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Reading language

Book I Chapter 59

Chapter 59 · Belief

On belief.²⁰⁵⁷

1.1 · Truth and falsity in the soul

Plato, from the Sophist.

“What, then? As for thought, belief, and appearance, is it not already clear that all these arise in our souls as both false and true? You will understand this more easily ⟨if⟩ you first grasp what they are and how each differs from the others.”

“Just explain them.”²⁰⁵⁸

1.2 · Thought as silent dialogue

“Then thought and speech are the same, except that the dialogue occurring within the soul with itself, without voice, has been given precisely this name by us: thought?”

“Certainly.”

“And the stream from the soul that passes through the mouth with sound has been called speech?”

“True.”²⁰⁵⁹

1.3 · Assertion, denial, and belief

“And we know that this is present in speech.”

“What?”

“Assertion and denial.”

“We do.”

“So when this occurs silently within the soul in thought, have you any name for it other than belief?”

“How could I?”²⁰⁶⁰

1.4 · Belief through perception

“And when belief comes to someone, not by itself but through perception, can this sort of experience in turn rightly be called anything other than appearance?”

“Nothing else.”²⁰⁶¹

1.5 · The related forms of discourse

“Then, since speech could be true or false, and among these things thought proved to be the soul’s dialogue with itself, belief the completion of thought, and what we call ‘it appears’ a mixture of perception and belief, must not some of these too sometimes be false, since these forms of discourse are related?”

“How could it be otherwise?”

“You understand, then, that false belief and speech have been discovered first.”²⁰⁶²

2 · The mind’s sight

Plato, from the Symposium.

“Indeed, the mind’s ⟨sight begins⟩ to see keenly when the sight of the eyes begins to lose its prime.”²⁰⁶³

3.1 · Losing a belief willingly or unwillingly

Plato, Republic, Book III.

“It seems to me that a belief leaves the mind either willingly or unwillingly: a false belief willingly, when someone learns better, but every true belief unwillingly.”

“I understand the willing case,” he said, “but I do [not] need to learn about the unwilling one.”²⁰⁶⁴

3.2 · Truth as a good

“Well, then,” I said, “do you not also think that people are deprived of good things unwillingly, but of bad things willingly? Or is being deceived about the truth not bad, and holding to the truth good? Or does believing things as they are not seem to you to be holding to the truth?”

“Yes,” he said, “you are right; and it seems to me that people are deprived of true belief against their will.”²⁰⁶⁵

2057.The apparatus records the heading in the Laurentian table of contents. Doxa is belief or opinion, which may be true or false. The chapter contains three Platonic extracts. Dialogue exchanges are placed on separate lines on both facing pages; speaker names absent from this printing are not added.

2058.The edition identifies Sophist 263e-264b. It supplies an, represented here by if with the following conditional verb. The apparatus notes an additional question in Plato at the transition to You will understand; it is absent from this excerpt and is not imported. Phantasia is rendered appearance in this discussion of a belief arising through perception.

2059.Dianoia is thought, logos speech or discourse, and dialogos dialogue. Their relationship is explained through the contrast between silent conversation within the soul and its audible stream through the mouth. The stream image also occurs in the Timaeus excerpt at I.55.3.

2060.Phasis and apophasis are assertion and denial. The passage moves from what spoken discourse does to its silent counterpart in thought. The reply How could I? agrees that belief is the appropriate name; it does not ask for an alternative explanation.

2061.The source retains doxa, belief, where the apparatus reports its omission in Plato. Its presence makes the construction less regular: belief and this sort of experience both enter the clause. The English smooths their relationship without removing belief from the facing Greek. Appearance here combines a perceptual experience with belief.

2062.The printed phainetai, it appears, is retained as the expression being explained, rather than replaced in the Greek by phantasia. The source has tōn logōn, of the discourses, where the apparatus reports tōi logōi, to speech, in Plato. The English takes the printed plural as describing related forms of discourse. First points to the surrounding argument in the Sophist, beyond the limits of this excerpt.

2063.The edition identifies Symposium 219a and supplies opsis archetai, sight begins. The saying contrasts mental discernment with the waning acuity of bodily vision. Oxys, keen, is used metaphorically for the mind, unlike its applications to pitch or sour taste in the preceding chapters.

2064.The edition identifies Republic III, 412e-413a. The rejected ou, not, is retained in square brackets; the reply’s intended sense is that the speaker still needs the second case explained. Metamanthanein means learning differently or correcting one’s previous understanding. Willingly and unwillingly concern the person relinquishing the belief.

2065.The argument treats true belief as a good and error as an evil. The apparatus reports that the manuscripts reverse willingly and unwillingly in the first question; the editor’s printed correction follows Plato and the parallel excerpt in Book II. The English follows that corrected text. This completes chapter 59.