

PLATO

THE LOVERS

ΕΡΑΣΤΑΙ

The Greek text of John Burnet
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with a new English translation and notes

THE COMPLETE DIALOGUE

132a–139a

Translation by Diotimos Editions

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INTRODUCTION

THE DIALOGUE

The *Lovers* is a conversation about what philosophy is, narrated by Socrates. He tells, to no named listener, how he went into the school of Dionysius the writing-master and found two lads quarreling, it seemed, over astronomy, drawing circles and tilting their hands, while the lovers of the young sat by (132a–b). He asks the man beside him what the two are so earnest about, and the conversation that follows is with two rival lovers of the same boy: an athlete, who thinks philosophy idle talk, and a man of music and letters, “the one who laid claim to being wiser”, who thinks it fine (132b–133b). No one is named but Socrates, Dionysius, Homer (135a), and three thinkers: Anaxagoras and Oenopides, whom the lads seemed to be quarreling about, and Solon, whom the musician quotes. The dialogue fills pages 132 to 139 of the first volume of Stephanus’ edition, by whose pages Plato is still cited, and thirteen pages of Burnet’s Oxford text.

Burnet’s manuscripts call it *Erastai*, “Lovers”; a later hand in the margin of B gives the title *Anterastai*, “Rival Lovers”, under which the ancient arrangement of Plato’s works by Thrasyllus, preserved by Diogenes Laertius (3.59), places it last in the fourth tetralogy, after the two *Alcibiades* and the *Hipparchus*, with the subtitle “or On Philosophy”, and classes it as “ethical”; Burnet’s second volume prints the four in that order. Its authorship was doubted in antiquity. Thrasyllus counts it among Plato’s genuine dialogues (3.57–59), yet he identifies the unnamed speaker for whom the philosopher is like a pentathlete only under a condition, “if the *Rival Lovers* is Plato’s” (9.37); Diogenes himself cites it, without doubt, as the place where Plato names Dionysius, the master from whom he learned his letters (3.4). Most modern scholars do not think it Plato’s, though it has had defenders, and no date for it is certain.

THE QUESTION AND THE ANSWERS

The athlete calls the lads' talk "prattling about the things up in the sky, and talking nonsense, philosophizing" (132b), and his rival, asked whether "philosophizing is fine or not", answers, "if ever I thought philosophizing shameful, I would not even consider myself a man" (132d–133b). Socrates asks whether one can know that a thing is fine or shameful without knowing what it is (133b), and so what philosophizing is. The musician answers with Solon's line, "I grow old always learning many things": the man who is going to philosophize "must in this way always be learning one thing at least ... so as to learn as much as possible in his life" (133c). Philosophy, then, is "much learning", and it is good as well as fine (133c–d).

Socrates tests the answer against the athlete's own pursuit. Is much labor the love of exercise, as much learning is philosophy (133e)? The musician says so; the athlete, nudged into the argument, says that "even a pig would know that moderate labors put bodies in good condition" (134a–b). The musician concedes that it is not the many but the moderate exercises that produce good condition, and then that in food, in everything to do with the body, and in what is given to the soul, "the subjects of learning" among them, it is the moderate that benefits (134c–d). But who is to judge what is moderate for the soul, as the doctor or the trainer judges for the body and the farmer for the sowing of seeds? At this "we were all of us now full of perplexity" (134e–135a).

THE ARGUMENT'S MAIN STRETCH

Socrates tries "another way" (135a). Which subjects of learning should the philosopher learn, since not all, nor many? The wiser lover answers: those that bring "the greatest reputation for philosophy", which a man would have "if he seemed to be experienced in all the crafts, or if not, in as many as possible", knowing of them what is fitting for free men to learn, "whatever belongs to understanding, not whatever belongs to handiwork" (135b). Not, he explains, that the philosopher must know each craft "precisely, like the man who has the craft himself", but "as is reasonable for a free and educated man": he must be able to follow what the craftsman says better than those present, and to contribute a judgment of his own, "so as to seem the most accomplished and the wisest" (135c–d). Socrates offers him an image, and he accepts it. The philosopher is like the pentathlete, second to the racer in the race and to

the wrestler in wrestling, first among the other athletes: "a kind of runner-up in everything" (135e-136a). The wiser lover is pleased with it: the philosopher, he says, is "the sort not to be a slave to any one thing", but "to have laid hold of all of them in moderation" (136a-b).

