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37.9 · Ascent and descent
I.49.37.9 · Wachsmuth pp. 373-374
Accordingly, the works of universal and more divine souls are unmixed because of the purity of their substance; those of souls in matter and particular souls are no longer undefiled in the same way. The works of souls ascending and being released from becoming are henceforth freed from bodies, whereas those of descending souls are entangled and interwoven with them in many ways.1463
37.10 · Luminous vehicles and solid bodies
I.49.37.10 · Wachsmuth pp. 374
Souls borne upon luminous pneumas, and easily bringing about through them whatever they wish, manifest their own works from above without trouble. But the works inserted into more solid bodies and held within them become in some measure imbued with the nature of those bodies.1464
37.11 · What turns toward what
I.49.37.11 · Wachsmuth pp. 374
The works of universal souls turn the things they govern toward themselves, whereas those of divided souls are themselves turned toward the things of which they take care.1465
37.12 · Functions of the composite
I.49.37.12 · Wachsmuth pp. 374
On another principle for distinguishing these same matters, the Peripatetic opinion assigns the works of soul solely to the living being, the composite. [Plato, however, attaches them primarily to soul and only then imparts them to the composite.]1466
37.13 · Soul prior to nature
I.49.37.13 · Wachsmuth pp. 374
Plato and Pythagoras, by setting soul’s substance above nature and making it generative of nature, give it works prior to and more honorable than nature. They do not make soul receive its rule from nature; they suppose that soul itself directs its own activities from itself and about itself. Whatever noble and excellent motions in it surpass nature, they set apart in their own right.1467
37.14 · Unity, conflict, and harmony
I.49.37.14 · Wachsmuth pp. 374-375
There are, moreover, many disagreements among the Platonists themselves. Some, such as Plotinus and Porphyry, bring the forms and parts of life and its operations into a single order and form. Others, such as Numenius, draw them into conflict. Others harmonize them out of conflicting elements, as do the followers of Atticus and Plutarch. These last say that disorderly and discordant motions exist beforehand, and that the motions which order and arrange them enter subsequently. In this way they weave concord from both;1468
37.15 · Causes of activities leading downward
I.49.37.15 · Wachsmuth pp. 375
the cause of activities leading downward being, according to Plotinus, primary otherness; according to Empedocles, the [first] flight from the god; according to Heraclitus, rest in the midst of change; according to the Gnostics, derangement or deviation; and according to Albinus, the mistaken judgment of free choice.1469
37.16 · Evil arising from external attachments
I.49.37.16 · Wachsmuth pp. 375
Others, in turn, disagree with these accounts and attach evil to soul in one way or another through things that adhere to it from outside: Numenius and Cronius often derive it from matter; these same thinkers, and Harpocration, sometimes derive it from bodies; Plotinus and Porphyry usually derive it from nature and irrational life.1470
37.17 · Human activities and degrees of imperfection
I.49.37.17 · Wachsmuth pp. 375
According to Aristotle, these things are distinguished separately in the human sphere by forms of life and other defining criteria. According to the Stoics, such operations of life are apportioned in ever less complete forms; and the further they proceed into irrationality, the more the inferior operations are carried toward incompleteness in comparison with the prior ones.1471
37.18 · Human and animal resemblances
I.49.37.18 · Wachsmuth pp. 375
But as I have heard from certain Platonists, such as Porphyry and many others, human operations become like those of beasts, and those of animals like human operations, to the extent that things distinguished by different substances are naturally capable of resembling one another.1472
38.1 · The measure of soul: unity and plurality
I.49.38.1 · Wachsmuth pp. 376
In the same work: on the measure of soul.
Some posit one substance of soul in number, yet hold that it becomes multiple through relations and assignments, as Amelius thinks, or through inspirations from the universal soul, as the Orphics say;1473
38.2 · Returning multiplicity to unity
I.49.38.2 · Wachsmuth pp. 376
then, drawing back from the multiplicity of the whole to the one soul that has laid aside its relations and its assignments to another, and releasing it from division among its participants, as the distinction among those participants is dissolved, they preserve it whole and everywhere the same. They give it one substance, bounded by unity.1474
38.3 · Infinitely many worlds and souls
I.49.38.3 · Wachsmuth pp. 376
Others think that, in infinitely many worlds, as the followers of Democritus and Epicurus suppose, from infinitely many atoms coming together by chance * * souls are constituted from elements of this kind. In accordance with their own premises, they declare the souls to be infinite in number.1475
38.4 · Endless generation and transformation
I.49.38.4 · Wachsmuth pp. 376
Those who generate souls from seeds, each capable of sowing many more, leave infinity always in the process of coming-to-be, since this generative process goes on forever and nowhere stops. Those who produce many living beings and many lives by transformation from one living being that perishes conceive an unlimited multitude of souls through continuous transformation and the unceasing generation that succeeds it: the multitude always becomes greater.1476