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Book I Chapter 49

25a.2 · The purpose of a threefold division

In Plato and in Aristotle’s ethical writings, the soul is said to have three parts. This view has prevailed among the many, who do not recognize that the division has been adopted for the purpose of establishing the virtues, rather than simply to encompass all the parts. For surely the imaginative, the perceptive, the intellective, and ⟨the⟩ nutritive powers will not be included in this division.¹³⁷⁰

25a.3 · Two souls and their interaction

Others, including Numenius, think that we possess not three parts of one soul, or even two, the rational and the irrational, but two souls, as we do other things: one rational and the other irrational. Among them, some consider both immortal; others consider the rational soul immortal, while the irrational not only ceases its characteristic motion in its activities, but is also dissolved in its substance. Others held that, when two souls are interwoven with each other in the same place, their movements are twofold: the souls become like one another because, in their union, each shares in what the other undergoes.¹³⁷¹

25a.4 · Parts require a different underlying subject

We must explain how a power differs from a part. A part differs in kind from the character of another part, whereas powers concern the same kind. That is why Aristotle rejected parts in the case of the soul, but did not reject powers: having different parts immediately introduces a difference in the underlying subject, whereas having different powers can occur in one underlying subject.¹³⁷²

25a.5 · Longinus: one thing with many powers

Longinus holds that even the living creature does not have many parts, but is without parts while having many powers. He cites Plato’s saying that soul becomes divided into many parts in bodies, although in itself it is without parts. Because it does not have many parts, it does not follow that it has only one power: a single thing without parts can have several powers.¹³⁷³

25a.6 · A criterion for distinguishing the accounts

Perhaps, then, we must sort out this great confusion by setting a criterion for recognizing difference and lack of difference in respect of parts; then for distinguishing powers from parts and from one another; and then, at a higher level, substances, asking whether several could exist in one. This will make it possible to know whether the soul in a living creature has many parts or only many powers. We can then decide whether to agree with those who confine one soul within the human being but say that it has many parts, either in itself or when it comes to be within that human being; or whether there was a conjunction of several souls, and the human being most resembled a choir singing together, possessing unity through the concord of those who make up the whole; or whether the differentiated plurality belonged to something one in substance.¹³⁷⁴

25a.7 · Part, constitution, and power

We must therefore explain that power, part, and constitution differ in the case of soul as follows. A part is what differs from another part in its underlying subject, its form, and its activities. Constitution is the fitness proper to the parts for that to which they are naturally suited. Power is a state of that constitution enabling activity in accordance with the way each thing is constituted. Some, however, have said that constitution and power are the same.¹³⁷⁵

25a.8 · An apple’s powers and its pieces

A power differs from a part. ⟨For powers⟩ are observed in plurality throughout one and the same underlying whole, without being limited to one quantity and [in] another of the underlying substance. Parts, however, take for themselves a certain quantity of the substance and circumscribe a distinct portion of it. For example, an apple’s powers are all in one thing, whereas its parts are separated in different places. The concept of a part concerns quantity, since a part takes a smaller quantity in relation to the constitution of the whole; the concept of a power has taken in the conception of the whole. Hence powers are without parts and extend throughout the whole, whereas parts are lesser, having the quantity of a portion instead of that of the whole.¹³⁷⁶

25a.9 · One soul, activities in different bodily regions

How, then, is soul without parts and yet threefold? Those who understand the soul’s parts quantitatively are understandably puzzled about how it can be both without parts and threefold. They resolve the difficulty by saying that, according to its own account and in itself, it is without parts, but that it is threefold in so far as, coming to be in a divisible body, it occupies different parts of that body for its different activities. For it is certainly not ⟨the⟩ soul itself that possesses a head, a chest, and a liver; rather, the different activities occurring through these, distributed among different bodily parts, have transferred division back to the soul from those parts.¹³⁷⁷

25a.10 · Nicolaus: qualitative divisions

Nicolaus did not think that the parts of the soul should be understood quantitatively, but rather qualitatively, like the parts of an art or of philosophy. In the case of quantity, the whole is completed from its parts and, in comparison with something else, becomes more or less, smaller or greater, when a part is added or removed. But we do ⟨not⟩ speak of parts of soul in this way. Its quantity is not completed by them, since it is neither a magnitude nor possessed of a plurality. We speak instead as we do of the parts of an art.¹³⁷⁸

