally, praiseworthy activities. External goods are friends, acquaintances, and similar things.²⁵⁹ Goods that neither concern the soul nor are external are virtuous people and, generally, ⟨those⟩ who possess the virtues.²⁶⁰

Evils Concerning the Soul and External Evils

Similarly, of evils, some concern the soul, some are external, and some neither concern the soul nor are external. Those concerning the soul are the vices together with depraved states and, generally, blameworthy activities. External evils are enemies together with their kinds. ⟨And⟩ those that neither concern the soul nor are external are base people and all who possess the vices.²⁶¹

Dispositions and States among Goods

Of goods concerning the soul, some are dispositions, some are states but not dispositions, and some are neither states nor dispositions. All the virtues are dispositions. Pursuits, such as divination and similar things, are states only, and not dispositions.²⁶² Activities in accordance with the virtues, such as an act of practical wisdom and the acquisition of temperance, are neither states nor dispositions.²⁶³

Dispositions and States among Evils

Similarly, of evils concerning the soul, some are dispositions, some are states but not dispositions, and some are neither states nor dispositions. All the vices are dispositions. Pronenesses, such as a tendency to envy, a tendency to distress, and the like, are states only, as are diseases and infirmities, such as love of money, drunkenness, and similar things.²⁶⁴ ⟨And⟩ activities in accordance with the vices, such as acting foolishly, acting unjustly, and similar acts, are neither states nor dispositions.²⁶⁵

249.Ὁσιότης is holiness or justice toward the gods, distinguished in wording from the preceding εὐσέβεια, piety. The accumulation of negative descriptions is retained; “without true festival observance” renders ἀνεορτάστους in light of the following ethical definition of celebrating. The report does not merely list who is physically present at public festivities.

250.Ἀστεῖος means the virtuous or morally excellent person here, not simply someone from a city or someone witty. Ἐπισημασία is a marking or commemoration, qualified as fitting. The concluding συγκαθεικέναι is difficult, and Wachsmuth records conjectures; “join ... in such an observance” conveys participation in the prescribed order without silently altering the printed Greek.

251.This is the report’s ethical use of μανία, madness, within the opposition between wisdom and vice; it is not a retrospective clinical diagnosis of individuals. Αὑτοῦ and καθ’ αὑτόν refer to oneself and what concerns oneself. The compressed πρός τί πως ἔχουσαν leaves the particular relation unspecified, and the translation does not invent a more precise cause.

252.“Fluttering” preserves πτοιώδης, connected with πτοία, the fluttering of the soul in the earlier definition of passion at II.7.1.4. Here the word describes unstable impulses and then qualifies ignorance itself. Compare Diogenes Laertius VII.124 for the related claim about folly and madness. The next source passage, II.7.5c, returns to divisions of goods and evils.

253.The distinction concerns whether a good belongs to every wise person at every time. “Wise perception” and “wise impulse” preserve the source’s repeated φρόνιμος, rather than reducing the examples to virtue alone. Compare the shorter parallel classification in Diogenes Laertius VII.98.

254.“Wise walking” renders φρονίμη περιπάτησις, a particular activity qualified by wisdom. It is not an assertion that ordinary walking is itself a moral good, nor a reference to membership in the Peripatetic school. The two qualifications, “all” and “always,” are retained separately.

255.The evil series mirrors the good series but gives “a foolish reply,” ἄφρων ἀπόκρισις, as its example of a particular activity. The English does not substitute foolish walking to make the lists symmetrical. Λύπη here is distress, alongside fear. The supplied conjunction before “always” remains bracketed.

256.The eight descriptions and their eight opposites retain the order of the Greek. Several English terms overlap, as do the Greek expressions; they are not separate classes of good. Εὔχρηστα and δύσχρηστα concern use, while οἰκεῖα and ἀνοίκεια express congeniality or its opposite. Καλόν retains its ethical sense, “noble,” beside αἰσχρόν, “shameful.”

257.The definition distinguishes ἀφ’ οὗ, “from which,” ὑφ’ οὗ, “by which,” and καθ’ ὅ, “in accordance with which.” The compressed parenthesis is read as specifying the causal force of “by which.” Wachsmuth rearranges transmitted wording in this difficult sentence; the English follows his printed order and preserves the parenthesis. The image is of a source or spring, πηγή.

258.The general formulation, τὸ οἷον ὠφελεῖν, describes what is such as to benefit and includes the preceding senses. The evil series repeats the distinctions using harm, but has no corresponding causal parenthesis. The English does not add one. The supplied δέ is represented by bracketed “and.”

259.“Concerning the soul” translates περὶ ψυχήν without changing it into “within the soul.” Friends and acquaintances appear in the external class; the passage does not reclassify health or wealth as moral goods. The supplied article before “worthy states” remains visible in English.

260.The third class names the possessors of virtue, rather than adding bodily goods. It distinguishes a person from virtues, states, and activities concerning that person’s soul. The supplied article before the participial expression is rendered by bracketed “those.” Compare Diogenes Laertius VII.95–96 for the parallel threefold division.

261.The unusual printed σὺν ταῖς εἴδεσιν is retained as “together with their kinds”; it is not silently replaced by a conjectural expression about malicious people. The English preserves the source’s three classes and its move from vices to their possessors. Wachsmuth’s supplied connective is represented by bracketed “and.”

262.Διάθεσις is rendered “disposition” and ἕξις “state” to keep this particular division visible. The wording “states but not dispositions” implies that the first class is not simply excluded from the broader category of states. The scheme concerns the Stoic exposition here; it should not be imposed on every earlier use of ἕξις in the anthology. “Pursuits” continues ἐπιτηδεύματα from II.7.5b11.

263.The printed φρονίμευμα is an act of practical wisdom. Wachsmuth prints κτῆσιν, “acquisition,” for temperance, although his apparatus discusses “use” and “exercise” as alternatives. The translation follows the printed text and does not turn the acquisition into the continuing possession of temperance.

264.Εὐκαταφορίαι are pronenesses or tendencies to fall into affections. The examples φθονερία and ἐπιλυπία are therefore rendered as tendencies, rather than as isolated episodes of envy or distress. “Diseases” and “infirmities” preserve νοσήματα and ἀρρωστήματα as terms of this ancient ethical classification.

265.The act nouns ἀφρόνευσις and ἀδίκευσις mark particular activities, as distinct from the vices and pronenesses already listed. The bracketed “and” represents the supplied δ’. The account does not identify these three categories with modern clinical classifications.