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⟨On the parts of the soul⟩
I.49.7a.heading · Wachsmuth pp. 325
⟨On the parts of the soul.⟩1278
7a · ⟨Aëtius⟩: Apollophanes
I.49.7a · Wachsmuth pp. 325
. . . . .
Apollophanes ⟨says that the soul consists of nine parts⟩.1279
On motion and indestructibility
I.49.7b.heading · Wachsmuth pp. 325
On the motion and indestructibility of the soul.1280
7b · ⟨Aëtius⟩: Aristotle on motion
I.49.7b · Wachsmuth pp. 325
Aristotle holds that the soul is unmoved and precedes every motion, but participates in motion incidentally, as do shapes, boundaries, and, in general, the forms belonging to bodies.1281
7c.1 · ⟨Aëtius and Plato⟩: Cebes’ doubt
I.49.7c.1 · Wachsmuth pp. 325-326
Plato holds that it is indestructible and always in motion.
He says, at any rate, in the Phaedo:
When Socrates had said this, Cebes took up the discussion. “Socrates,” he said, “the other things seem to me well said. But what concerns the soul causes people much disbelief. They fear that, once released from the body, it may no longer ⟨exist⟩ anywhere, but may be destroyed and perish on the very day the person dies; that immediately on leaving the body and departing from it, scattered like breath or smoke, it may fly away and no longer be anything anywhere.”1282
7c.2 · Survival must include understanding
I.49.7c.2 · Wachsmuth pp. 326
“For if it existed somewhere on its own, gathered together and released from those evils ⟨which⟩ you have just described, Socrates, there would be great and noble hope that what you say is true. But perhaps no little reassurance and convincing evidence are needed for this: that the soul exists after the person has died and possesses some power and understanding.”1283
7c.3 · Socrates proposes an inquiry
I.49.7c.3 · Wachsmuth pp. 326
“What you say is true, Cebes,” said Socrates. “But what shall we do? Would you like us to discuss these very matters, whether they are likely to be so or not?”
“I, at any rate,” said Cebes, “would gladly hear what opinion you hold about them.”1284
8.1 · Plato: an old account of return
I.49.8.1 · Wachsmuth pp. 326
In the same work.
“Now there is this old account that we remember: souls exist there after arriving from here, and return here again and come into being from the dead. If this is so, if the living come into being again from those who have died, must not our souls exist there? For they could hardly come into being again if they did not exist. This would be sufficient evidence that these things are so, if it actually became clear that the living come into being from no other source than the dead. If that is not the case, some other argument would be needed.”
“Certainly,” said Cebes.1285
8.2 · The generation of opposites
I.49.8.2 · Wachsmuth pp. 326-327
“Then do not consider this only in human beings,” he said, “if you want to understand it more easily. Let us examine all animals and plants, and, in a word, everything that comes into being: does everything arise in this way, opposite from opposite and from no other source, wherever there is such an opposition? For example, the beautiful is surely opposite to the ugly, the just to the unjust, and countless other things stand in this relation. Let us therefore consider whether, for everything that has an opposite, it must come into being from no other source than its own opposite.”1286
8.3 · Greater and smaller, better and worse
I.49.8.3 · Wachsmuth pp. 327
“For example, when something becomes larger, must it not have been smaller before and then become larger?” “Yes.”
“And if it becomes smaller, will it not have been larger before and afterward become smaller?” “That is so,” he said.
“And the weaker comes from the stronger, the faster from the slower?” “Certainly.”
“What about this: if something becomes worse, does it not come from being better, and if more just, from being more unjust?” “Of course.”
“Have we then sufficiently established,” he said, “that all things arise in this way, opposite things from their opposites?” “Certainly.”
. . . . .1287
8.4 · Living and being dead
I.49.8.4 · Wachsmuth pp. 327
“What then?” he said. “Does living have an opposite, as sleeping is opposite to being awake?”
“Certainly,” he said.
“What is it?”
“Being dead,” he said.
“Then these arise from one another, if they are opposites, and there are two processes of becoming between them, since they are two?”
“Of course.”1288
8.5 · The comparison with sleep and waking
I.49.8.5 · Wachsmuth pp. 327-328
“I will describe one of the two pairs I was just speaking of,” said Socrates, “both the pair itself and the processes of becoming; you describe the other to me. I mean sleeping and being awake: being awake arises from sleeping, and sleeping from being awake. Of their processes of becoming, one is falling asleep and the other waking up. Have I explained it sufficiently to you, or not?”
“Certainly.”1289
8.6 · From the living to the dead and back
I.49.8.6 · Wachsmuth pp. 328
“Now you tell me in the same way,” he said, “about life and death. Do you not say that being dead is opposite to living?” “I do.”
“And that they arise from one another?” “Yes.”
“Then what arises from what is living?” “What is dead,” he said.
⟨“And what,” he said, “arises from what is dead?” “One must admit,” he said,⟩ “that it is what is living.”
“Then living things and living people arise from the dead, Cebes?” “It appears so,” he said.
“Then our souls exist in Hades,” he said. “So it seems.”1290
8.7 · The opposite process
I.49.8.7 · Wachsmuth pp. 328
“And of the two processes of becoming involved here, is not one at least clear? Dying is surely clear, is it not?”
“Certainly,” he said.
“What then shall we do?” he said. “⟨Shall we not assign in return⟩ the opposite process of becoming? Will nature be lame in this respect? Or must we assign to dying an opposite process?”
“Surely we must,” he said.
“What is it?”
“Coming back to life.”1291
8.8 · The conclusion from the cycle
I.49.8.8 · Wachsmuth pp. 328
“Then,” he said, “if coming back to life exists, ⟨would this be a process of becoming that leads⟩ from the dead ⟨to the living, namely coming back to life?” “Certainly.” “We agree, then, on this ground also, that the living⟩ have come into being ⟨from the dead⟩ no less than the dead from the living. And if this is so, it seemed sufficient evidence that the souls of the dead must exist somewhere, from which they come into being again.”
“From what we have agreed,” he said, “it seems to me necessary that this should be so, Socrates.”1292