Then Socrates asks what such a man is good for. The good are useful, the base useless, and philosophers, the wiser lover says, are most useful (136b-c). But in sickness, asked whether he would bring "that runner-up" into the house or get the doctor, the wiser lover answers "Both", and then the doctor, "both rather and first"; in a storm he would rather trust himself to the pilot; and to Socrates' question, "Then so too in everything else: as long as there is any craftsman, the philosopher is not useful?", he answers, "It appears so" (136c-d). Since "there always are craftsmen", philosophers are useless, and by the wiser lover's account "base and useless as long as there are crafts among men" (136e-137b).

THE ENDING

"But I suspect, my friend, that they are not so," Socrates says, and that philosophizing is not being in earnest about the crafts, "nor learning much, but something else" (137b). He starts again from horses and dogs: the craft that makes them best also knows how to punish them rightly, and knows the decent and the worthless among them; the same holds for men, and the knowledge that rightly punishes the unruly in cities is the judge's, which is justice (137b-d). Whoever knows one knows many, and whoever is ignorant of many is ignorant of one; so a man who does not know the decent and worthless men does not know himself (137d-138a). Not to know oneself is not to be temperate, so knowing oneself is being temperate, and this, it seems, is what "the inscription at Delphi urges: to practice temperance and justice"; and since the same knowledge punishes rightly and distinguishes oneself and others, justice and temperance prove to be "the same thing" (138a-b). Cities are well ordered when wrongdoers pay the penalty; the statesman's art, the king's and the tyrant's, and the household manager's and the master's prove to be one craft with justice and temperance (138b-c).

Here the philosopher cannot be a runner-up. It would be shameful for him to be unable to follow or contribute when a judge or a king speaks, and he must not entrust his own household to another, "nor hold the second prizes in this, but must himself punish, judging rightly"; when his friends or his city ask him to judge, it is

shameful “to appear second or third and not to lead” (138d–139a). “Then, my excellent friend, for us philosophizing is far from being either much learning or busying oneself with the crafts.” The wise one falls silent, “ashamed of what had been said before”; the unlearned one agrees; “and the others praised what had been said” (139a).

WHAT IS MOST EXPOSED

Four things in this dialogue are likely to trouble a first-time reader, and they are best stated plainly.

First, it may not be Plato’s. Thrasyllus, though he counted it among the genuine dialogues, spoke of it under a condition (Diogenes Laertius 3.57–59, 9.37); most modern scholars doubt it, though the dialogue has had defenders; this edition calls it Plato’s only in the sense that the tradition handed it down among his works.

Second, the dialogue says what philosophy is not, and only by implication what it is. It refutes “much learning” and the runner-up’s smattering of every craft, and ends with “far from” (139a). What it puts in their place, the knowledge by which one knows oneself and rightly orders one’s household and one’s city, is reached by identification, not definition: the judge’s knowledge is justice, knowing oneself is temperance, these two are “the same thing”, and the arts of king, tyrant, statesman, household manager and master are one with them (137d–138c). Whether philosophy is that craft, or the knowledge of it, or the love of it, the dialogue does not say.

Third, several steps are short. From those who know horses the argument passes to a horse that does not know the decent and base horses, from that to the horse that does not know itself, and then to the man (137e–138a; see the note there); the knowledge of many and of one is asserted, not shown (137d–e); justice and temperance are made one because that by which “we know how to punish rightly” is also that by which we know how “to distinguish both oneself and others” (138a–b); and the tyrant is set beside the king as though the name made no difference, where the *Statesman* sets the two apart (276e). A reader may take these as faults, or as an exercise in finding them; the dialogue does not say which.

Fourth, much of it can be read as a gathering of themes from other dialogues of the tetralogy and beyond: self-knowledge and temperance joined at Delphi, as in the *Charmides* (164d–165a); the king, the statesman and the household manager as one knowledge,

argued in the *Statesman* (258e–259c) and touched in the *Alcibiades I* (133d–e); the specialist preferred to the man of general learning, as the doctor and the pilot are preferred throughout the dialogues. That reading is an interpretation; the dialogue names none of them.

