37 Xenophon, Memorabilia IV (2)

“And what of this: since we need food, they bring it forth for us from the earth and provide seasons suited to it, ⟨which⟩ supply us in abundance and variety not only with necessities but also with things that delight us?” “These too are very kindly provisions for humanity.”

“And they provide water, so valuable that, together with earth and the seasons, it helps everything useful to us grow and flourish. It helps nourish us ourselves, and, mixed with our food, makes it easier to prepare, more beneficial, and more pleasant. Since we need it in the greatest quantity, they provide it most abundantly.” “That too,” he said, “shows forethought.”

38 Plato, from Sophist (1)

“First, let there be two divisions of productive art.” “Which?” “The divine and the human.” “I understand.” “If we remember what was said at the beginning, we called every power productive that causes things not previously existing to come into being afterward.” “I understand.”

“Then all mortal animals and plants, whatever grows on earth from seeds and roots, and all the lifeless bodies formed from earth within earth, whether fusible or not—shall we say that anything other than a god’s craftsmanship causes them to come into being when they did not exist before? Or shall we adopt ⟨the⟩ common opinion?” “What opinion?” “That nature produces them from some spontaneous cause arising without intelligence; or that the cause comes from a god, with reason and divine knowledge?”⁹²

38 Plato, from Sophist (2)

“⟨I myself, perhaps⟩ because of my age, often change my mind between the two. But now, looking to you and supposing ⟨that you think⟩ they come into being through a god, I too have come to hold that view.”

“Good, Theaetetus. If we thought you likely to adopt another opinion later, we would now try to bring you to agreement by an argument carrying compelling persuasion. But since I see that your nature will itself advance, even without our arguments, toward the position to which you now say you are drawn, I shall leave it: otherwise we should spend time unnecessarily. I shall posit that what is said to exist by nature is made by divine art, and what human beings construct from it by human art. On this account there are two kinds of production, human and divine.” “Correct.”⁹³

39 Onatas, On God and the Divine (1)

God perceives the affairs of other living beings, yet is himself apprehensible neither to thought nor to perception, except to a very few human beings. His powers, however, are true realities—†hōn oimai nomeis ei†—manifest and perceptible.⁹⁴

For God himself is mind, soul, and the governing principle of the entire cosmos. His powers in truth—†hōn oimai nomeis†—are his works and actions, those extending throughout the whole cosmos. God himself is neither visible nor perceptible, but can be contemplated only by reason and mind; his works and actions are manifest and perceptible to all human beings.

39 Onatas, On God and the Divine (2)

It also seems to me that there is not just one god. One is greatest and highest, ruling the universe; the others are many, differing in power. The one greater in might, greatness, and excellence rules over them all. This would be the god who encompasses the entire cosmos; the other gods are those that run their courses in heaven with the revolution of the whole, following the first and intelligible god in accordance with reason.

Those who say there is one god rather than many are mistaken: they fail to consider the greatest dignity of divine superiority. I mean ruling and leading beings like oneself, and being strongest and highest among the rest.⁹⁵

39 Onatas, On God and the Divine (3)

The other gods stand in relation to the first and intelligible god as members of a chorus to their leader, soldiers to their general, and men in companies and ranks to their regimental and company commanders. It is their nature to follow and attend upon one who leads well.

Their work is therefore shared by ruler and ruled. Yet the ruled could no longer be organized for that work if deprived of a leader, just as neither choristers could join in song nor soldiers form an army without, respectively, a chorus-leader and a general.⁹⁶

39 Onatas, On God and the Divine (4)

Such a nature needs nothing, whether kindred or external. It is therefore composed neither of the two, soul and body—for it is soul throughout—nor of any opposing things, since opposites are by nature capable of both mastering and being mastered.

Mixture with body stains the purity of soul: soul is undefiled and divine, whereas body is mortal and mingled with impurity. So too lead stains gold, and what is spurious stains what is genuine by nature. In general, God has given body to mortal living beings through eternal and inescapable necessity. For everything that shares in coming-to-be is by nature needy and poor.⁹⁷

39 Onatas, On God and the Divine (5)

God, then, exists, as I said at the beginning of the discourse, for he himself is the beginning and the first. The cosmos and the things revolving within it in every direction are divine. Likewise the soul is a divine spirit, since it rules and moves the whole living being; the body and everything belonging to it are of a divine spirit. We must therefore distinguish in this way: God and the divine, a divine spirit and what belongs to a divine spirit.⁹⁸

40 Arrian’s Epictetus: On Contentment (1)

Concerning the gods, some say that the divine does not even exist. Others say it exists but is inactive and indifferent, taking forethought for nothing. A third group says it exists and exercises providence, but only over great and heavenly matters, not over anything on earth. ⟨And⟩ a fourth extends this care to earthly and human affairs, but only collectively, not to each individual. A fifth group, which included Odysseus and Socrates, says:

“Nor do I escape your notice when I move.”⁹⁹

40 Arrian’s Epictetus (2)

If, then, it is sound to say that our end is to follow God, we must have examined each of these positions. If there are no gods, how can following the gods be our end? If they exist but care for nothing, how can the statement be sound even then? And if they both exist and care, but nothing passes from them to human beings—and, by Zeus, to me as well—how can it still be sound?

The good and honorable person, having examined all these matters, has subordinated his own judgment to the one who governs everything, as good citizens subordinate theirs to the law of their city.¹⁰⁰