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← ExitStobaeus, Volume II

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Book II Chapter 7

Virtue and Vice

There is nothing intermediate between virtue and vice. For all human beings have natural starting points toward virtue and, according to Cleanthes, are, as it were, like half-lines of iambic verse. Hence, while incomplete they are base, but when brought to completion they are virtuous.²³⁵

They also say that the wise person does everything ⟨in accordance with⟩ all the virtues. Every action of his is complete, and therefore falls short of no virtue.²³⁶

The Wise Person and the Lover

In keeping with these doctrines, they also maintain that he acts with understanding, with dialectical skill, with skill at symposia, and with skill in love. “Lover,” however, is spoken of in two ways: one who acts in accordance with virtue is virtuous; one who acts in accordance with vice is blamed as a person mad with love.²³⁷ Love is [text missing]. And “worthy of love” is spoken of in the same way as “worthy of affection,” not “worthy of being enjoyed”; for the person worthy of a virtuous person’s love is worthy of love.²³⁸

The Arts of the Symposium and of Love

Like the art of love, they include the art of the symposium among the virtues. The latter concerns appropriate conduct at a symposium and is knowledge of how drinking gatherings should be conducted and how people should drink together. The art of love is knowledge of the pursuit of young men with good natural gifts, encouraging them toward virtue, and, in general, knowledge of loving nobly. They therefore say that the person with understanding will fall in love.²³⁹

Love and the Making of Friendship

Loving by itself, however, is indifferent, since it is sometimes found among the base as well. Love is neither appetite nor directed toward anything base, but an undertaking to make friendship on account of the appearance of beauty.²⁴⁰

Doing Everything Well

They also say that the wise person does everything well—what he does, obviously. For just as we say that the flute player or the singer to the lyre does everything well, with the understanding that the former’s actions concern flute playing and the latter’s singing to the lyre, so the practically wise person does everything well, both what he does—yes, by Zeus—and what he does not do.²⁴¹ Because he accomplishes everything according to right reason and, as it were, according to virtue, an art extending over the whole of life, they thought the doctrine that the wise person does everything well followed consistently. Correspondingly, the base person does everything he does badly and in accordance with all the vices.²⁴²

Pursuits and Knowledge

They call love of music, love of letters, love of horses, love of hunting, and, in general, the so-called general educational arts “pursuits,” but not forms of knowledge. They ⟨also⟩ leave these among worthy states, and accordingly say that only the wise person is a lover of music and of letters, and similarly in the other cases.²⁴³ They describe a pursuit in this way: a path through an art or a part of one that leads to ⟨things⟩ in accordance with virtue.²⁴⁴

The Wise Person and Particular Arts

They say that only the wise person can be a good diviner, poet, orator, dialectician, or critic; but he is not all of these, since some of these pursuits also require acquiring certain principles.²⁴⁵ They say that divination is knowledge that considers signs from gods or divine beings bearing upon human life. The kinds of divination are understood similarly.²⁴⁶

The Priest and Piety

They also say that only the wise person is a priest, and no base person is. For a priest must be experienced in the laws concerning sacrifices, prayers, purifications, consecrations, and all such matters; he also needs religious purity, piety, experience in service to the gods, and inward acquaintance with the divine nature.²⁴⁷ Not a single one of these belongs to the base person; hence all the foolish are impious. For impiety, being a vice, is ignorance of service to the gods, while piety, as we have said, is knowledge of service to the gods.²⁴⁸

235.The image of half-lines renders Wachsmuth’s printed ἡμιαμβείων; his apparatus records a different manuscript form and another proposed reading. The brief comparison associates natural starting points with incompleteness that requires completion. Its full original setting is not preserved here. The denial of an intermediate state is the report’s classification of virtue and vice; compare Diogenes Laertius VII.127.

236.The supplied κατά is bracketed through “in accordance with.” The claim concerns every action of the wise person and the inseparability of the virtues, rather than an action’s displaying just one virtue while lacking another. The translated subject of “falls short” is each complete action; the Greek infinitive construction is compressed.