THE MANNER

The comedy is in the persons and in the timing. The rivals trade scorn. The musician says that the athlete “has spent his whole life having his neck twisted, stuffing himself and sleeping” (132c), and the athlete answers in kind, that “even a pig would know that moderate labors put bodies in good condition”, how much more “a man, at any rate, sleepless and unfed, with an unrubbed neck, and thin with worries” (134a–b); “the lads were delighted and laughed at it, and the other blushed”. The wiser lover speaks loudly “so that his beloved should hear him” (133b), and answers “very ironically” with two answers, one for his rival and one for Socrates (133d). Socrates is “dazzled” by the young and beautiful, as always (133a), and when the lovers are stuck he offers, “teasing them”, to put the question to the lads: “Or are we perhaps ashamed, as Homer said of the suitors”, who would not let anyone else string the bow? (135a). The pentathlete comes as a compliment, “a kind of runner-up in everything”, and the wiser lover takes it as one (136a); Socrates then asks where these runners-up are useful. At the end the one who claimed much learning is silent and “the unlearned one” agrees (139a). The translation tries to keep all of this and to add nothing; where the English cannot carry a joke, a note says what it was.

ON READING THIS EDITION

Each left-hand page is a page of Burnet’s Oxford text, line for line, with his apparatus at the foot; each right-hand page translates it, with the Stephanus section letters in the margin so that any passage can be found on both sides. Burnet’s Greek has no quotation marks and no names of speakers: Socrates narrates, and each speech begins with a capital. The English sets the speeches in quotation marks, as English narrative does. A word in angle brackets < > in the Greek is not in the manuscripts and has been supplied by a scholar’s conjecture; it is translated. Words in square brackets [] are ones Burnet thought spurious; they are not translated. Solon’s verse at 133c is set as verse on both pages. The Key Words of the

Dialogue, which follow, explain the words on which the argument turns and how they are rendered. At the back, the Outline gives the argument's joints by Stephanus page, the Editorial Note sets out the conventions of both pages and explains the abbreviations of the apparatus, the Glossary lists the renderings for reference, and the Note on this Edition says how the volume was made and where a reader should be careful.

A NOTE ON THE PERSONS

The dialogue establishes little about its persons. The narrator is Socrates, whom the wiser lover calls by name from his first words (132c) and throughout, and the athlete once (134a); he is susceptible to beauty (133a) and teases the lovers. The two lovers are rivals for the same boy (132c, 133b). One has spent his time on music, the other on gymnastics (132d); the musician claims to be wiser and is called "the wiser one" and, at the end, "the wise one" (135b, 139a), the athlete "the unlearned one" (139a). The lads are among the young "who were thought the most comely in looks and born of esteemed fathers" (132a). None is named.

The rest comes from other sources. Diogenes Laertius says that Plato learned his letters from Dionysius, the master named here (3.4). Anaxagoras of Clazomenae (about 500–428 BC) taught at Athens and held the sun to be a fiery stone (Xenophon, *Memorabilia* 4.7.7). Oenopides of Chios, a mathematician and astronomer of the fifth century, first found the slant of the zodiac, as Eudemus records (Theon of Smyrna, p. 198 Hiller). Solon, the Athenian lawgiver and poet of the early sixth century, wrote the line the musician quotes (fragment 18 West). Thrasyllus, as Diogenes reports (9.37), thought that if the dialogue is Plato's the unnamed speaker for whom the philosopher is like a pentathlete would be Democritus of Abdera; nothing in the dialogue itself names him.

KEY WORDS OF THE DIALOGUE

These notes are for orientation, not reference: each explains a word the argument leans on, what it meant in the Athens of Socrates, and what the dialogue does with it. The Glossary at the back lists the renderings with the places where they matter.

PHILOSOPHY, PHILOSOPHIZE, PHILOSOPHER (PHILOSOPHIA, PHILOSOPHEIN, PHILOSOPHOS)

Philosophia joins *philo-*, “loving”, and *sophia*, “wisdom”, and the words did not yet name a discipline or a profession: to philosophize could be to pursue learning and argument of any kind, and comic poets mocked it as idle talk about “the things up in the sky” (132b). The dialogue asks what it is. The athlete calls it prattle; the wiser lover first calls it “much learning” (133c–e), then the knowledge of as many crafts as possible, not precisely, like the man who has the craft himself, “but as is reasonable for a free and educated man” (135b–d); the argument ends by placing it nearer the knowledge by which a man knows himself and rightly orders his household and his city (138a–139a). *Philosophia* and *philosophos* are “philosophy” and “philosopher”, as in the *Charmides* (153d, 154e), and *philosophein* is “philosophize”, throughout, and *pephilosophēkōs* is “the man who has philosophized” (136a); the English thereby gives up the “love of wisdom” inside the word, which the note at 132b explains, with the dialogue’s other “loves”: *philotimōs*, “ambitiously” (133a), *philogymnastia*, “the love of exercise” (133d), and *philonikein*, “strive for victory” (134c).

