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40.6 · Lives before embodiment
I.49.40.6 · Wachsmuth pp. 380
We must also consider the lives of souls before they enter a body, since these lives too differ greatly among themselves. Their different modes of life make their first conjunction different as well. Those newly initiated and rich in contemplation of beings, those who accompany the gods and are akin to them, and those wholly perfected and containing the forms of soul in their entirety all first become implanted in bodies free from affections and undefiled. But those filled to satiety with desires and full of other passions first unite with bodies already attended by passions.1492
41.1 · When soul becomes present
I.49.41.1 · Wachsmuth pp. 381
In the same work.
According to Hippocrates, the member of the Asclepiads, the actual imparting of life and presence of soul first arise when the seed is formed, for it is then suitably disposed to share in life; according to Porphyry, they arise at the newborn’s first emergence in birth.1493
41.2 · A possible sequence of powers
I.49.41.2 · Wachsmuth pp. 381
There could also be another opinion, not yet stated even now: that soul has several powers and substances, and that at different times, according to the developing body’s readiness, it shares first in nature, then in perception, then in impulsive life, and subsequently in rational soul, with intellectual soul at the end. Such are the opinions admitted by the association of souls with bodies as it develops over time.1494
41.3 · Drawing soul in from outside
I.49.41.3 · Wachsmuth pp. 381
As for the topic of souls’ entry, under which we inquire how soul is introduced, one opinion has three forms. It draws soul in from outside at what is called conception: either through the eagerness of the begetter, by means of breathing; or through the eagerness of the receiving [womb], when it is suitably disposed to retain it; or through the sympathy of both, when both, breathing together in common, possess an attractive property, nature also moving in concert;1495
41.4 · Entry under necessity
I.49.41.4 · Wachsmuth pp. 381
another opinion makes ⟨it⟩, self-moving, enter the organic body under a necessity deriving either from the universe, from the universal soul, or from creation as a whole.1496
41.5 · Using the body: helmsman and rider
I.49.41.5 · Wachsmuth pp. 382
The use of the body, moreover, requires careful distinctions. Some say that it resembles the steering of a ship, from which the helmsman can also be released and stand apart. Others compare it to mounting a vehicle and guiding a journey and conveyance shared with it;1497
41.6 · Cooperation, inclination, part, and art
I.49.41.6 · Wachsmuth pp. 382
others offer what they consider a more fitting likeness: cooperation in which both contribute equal shares, or a leaning and inclination toward the body that exercises mastery over it. Others accept none of these accounts, but say that soul is a part within the whole living being; still others say that it is an art implanted in its instruments, as if ⟨the⟩ tiller were itself ensouled.1498
41.7 · Powers free of particular bodies
I.49.41.7 · Wachsmuth pp. 382
The purer of the Platonists, such as the followers of Plotinus, say that the organic body begins its movement from these parts, serving for generation the powers that use it. But they maintain that the powers themselves are free of particular bodies.1499
42.1 · Souls’ association with the gods
I.49.42.1 · Wachsmuth pp. 382
⟨In the same work.⟩
There has been some dispute about souls’ association with the gods. Some say that gods cannot mingle with souls confined in the body; others maintain that pure souls share a single common civic life with the gods, even while they dwell fully in bodies. Others assign souls to a shared association only with divine spirits, or with heroes as well.1500
42a.1 · Criteria for the better life
I.49.42a.1 · Wachsmuth pp. 382-383
* * some are the better, judged according to Plato by purification, elevation, and perfection of soul; others are the worse, distinguished in contrast by the opposites of these. According to the Stoics, the criterion is fellowship and the nobility dependent on nature. According to the Peripatetics, they are preferred for proportion in accordance with nature and for intellectual life above human nature;1501
42a.2 · Further standards and countless lives
I.49.42a.2 · Wachsmuth pp. 383
according to Herillus, for knowledge; according to Ariston, for indifference; according to Democritus, for decorum; and according to others, for some portion of nobility. Or they find what is choiceworthy in freedom from disturbance, according to Hieronymus, or in other modes of conduct. From these arise the particular lives, divided without limit within becoming. We need not investigate them busily, but may let them run on into infinity and bid them farewell.1502
43.1 · On death: the central question
I.49.43.1 · Wachsmuth pp. 383
In the same work: on death.
When death comes after life here, what is it that happens? Just as, according to the different schools, soul pre-existed bodies at their coming-to-be, came into existence along with them, or somehow arose in them afterward, does it likewise, in dying, perish before the body, perish together with it, or remain on its own after its departure from here? Such, then, is the question as a whole;1503
43.2 · Bodily processes and Cornutus
I.49.43.2 · Wachsmuth pp. 383-384
its parts and division into kinds admit many disputes of this sort. Do things that previously lived then die through suffocation, when the air passages are prevented from receiving the breath outside; through the dissolution and slackening of tension; or through heat somehow being extinguished within? But if death occurs in this way, soul is destroyed before the body or together with it, as Cornutus thinks.1504