25a.11 · The limit of the analogy with an art

But soul differs from these as well. An art, ⟨if⟩ some part is absent, would not be whole or complete. Every soul, however, is complete, while every living creature that has not attained its natural end is incomplete.¹³⁷⁹

25a.12 · Powers of the being that possesses soul

Nicolaus therefore understands the parts of soul as powers of the being that possesses it. For a living creature, and in general anything ensouled, can do many things by possessing soul: live, perceive, move, think, and desire. Soul is the cause and source of all these. Accordingly, as has been said, he posits as parts of soul those powers by which the ensouled being is said to do or undergo these things. ⟨But⟩ nothing prevents the being from receiving in a divided manner the activities imparted by soul, although soul itself is without parts.¹³⁸⁰

1370.This is Porphyry’s report of a division used for an ethical purpose. It should not be expanded into a claim that every account in Plato or Aristotle recognizes only three functions. Phytikon, literally the plantlike or vegetative power, is rendered “nutritive,” distinguishing it from perception and thought. The supplied article remains marked.

1371.The report distinguishes several views within a two-soul account. The contrast between ceasing an activity and being dissolved in substance is essential to the second view. “As we do other things” retains the elliptical hōsper kai alla; the apparatus explains “other things” by paired bodily organs, but that explanation is not inserted into the text. Pathēmata means what is experienced or undergone, not necessarily emotions alone.

1372.Hypokeimenon is the underlying subject or bearer of a property. The distinction here permits a single bearer to have several capacities without requiring several distinct constituents. The statement about Aristotle continues Porphyry’s interpretation; it is kept distinct from the earlier report of an ethically motivated division.

1373.The opening prints to zōion, “the living creature,” although the following account concerns soul. That wording is retained, without replacing it by psychē. Ameres, “without parts,” and polydynamon, “having many powers,” need not be opposites in this argument. The distinction concerns what a thing is in itself and how its activity appears in bodies.

1374.The inquiry distinguishes three possibilities: one soul with parts, several souls united like singers in a choir, or diverse powers belonging to one substance. The Greek moves awkwardly into past tenses, ēn and eōikei, in the second and third alternatives; these remain visible in the English. “At a higher level” renders the edited anōterō, introducing the further question about substances.

1375.Kataskeuē is rendered “constitution,” the way something is fitted for its function; epitēdeiotēs is its fitness or aptitude. Hexis, “state,” describes the condition that enables activity. These definitions distinguish the bearer, its fitness, and its ability to act, while also recording that some thinkers identify the last two.

1376.The apple illustrates a difference between a power belonging throughout one bearer and a piece occupying only a limited quantity of it. No particular apple qualities are enumerated in the Greek. The supplied “For powers” and the rejected second en, “in,” remain marked; the latter deliberately interrupts the English construction. “Parts are lesser” renders ēlattōtai in the quantitative contrast, without suggesting a loss of the whole’s powers.

1377.The proposed solution locates division in the bodily sites of activity and then explains its attribution to soul. The supplied article is represented by “the” before the understood “soul.” The words tou pot’ before hēpar, “liver,” are textually problematic: literally, “of the ... at some time.” The English gives the recoverable anatomical list; it does not adopt the apparatus’s conjecture “third, the liver.” The edited phrase about activities occurring in bodily parts is also compressed.

1378.Poson, “quantity,” concerns how much or how many; poion, “quality,” concerns what kind. Divisions within an art or philosophy provide the analogy for a distinction that does not add pieces to a spatial whole. The restored negative “not” is essential and remains marked. The claim that soul has no plurality belongs to the quantitative contrast; it does not cancel the earlier claim that soul has many powers.

1379.The analogy with an art is qualified immediately: soul’s completeness does not depend on assembling components. Teleia, “complete,” and telos, “end,” express the contrast with a creature’s attainment of its natural completion. “If” represents the supplied conditional particle an. The sentence distinguishes the soul from the living creature whose development is not yet complete.

1380.The bearer of the powers is the ensouled being; soul is their cause and source. Endoseis denotes the imparting of activities, not the cutting of soul into pieces. The recipient in the last sentence is understood from the preceding “ensouled being,” since the Greek leaves it unexpressed. The supplied de, “but,” remains marked.