LOVER, RIVAL LOVER, BELOVED (ERASTĒS, ANTERASTĒS, PAIDIKA)

Erastēs is the older lover of a youth, *paidika* the youth he loves, and *anterastēs* one of two men who love the same youth. The scene is a school where “the young who were thought the most comely” sit with “their lovers” (132a), and the two rivals argue before the boy they both love: the wiser speaks “in a loud voice, so that his beloved should hear him” (133b). The rivalry is in the arguments too. Each disparages the other (132c, 134a–b), the wiser most bluntly (“he is nothing”, 134c), and the wiser twice speaks one way to his ri-

val and another to Socrates (133d, 134c). The title *Anterastai*, “Rival Lovers”, which Diogenes Laertius uses (3.59), comes from the word. *Erastēs* is “lover”, *anterastēs* “rival lover” (“his rival in love” at 132c, where it is predicative), *paidika* “beloved”, as in the series.

MUCH LEARNING, MUCH LABOR (POLYMATHIA, POLYPONIA; PONOI)

The wiser lover’s first answer, which Socrates sums up as *polymathia*, “much learning”, and he accepts, is Solon’s: Solon grew old “always learning many things”, and the philosopher must learn “as much as possible in his life” (133c). Socrates sets beside it a word of the same make, *polyponia*, “much labor”, and asks whether that is the love of exercise (133e). The athlete knows better: *ponoi*, the labors of training, make the body fit when they are moderate, not many (134a–b), and his rival concedes it (134c). The parallel carries the argument from the body to the soul, where the subjects of learning too should be moderate (134d–e). Socrates’ last words return to it: philosophizing is far from being “much learning” (139a). The English keeps the pair parallel: “much learning”, “much labor”, and *ponoi* “labors”, as in the *Alcibiades II* (142b); *diapeponēkenai* is “to have labored at” (136a).

MODERATE, IN MODERATION (METRIOS, METRIŌS; AMETROS)

Metrios, from *metron*, “measure”, is what keeps to the measure: neither too much nor too little. The athlete’s moderate labors (134a) lead Socrates to the moderate in food, in everything to do with the body, and in the soul (134c–d), and so to the question who knows the measure for the soul, as the doctor, the trainer and the farmer know theirs (134e). The wiser lover takes up the word for his own ideal: the philosopher should “have laid hold of all of them in moderation” (136b). The English keeps “moderate” throughout, *ta metria* “what is moderate”, *ametros* “immoderate”, and *metriōs* “in moderation”, where the *Alcibiades I* (130c) has “adequately” (a departure recorded in the Glossary).

USEFUL AND USELESS (CHRĒSIMOS, ACHRĒSTOS, ACHREIOS)

Chrēsimos is what can be used, *achrēstos* what cannot. The wiser lover grants that the good are useful and the base useless, and that philosophers are most useful (136b–c); but the craftsman is always there, and to the question whether, “as long as there is any craftsman, the philosopher is not useful”, he answers “It appears so”

(136d), so that philosophers prove “base and useless” (137a–b). At the end Socrates asks whether the runner-up philosopher is to be *achreios*, “of no use”, so long as there is a judge or a king, and the answer is no (138e). *Chrēsimos* is of the same root as *chrēstos*, “decent”, which the next stage of the argument uses. *Chrēsimos* is “useful”, *achrēstos* “useless”, *achreios* “of no use”.

GOOD, DECENT, BASE, WORTHLESS (AGATHOS; CHRĒSTOS; PONĒROS;
MOCHTHĒROS)

Agathos is the widest word of praise: good of its kind, good for someone, good morally. *Chrēstos*, “serviceable”, is of men honest, respectable, decent; *ponēros*, from *ponos*, “toil”, and *mochthēros*, from *mochthos*, “hardship”, are both “wretched”, and so worthless or bad. The dialogue uses the last two interchangeably: the good are useful and “the base useless” (136b), recalled as “the worthless useless” (136e) and again as “the base useless” (137a); the craft that makes horses and dogs best knows “the decent and the worthless” (137c), and a man ignorant of “the decent and worthless men” is ignorant “whether he is decent or base” (138a). The words are the same for horses, oxen and men, since the argument turns on the likeness. *Agathos* is “good”; *chrēstos* is “decent” and *ponēros* “base”, as in the *Hipparchus*, and *mochthēros* “worthless”, as in the *Alcibiades II*.

