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4.1 · Hermes: soul, spirit, and desire
I.49.4.1 · Wachsmuth pp. 321-322
By the same author.
Soul, then, Ammon, is a substance complete in itself. At the beginning it chose a life in accordance with fate and drew to itself a reason resembling matter, possessing spirit and desire.1262 Spirit prevails over matter: if it forms a settled relation to the soul’s thought, it becomes courage and is not led astray by cowardice. Desire, however, is prevailed over. If it forms a settled relation to the soul’s reasoning, it becomes self-control and is not moved by pleasure; for reasoning supplies what desire lacks.1263
4.2 · Justice as a balanced disposition
I.49.4.2 · Wachsmuth pp. 322
When both come into agreement, establish an equal disposition, and both adhere to the soul’s reasoning, justice arises. Their equal disposition removes the excess of spirit and makes good the deficiency of desire. Their principle is the thinking substance, itself existing in its own right, possessing power in its encompassing reason [its own reason]. The substance rules and leads like a ruler, while its reason acts like a counselor.1264
4.3 · Reason and its echo
I.49.4.3 · Wachsmuth pp. 322
The substance’s encompassing reason is therefore knowledge of the reasonings that supply the irrational with a likeness of reasoning. This is dim in comparison with reason, yet counts as reasoning in comparison with the irrational, as an echo stands to a voice and the moon’s brightness to the sun.1265 Spirit and desire are attuned to a certain reasoning; they pull against one another and draw to themselves the material understanding within them.1266
5.1 · Hermes: soul and its origin
I.49.5.1 · Wachsmuth pp. 322-323
By the same author.
Every soul is immortal and always in motion. For in the general discussions we said that some motions come from activities, others from bodies. We say that soul has arisen from a certain substance, not from matter, being itself incorporeal and that substance also incorporeal. For everything that has come into being must have arisen from something.1267
5.2 · Two motions in mortal creatures
I.49.5.2 · Wachsmuth pp. 323
In things whose coming into being is followed by destruction, two motions must accompany them: that ⟨of⟩ soul, by which each is moved, and that of body, by which it grows and declines; moreover, when the body is dissolved, it too is dissolved. This I define as the motion of perishable bodies.1268 Soul, however, is always in motion, because it always moves within itself and brings about motion in other things. On this account every soul is immortal and always in motion, having its own activity as its motion.1269
5.3 · The divine soul
I.49.5.3 · Wachsmuth pp. 323
The forms of soul are divine, human, and irrational. The divine soul, then, is the activity of the divine body, acting ⟨through⟩ itself. For it moves within itself and moves that body. When it is freed from mortal living creatures, separated from its own irrational parts, and has gone out into the divine body, it moves within itself as something always in motion, revolving together with the universe.1270
5.4 · Human and irrational souls
I.49.5.4 · Wachsmuth pp. 323
The human soul has something of the divine, but the irrational elements, desire and spirit, are also attached to it. These too are immortal, insofar as they too are activities, yet activities of mortal bodies. They are therefore far from the divine part of the soul while the soul is in the divine body. But whenever that part enters a mortal body, those elements also arrive, and through their presence it always becomes a human soul. The soul of irrational creatures consists of spirit and desire. These creatures are accordingly called irrational because they lack the soul’s reason.1271
5.5 · Motion in things without soul
I.49.5.5 · Wachsmuth pp. 323-324
Understand a fourth kind, that belonging to things without soul: it is outside the bodies and acts by moving them. This would be moving within the divine body and moving these things, as it were, in passing.1272
6.1 · Hermes: the soul’s own reason
I.49.6.1 · Wachsmuth pp. 324
By the same author.
Soul, then, is an eternal substance capable of thought, having its own reason as its object of thought; in thinking together with it, soul draws to itself an understanding of harmony. Released from the natural body, it remains on its own, belonging to itself in the intelligible world.1273 It rules its own reason, bringing a motion like [in] its own thought, life in name, to what comes to life. For this is peculiar to soul: to supply other things with something like its own distinctive character.1274
6.2 · Two lives and two motions
I.49.6.2 · Wachsmuth pp. 324
There are therefore two lives and two motions. One accords with substance, the other with the nature of body. The one is more general, ⟨the other more particular⟩. That which accords with substance is self-governing; the other is governed by necessity, for everything moved is subject to the necessity imposed by what moves it. The motion that imparts movement is bound to the love of the thinking substance. For soul would be incorporeal, having no share in the natural body.1275
6.3 · Breath, perception, and thought
I.49.6.3 · Wachsmuth pp. 324
For if it has a body, it has neither reason nor thought. Every body is without thought; but by sharing in substance it has acquired existence as a breathing living creature. Breath belongs to the body, while the reason of the substance contemplates the beautiful. Perceptive breath judges appearances. It is divided among the senses that operate through organs: one part of it is vision through breath, and there is breath for hearing, smelling, tasting, and touching. When this breath comes into correspondence with understanding, it judges what is perceived; otherwise it merely receives appearances. For it belongs to the body and is receptive to everything. But the reason of the substance is that which thinks.1276
6.4 · Knowledge and opinion
I.49.6.4 · Wachsmuth pp. 325
Knowledge of things worthy of honor accompanies reason, while opinion accompanies breath. For the one has its activity from the surrounding cosmos, the other from itself.1277