Diotimos Reading Desk

Tap the page, move to the top or bottom edge, swipe down, or press Tab to reveal reading controls. Use the arrow keys or swipe sideways to turn pages.

← ExitStobaeus, Volume I

Reading language

Book I Chapter 12

Chapter 12: Forms

On forms.

1a ⟨Aëtius, Opinions⟩: the definition

A form is an incorporeal substance, the cause of things being such as it itself is, and a pattern for the subsistence of sensible things constituted according to nature.³⁷⁵ It subsists on its own [in], but impresses its likeness upon formless materials and becomes the cause of their ordering, occupying the position of a father in relation to sensible things.³⁷⁶

1a ⟨Aëtius, Opinions⟩: Pythagoras

Pythagoras placed the so-called forms and ideas in numbers, in their harmonies, and in what are called geometrical entities, holding them to be inseparable from bodies.³⁷⁷

1b ⟨Arius Didymus⟩: Aristotle, part 1

Aristotle. Aristotle sometimes says that these principles are two, matter and form. He also calls form “shape,” “actuality,” “essence,” “substance according to its account,” and “activity”: so rich in meaning and so variously named is form for him.³⁷⁸

Form, then, differs from shape in this respect: form extends through the depth, whereas shape lies on the surface. Shape is like whiteness ⟨as found⟩ in painting, while form is like the whiteness belonging to the substance of milk. Yet both are called form, insofar as one gives matter form and the other gives it shape.³⁷⁹

1b ⟨Arius Didymus⟩: Aristotle, part 2

⟨And⟩ he called it “actuality” either because it exists continuously or because it renders complete each of the things that participate in it. For bronze is not yet a statue except potentially; once shaped and endowed with the appropriate form, however, it is called a statue in actuality, for it has then attained its end.³⁸⁰

1b ⟨Arius Didymus⟩: Aristotle, part 3

He called it “essence” because it confers on each existing thing the capacity to be; and “substance according to its account” because it differs from substance according to matter, as a statue differs from bronze, a Thericlean cup from silver, and any sculpted image from stone. For that by which these exceed the matter from which they have been fashioned is their substance according to its account.³⁸¹ He called it “activity” because none of the things that exist could act without first having been given form.³⁸²

2a ⟨Arius Didymus⟩: Plato, part 1

⟨Plato.⟩ He expounded the forms as follows, saying that they are certain determinate patterns corresponding to the several natural sensible things, from which knowledge and definitions arise. For besides all human beings a certain human being is conceived, and besides all horses a horse, and, generally, besides living creatures a living creature that is ungenerated and imperishable. Just as many impressions come from one seal and many likenesses from one man, so from each single form come countless natures of sensible bodies: all human beings from the form of human beings, ⟨and all horses from the form of horses⟩; the same account applies to the other things that exist by nature.³⁸³

2a ⟨Arius Didymus⟩: Plato, part 2

A form is an eternal substance, the cause and principle of each thing’s being such as the form itself is. Just as the particular forms have priority over sensible bodies as their archetypes, so the most beautiful and most perfect substance, containing all the forms within itself, is ⟨the pattern of this world⟩.³⁸⁴

2b Plato, Parmenides (132c-d)

He says, indeed, in the Parmenides as well: “But, Parmenides, this is how the matter seems most clearly to me: these forms stand in nature as patterns, and the other things resemble them and are likenesses of them; and this participation of the other things in the forms is nothing other than their being made like them.”³⁸⁵

3 ⟨Arius Didymus⟩: Zeno, part 1

Zeno ⟨and his followers⟩. They say that concepts are neither somethings nor qualified things, but images in the soul that are, as it were, somethings and, as it were, qualified things. These were called “ideas” by the ancients. For the ideas are of things falling under the concepts: for example, human beings and horses, or, more generally, all living creatures and all the other things of which they say there are ideas.³⁸⁶

3 ⟨Arius Didymus⟩: Zeno, part 2

The Stoic philosophers say that these do not subsist, and that we participate in the concepts but obtain the “cases,” which they call “appellations.”³⁸⁷

375.Idea is rendered “form” here, rather than “idea” in the everyday sense of a thought. The opening phrase after “cause” is grammatically defective in the printed Greek. “Of things being such as it itself is” gives the apparent sense, supported by the fuller definition in excerpt 2a; it does not silently replace the facing text with a conjecture. Wachsmuth’s supplied Latin attribution to Aëtius is rendered in the headings.

376.The isolated en, “in,” is bracketed as rejected by Wachsmuth. The English retains it in brackets so that the editorial problem remains visible. The father analogy corresponds to the pattern’s role in the Timaeus passage quoted in I.11.3; matter there is compared to a mother.

377.The report uses both eidē and ideai, here distinguished as “forms” and “ideas” to retain the paired wording. It expressly adds “inseparable from bodies”; this qualification belongs to the ancient account under Pythagoras’s name.

378.The passage is a report of Aristotle’s terminology, with an attribution to Arius Didymus supplied by Wachsmuth. Eidos, morphē, entelecheia, to ti ēn einai, ousia kata ton logon, and energeia are distinguished in English here because the report goes on to explain each expression.

379.The contrast is between a surface appearance and a determination extending through the thing. “Both are called form” interprets the compressed phrase tauton de eidos legetai; the report distinguishes form and shape while allowing them a common designation. The whiteness comparison follows Wachsmuth’s repaired text, including his printed supplement.

380.Entelecheia, “actuality,” is explained here through both endelechōs, “continuously,” and teleion, “complete.” These are the report’s own verbal associations. The bronze example contrasts the capacity to become a statue with the completed statue; telos, “end,” is the completion attained.

381.To ti ēn einai, rendered “essence,” literally means “what it was to be.” “According to its account” distinguishes what the thing is as a formed object from its material: the cup, for example, from its silver. The cup’s particular name does not affect the comparison.

382.Energeia is rendered “activity” here to preserve its connection with energein, “to act,” and its distinction from entelecheia in the preceding explanation. The excerpt ends here in Wachsmuth; the manuscript repetition of the opening of excerpt 3, reported in his apparatus, is not printed a second time.

383.The singular human being, horse, and living creature are the intelligible patterns contrasted with their many sensible instances. Wachsmuth supplies the heading “Plato” and prints the supplemented horse example. This is an exposition attributed to Arius Didymus; a direct quotation from Plato follows in excerpt 2b.

384.The final words, “the pattern of this world,” are supplied by Wachsmuth from the parallel text in Eusebius, Preparation for the Gospel XI.23. The passage moves from the several patterns of natural things to a single comprehensive pattern. “Have priority” does not by itself specify an earlier moment in time.

385.In Plato’s dialogue, Socrates makes this proposal to Parmenides, who immediately subjects it to objections about likeness and further forms (132d-133a). The extract presents a proposal within that argument, not the dialogue’s unqualified conclusion. “Participation” renders methexis.

386.“Somethings” and “qualified things” retain the deliberately technical tina and poia. The qualification “as it were” distinguishes a concept’s representative content from the things it represents; the next sentence denies that the ideas themselves subsist. The words “and his followers” are supplied in the base edition.

387.The closing contrast is textually uncertain. Wachsmuth judges the wording scarcely sound and complete, and discusses possible repairs without inserting one. “Cases” renders ptōseis, and “appellations” prosēgoriai, a term also used for common nouns. The literal rendering here is provisional: the relation asserted between concepts and names cannot be securely recovered from the printed sentence.