CRAFT AND CRAFTSMAN (TECHNĒ, DĒMIOURGOS)

A *technē* is a craft or art with knowledge of its own: carpentry, medicine, piloting, farming. A *dēmiourgos* is one who practises a craft for others. The wiser lover wants the philosopher to know the crafts as “a free and educated man”, by “understanding”, not “handiwork”, so as to follow what the craftsman says and to contribute a judgment, without being a slave to any one of them (135b–136b). Socrates turns this into the question of use: whenever there is a craftsman, the philosopher is not needed (136c–e). Those “in earnest about the crafts”, Socrates says, are called “menial” (*banauosos*) (137b). Then the argument finds a craft of its own for the philosopher: the one by which the king, the statesman and the household manager rule, which is one with justice and temperance (138c). *Technē* is “craft” and *dēmiourgos* “craftsman”, as in the series.

RUNNER-UP, PENTATHLETE, SECOND PRIZES (HYPAKROS; PENTATHLOS; TA
DEUTEREIA)

The pentathlon joined running, the long jump, the discus, the javelin and wrestling. The pentathletes, Socrates says, “fall short” of the racers and wrestlers “in these men’s own events”, but “are first among the other athletes and beat them” (135e); so the philosopher, “holding the second prizes”, is “a kind of runner-up in everything” (136a). *Hypakros*, a rare word, is “just under the top”, answering *akros*, “top”, in Socrates’ “top master builder” (135c). The wiser lover takes the image as praise; Socrates uses it to ask where the runner-up is useful (136c), and at the end denies that the philosopher may “hold the second prizes” in judging and ruling (138e). *Hypakros* is “runner-up”, *pentathlos* “pentathlete”, *ta deutereia* “the second prizes”.

PUNISH (KOLAZEIN; AKOLASTAINEIN)

Kolazein is to correct, chastise, punish: to check what is unruly. The argument’s last stage begins from it. The same craft makes horses and dogs best and “punishes them rightly” (137b–c); in cities, the knowledge that “rightly punishes those ... who are unruly and break the law” is the judge’s, which is justice (137d); and the philosopher must “himself punish, judging rightly”, in his own household (138e). *Akolastainein*, “to be unruly”, is of the same root: *akolastos*, literally “unchastened”, was the ordinary word for the undisciplined and licentious man. *Kolazein* is “punish” throughout, of horses and dogs as of men.

TEMPERANCE AND KNOWING ONESELF (SŌPHROSYNĒ, SŌPHRONEIN; TO
HEAUTON GIGNŌSKEIN)

Sōphrosynē, from “sound” and “mind”, was self-control, moderation, discretion, the virtue that knows its limits. The Delphic inscription “Know thyself” was commonly read as a call to it, and the *Charmides* (164d–165a) makes Critias read it so. Here the argument reaches it from the other end: whoever does not know the decent and worthless men does not know himself, “whether he is decent or base”; not knowing oneself is “not being temperate”; so knowing oneself is being temperate, which is “what the inscription at Delphi urges” (138a). *Sōphrosynē* is “temperance”, *sōphronein* “be temperate” and *sōphrōn* “temperate”, as throughout the series.

JUSTICE (DIKAIOSYNĒ, DIKAIOS; DIKAZEIN, DIKASTIKĒ; DIKĒN DIDONAI)

Dikaiosynē is justice, *dikaioi* the just man, *dikazein* to judge a case, and *dikēn didonai* to pay the penalty. The knowledge that “rightly punishes those in cities who are unruly and break the law” is “the judge’s”, and Socrates’ interlocutor calls no other “justice” (137d). Since that by which we punish rightly is justice, and that by which we distinguish oneself and others is temperance, and both are the same knowledge, justice and temperance are “the same thing” (138b); and cities “are well ordered: when wrongdoers pay the penalty”. The inscription at Delphi had already been said to urge “temperance and justice” (138a). *Dikaiosynē* is “justice” throughout the series; *dikastikē* is “the judge’s” (knowledge).

