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3 Hermes: Hollow rather than empty
I.18.3.3 · Wachsmuth pp. 159
⟨Hermes⟩ Does this body not pass through all existing things and fill everything it passes through? And is body not constituted by a blend of the four? Everything you call empty is therefore full of air; and if full of air, then full of the four bodies.508 The contrary account then emerges: everything you call full is empty of air, because those things are crowded with other bodies and have no room to receive the air. So the things you call ⟨empty⟩ should be called hollow, not empty; for in their actual existence they are full of air and breath.509
3 Hermes: Mind and reason
I.18.3.4 · Wachsmuth pp. 159
⟨Asclepius⟩ The argument cannot be refuted, Trismegistus. What, then, shall we call the place in which the whole moves?
⟨Hermes⟩ Incorporeal, ⟨O⟩ Asclepius.
⟨Asclepius⟩ ⟨What⟩, then, is the incorporeal?
⟨Hermes⟩ Mind ⟨and reason⟩, a whole wholly enclosing itself, free of every body, unerring, unaffected, intangible, standing in itself, making room for all things and preserving what exists. Its rays, as it were, are the good, truth, archetypal light, and the archetype of the soul.510
3 Hermes: God as cause
I.18.3.5 · Wachsmuth pp. 160
⟨Asclepius⟩ What, then, is God?
⟨Hermes⟩ He who is none of these things, yet is the cause of their being, for all of them and for each and every existing thing.511
4a ⟨Aëtius⟩: Epicurus
I.18.4a · Wachsmuth pp. 160
Epicurus held that void, place, and space differ in their names [all of them].512
4b ⟨Aëtius⟩: The Pythagoreans
I.18.4b.1 · Wachsmuth pp. 160
Those ⟨of the school⟩ of Pythagoras held that there is void outside the world, into which the world breathes and from which it draws breath.513
4b ⟨Aëtius⟩: The Stoics and Posidonius
I.18.4b.2 · Wachsmuth pp. 160
The Stoics held that there is void, infinite in extent, into which the world is dissolved at the conflagration.
Posidonius said that what lies outside the world is not infinite, but only large enough to accommodate its dissolution.514
4c ⟨Aëtius and Plato⟩: The receptacle
I.18.4c.1 · Wachsmuth pp. 160
Plato held that place is what receives the forms: by this he meant matter, speaking figuratively of it as a kind of nurse and receptacle. There is no void either outside the world or within it.515
4c Plato, Timaeus: The complete world
I.18.4c.2 · Wachsmuth pp. 160-161
For he says in the Timaeus: “The constitution of the world has taken each of the four in its entirety. Its maker constituted it from all the fire, water, air, and earth, leaving outside no part of any of them, nor any power. He had these things in mind: first, that it should be, as fully as possible, a complete living whole composed of complete parts; and further, that it should be one, since nothing had been left from which another such world could arise.”516
4c Plato, Timaeus: Nothing outside
I.18.4c.3 · Wachsmuth pp. 161
“He finished its whole exterior smooth all around, for many reasons. It had no need of eyes, [and] for nothing visible remained outside; nor of hearing, ⟨for⟩ there was nothing audible; and there was no surrounding air that required breathing in.”517
4d ⟨Arius Didymus⟩: Chrysippus on place
I.18.4d.1 · Wachsmuth pp. 161
Chrysippus. Chrysippus declared that place is what is occupied throughout by an existing thing, or what is ⟨capable of⟩ being occupied by an existing thing and is occupied throughout, whether by one thing ⟨or⟩ by several.518
4d Chrysippus: Partial occupation
I.18.4d.2 · Wachsmuth pp. 161
If, of what can be occupied by an existing thing, one part is occupied and another is not, the whole will be ⟨neither⟩ void nor place, but something different that has no name. For “void” is spoken of by analogy with empty vessels, and “place” by analogy with full ones.519 As for “space,” is it the larger thing capable of being occupied by an existing thing, like a larger vessel for body, or that which accommodates a larger body?520
4d Chrysippus: Limits and infinity
I.18.4d.3 · Wachsmuth pp. 161
Void, then, is said to be infinite, for what is outside the world is of that kind; but place is finite, because no body is infinite. Just as the corporeal is finite, so the incorporeal is infinite, for both time and void are infinite.521
4d Chrysippus: The absence of a boundary
I.18.4d.4 · Wachsmuth pp. 161
For just as nothingness is no boundary, so neither is there a boundary of nothingness, such as void is. In its own subsistence it is infinite; yet it becomes bounded when it is filled. Once what fills it is removed, no boundary of it can be conceived.522