237.The subject of the opening sentence is the wise person carried forward from II.7.5b8. The adverbs concern intelligent and skilled conduct in dialectic, the symposium, and love. The subsequent distinction prevents “lover” from being treated as uniformly a term of praise. The symposium is a drinking gathering, rather than a modern academic conference.

238.The asterisks mark a gap after “love” in Wachsmuth’s Greek. His apparatus offers possible restorations, but none is inserted here; the English explicitly marks the loss. The following distinction separates being worthy of a virtuous person’s love from being an object of enjoyment. Ἀξιοφίλητος is rendered “worthy of affection” to preserve its relation to friendship without making the two Greek compounds identical.

239.The Greek balances the symposium and love with τὴν μέν and τὴν δέ; the English names the arts again to keep their referents clear. Θήρα literally means a hunt or pursuit, and νέων here denotes young men in the ancient erotic and educational setting; it does not specify an exact age. The printed προτρεπτικήν and the compressed ἐπὶ τὴν κατ’ ἀρετήν connect the pursuit with encouragement toward virtue. Compare Diogenes Laertius VII.129 for the related Stoic report.

240.The text distinguishes loving considered by itself from the definition of love directed toward friendship. “Indifferent” retains the ethical classification, rather than expressing emotional coldness. Ἐπιθυμία is appetite or desire in the technical discussion; φιλοποιία is the making of friendship, and ἔμφασις the appearance or manifestation of beauty. The two statements are preserved together without silently removing their tension.

241.The comparison qualifies “everything” by the relevant art. Αὐλητής is a player of the aulos, conventionally called a flute; κιθαρῳδός sings to a stringed instrument. The source’s emphatic and paradoxical extension to what the wise person does not do is retained. Wachsmuth brackets the rejected οὐ after ναί; it remains in the Greek but is omitted from the English, as his deletion requires.

242.Virtue’s art concerns the whole of life, which explains the wider scope of its “everything.” The following passage on particular professions also requires additional principles in some cases; the present statement should not be expanded into automatic mastery of every specialized craft. The final counterpart expressly concerns all the vices, matching the earlier inseparability claim for virtues.

243.Ἐπιτηδεύματα are cultivated pursuits or occupations; they are distinguished from ἐπιστῆμαι. Ἐγκύκλιοι τέχναι are the arts of general education, not an encyclopedia in the modern sense. Φιλομουσία can extend to cultivated engagement with the arts of the Muses, while φιλογραμματία concerns letters or literary study. The supplied τε is represented by “also.” The printed καταλείπουσι, “leave,” is retained rather than another proposed verb of enumeration.

244.The positive ethical qualification governs calling these worthy states and attributing them properly to the wise person; the report need not be read as denying that other people ever play music or study letters. The supplied article in ἐπὶ τὰ κατ’ ἀρετήν is represented by the bracketed “things.” “A part of one” retains the alternative ἢ μέρους, referring back to the art.

245.The qualification οὐ πάντα δέ, “but not all,” is essential. The report’s restriction to the wise person does not mean that every wise person already possesses every specialized competence. Some require the further acquisition of θεωρήματα, principles. Κριτικός here denotes a critic or expert judge, particularly in the literary setting of poetry and rhetoric, rather than simply a habit of criticizing others.

246.Μαντική is divination, interpreted here as knowledge concerning divine signs. Δαίμονες are divine beings; translating them as “demons” in a uniformly hostile sense would impose a later association. The passage states the reported doctrine and its definition, rather than supplying evidence that any particular act of divination succeeded.

247.The priesthood is defined through ethical and religious competence, rather than the mere possession of an office. Ἱδρύσεις concerns establishing or consecrating sacred objects or cults; ἁγιστεία concerns religious purity or holy observance. “Inward acquaintance” renders the expression literally meaning being within the divine nature; it does not assert a particular initiation ceremony. The supplied τοῦ introduces that infinitive construction and is expressed through English grammar.

248.The supplement δέ τ restores the connective and the beginning of τι in the compressed negative expression; English renders its force in “not a single one” without adding a separate bracketed noun. The opposition of ignorance and knowledge repeats the earlier definition of piety at II.7.5b2.6, printed p. 62. Wachsmuth’s parenthetical page reference is omitted from the ancient sentence. The universal description of the foolish as impious is the report’s claim.