KING, TYRANT, STATESMAN, HOUSEHOLD MANAGER, MASTER (BASILEUS, TYRANNOS, POLITIKOS, OIKONOMOS, DESPOTĒS)

When one man orders a city rightly, his name is “tyrant and king”; when one man on his own orders a household rightly, “household manager and master” (138b–c). The arts of each, *basilikē*, *tyrannikē*, *politikē*, *oikonomikē* and *despotikē*, prove to be “one craft” with justice and temperance (138c). The list joins the household to the city, as the *Statesman* (258e–259c) does at length, and the tyrant to the king, as it does not (276e). A *tyrannos* was a sole ruler whose power rested on no lawful or traditional title; the word was not always one of blame. The renderings are “king”, “tyrant”, “statesman”, “household manager” and “master”, with “kingly”, “tyrannical”, “the statesman’s”, “the household manager’s” and “the master’s” for the crafts; *dioikein* is “order”, and *oikeisthai* “be ordered”, as in the *Alcibiades I*.

FINE AND SHAMEFUL (KALOS, AISCHROS)

Kalos is beautiful of persons and fine of acts and things; *aischros*, its opposite, is ugly or shameful. The dialogue opens with the question whether philosophizing is “shameful” or “fine” (132c–133b), and Socrates’ first objection is that one cannot know whether a thing is fine or shameful without knowing what it is (133b). Philosophy is then found “fine” and also “good” (133d), and the love of exercise “both fine and good” (133e). At the end the word returns as a reproach: the wiser lover agrees that it is “shameful” for the philosopher not to be able to follow the judge and the king, and “shameful ... to appear second or third and not to lead” (138d–

139a). *Kalos* is “fine” (and “beautiful” of the young, 133a), *kallion* “more finely”, *aischros* “shameful”.

ΕΡΑΣΤΑΙ

St. I
p. 132

Εἰς Διονυσίου τοῦ γραμματιστοῦ εἰσῆλθον, καὶ εἶδον a
 αὐτόθι τῶν τε νέων τοὺς ἐπιεικεστάτους δοκοῦντας εἶναι τὴν
 ἰδέαν καὶ πατέρων εὐδοκίμων, καὶ τούτων ἐραστάς. ἐτυγ-
 χανέτην οὖν δύο τῶν μειρακίων ἐρίζοντε, περὶ ὅτου δέ, οὐ
 σφόδρα κατήκουον. ἐφαινέσθην μέντοι ἢ περὶ Ἀναξαγόρου 5
 ἢ περὶ Οἰνοπίδου ἐρίζειν· κύκλους γοῦν γράφειν ἐφαινέσθην b
 καὶ ἐγκλίσεις τινὰς ἐμμοῦντο τοῖν χεροῖν ἐπικλίνοντε καὶ
 μάλ' ἐσπουδακότε. κἀγώ—καθήμην γὰρ παρὰ τὸν ἐραστὴν
 τοῦ ἐτέρου αὐτοῖν—κινήσας οὖν αὐτὸν τῷ ἀγκῶνι ἡρόμην
 ὅτι ποτὲ οὕτως ἐσπουδακότε τὸ μειρακίῳ εἵτην, καὶ εἶπον· 5
 Ἦ που μέγα τι καὶ καλὸν ἐστὶ περὶ ὃ τοσαύτην σπουδὴν
 πεποιημένῳ ἐστὸν;

Ὁ δ' εἶπε, Ποῖον, ἔφη, μέγα καὶ καλόν; ἀδολεσχοῦσι
 μὲν οὖν οὗτοί γε περὶ τῶν μετεώρων καὶ φλυαροῦσι 10
 φιλοσοφοῦντες.

Καὶ ἐγὼ θαυμάσας αὐτοῦ τὴν ἀπόκρισιν εἶπον· ὦ νεανία, c
 αἰσχροὺν δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι τὸ φιλοσοφεῖν; ἢ τί οὕτως χαλεπῶς
 λέγεις;

Καὶ ὁ ἕτερος—πλησίον γὰρ καθήμενος ἐτύγχανεν αὐτοῦ,
 ἀντεραστῆς ὢν—ἀκούσας ἐμοῦ τε ἐρομένου κἀκείνου ἀπο- 5

ΕΡΑΣΤΑΙ BT: ANTEΡΑΣΤΑΙ in marg. b b 1 γράφειν B: γράφοντες TW
 ἐφαινέσθην B: ἐφαίνεσθον ex ἐφαίνοντο T b 6 μέγα τι B: τι μέγα T ὃ T: ὅτου B
 b 9 γε T: om. B

I went into the school of Dionysius the writing-master,¹ and there I saw those of the young who were thought the most comely in looks and born of esteemed fathers, and their lovers. Now two of the lads were in fact quarreling, but about what, I could not quite hear. They appeared, though, to be quarreling about either Anaxagoras or Oenopides: it was circles, at any rate, that they appeared to be drawing, and with their hands they were miming some inclinations, tilting them, and were very much in earnest.² And I—for I was seated next to the lover of one of the two—well, nudging him with my elbow, I asked what in the world the two lads were so much in earnest about, and said, “Surely it is something great and fine that they have put such earnestness into?”

And he said, “Great and fine, you call it?” he said. “No: these two are prattling about the things up in the sky, and talking nonsense, philosophizing.”³

And I said, wondering at his answer, “Young man, do you think philosophizing is shameful? Or why do you speak so harshly?”

And the other—for he was in fact sitting near him, being his rival in love⁴—hearing me asking and him

1. A *grammatistēs*, “writing-master”, taught boys their letters. Diogenes Laertius says that Plato learned his letters from a Dionysius, “whom he mentions in the *Rival Lovers*” (3.4).

2. Anaxagoras of Clazomenae (about 500–428 BC) taught at Athens and held the sun to be a fiery stone (Xenophon, *Memorabilia* 4.7.7); Oenopides of Chios, a mathematician and astronomer of the fifth century, first found the slant of the zodiac, as Eudemus records (Theon of Smyrna, p. 198 Hiller). The “inclinations” (*enkliseis*) can be read as the tilt of one circle against another, which the tilted hands suit.

3. *Adoleschein*, “to prattle”, and *ta meteōra*, “the things up in the sky”, were the comic poets’ words for philosophers: Aristophanes’ Socrates looks into “the things up in the sky” from a basket (*Clouds* 225–228), and his school is “prattle” (1480, 1485); in the *Phaedo* (70b–c) Socrates says that not even a comic poet could now accuse him of prattling. *Philosophēin*, “to philosophize”, and *philosophia*, “philosophy”, join *philo-*, “loving”, and *sophia*, “wisdom”; the English keeps “philosophy”, “philosophize” and “philosopher” throughout. The love in the word returns in the dialogue’s other loves: *philotimōs*, “ambitiously”, literally “honor-lovingly” (133a), *philogymnastia*, “the love of exercise” (133d), and *philonikein*, “strive for victory”, literally “love winning” (134c).

4. *Anterastēs*, “rival lover”, one who courts the same boy. From it the dialogue has its other title, *Anterastai*, “The Rival Lovers”, under which Diogenes Laertius lists it (3.59) and which a later hand writes in the margin of B (apparatus, at the title).

κρινομένου, Οὐ πρὸς σοῦ γε, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ποιεῖς τὸ καὶ ἀνερέσθαι τοῦτον εἰ αἰσχρὸν ἡγείται φιλοσοφίαν εἶναι. ἢ οὐκ οἶσθα τοῦτον ὅτι τραχηλιζόμενος καὶ ἐμπιμπλάμενος καὶ καθεύδων πάντα τὸν βίον διατετέλεκεν; ὥστε σὺ τί αὐτὸν ὦρον ἀποκρινεῖσθαι ἀλλ' ἢ ὅτι αἰσχρὸν ἐστὶ φιλοσοφία; 10

Ἦν δὲ οὗτος μὲν τοῖν ἐρασταῖν περὶ μουσικὴν δια- d
τετριφώς, ὁ δ' ἕτερος, ὃν ἐλοιδόρει, περὶ γυμναστικὴν. καί μοι ἔδοξε χρῆναι τὸν μὲν ἕτερον ἀφιέναι, τὸν ἐρωτώμενον, ὅτι οὐδ' αὐτὸς προσεποιεῖτο περὶ λόγων ἔμπειρος εἶναι ἀλλὰ περὶ ἔργων, τὸν δὲ σοφώτερον προσποιούμενον εἶναι διε- 5
ρωτῆσαι, ἵνα καὶ εἴ τι δυναίμην παρ' αὐτοῦ ὠφεληθεῖην. εἶπον οὖν ὅτι Εἰς κοινὸν μὲν τὸ ἐρώτημα ἡρόμην· εἰ δὲ σὺ οἶε τοῦδε κάλλιον ἂν ἀποκρίνασθαι, σὲ ἐρωτῶ τὸ αὐτὸ ὅπερ καὶ τοῦτον, εἰ δοκεῖ σοι τὸ φιλοσοφεῖν καλὸν εἶναι ἢ οὐ.

Σχεδὸν οὖν ταῦτα λεγόντων ἡμῶν ἐπακούσαντε τῷ μει- 133
ρακίῳ ἐσιγησάτην, καὶ αὐτῷ παυσαμένῳ τῆς ἔριδος ἡμῶν ἀκροαταὶ ἐγενέσθην. καὶ ὅτι μὲν οἱ ἐρασταὶ ἔπαθον οὐκ οἶδα, αὐτὸς δ' οὖν ἐξεπλάγην· αἰεὶ γάρ ποτε ὑπὸ τῶν νέων τε καὶ καλῶν ἐκπλήττομαι. ἐδόκει μέντοι μοι καὶ ὁ ἕτερος 5
οὐχ ἦττον ἐμοῦ ἀγωνιᾶν· οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ἀπεκρίνατό γέ μοι καὶ μάλα φιλοτίμως. Ὅποτε γάρ τοι, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸ φιλοσοφεῖν αἰσχρὸν ἡγησαίμην εἶναι, οὐδ' ἂν ἀνθρωπον b
νομίσαιμι ἐμαυτὸν εἶναι, οὐδ' ἄλλον τὸν οὕτω διακείμενον, ἐνδεικνύμενος εἰς τὸν ἀντεραστήν, καὶ λέγων μεγάλη τῇ φωνῇ, ἵν' αὐτοῦ κατακούοι τὰ παιδικά.

Καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον, Καλὸν ἄρα δοκεῖ σοι τὸ φιλοσοφεῖν; 5

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

c7 φιλοσοφίαν εἶναι B: εἶναι φιλοσοφίαν T c8 τοῦτον B: αὐτὸν T c9 σὺ τί αὐτὸν ὦρον B: ὥστε τί σοι οἶε αὐτὸν TW c10 ἀποκρινεῖσθαι B: ἀποκρίνεσθαι TW ἀλλ' ἢ B: ἄλλο ἢ TW d3 τὸν ἐρωτώμενον Schleiermacher (*quem prius interrogaveram* Ficinus): τὸν ἐρόμενον b: τὸν ἐρώμενον BT d5 σοφώτερον T: σοφώτατον B d7 οὖν T: γ' οὖν B d8 ἂν ἀποκρίνασθαι Laur. lxxxv. 14: ἂν ἀποκρίνεσθαι T: ἀποκρίνεσθαι B: ἀποκρινεῖσθαι b a4 δ' οὖν T: γ' οὖν B b3 μεγάλη BW: μέγα T b5 σοι TW: σοι οἷόν τ' εἶναι B

answering, said, “It is not like you, Socrates, even to ask this fellow whether he thinks philosophy is shameful. Or don’t you know that he has spent his whole life having his neck twisted, stuffing himself and sleeping?¹ So what did you think he would answer, except that philosophy is shameful?”

Now of the two lovers this one had spent his time on music, and the other, the one he was abusing, on gymnastics.² And I thought I ought to let the one go, the one I had questioned, since he himself did not even lay claim to being experienced in words, but in deeds, and to question closely the one who laid claim to being wiser, so that I might also, if I could in any way, be benefited by him.³ So I said, “I put my question to the company; but if you think you would answer more finely than he, I ask you the same thing as I asked him: whether you think philosophizing is fine or not.”

As we were saying something like this, then, the two lads overheard us and fell silent, and, stopping their quarrel, became our listeners themselves. How the lovers were affected I don’t know, but I, for one, was dazzled; for I am always dazzled by the young and beautiful.⁴ It seemed to me, though, that the other too was no less on edge than I;⁵ all the same, he did answer me, and very ambitiously.

“Why, Socrates,” he said, “if ever I thought philosophizing shameful, I would not even consider myself a man, nor anyone else who was so disposed”—pointing at his rival lover as he said it, and speaking in a loud voice, so that his beloved should hear him.

And I said, “So you think philosophizing is fine?”

“Certainly,” he said.

1. *Trachēlizesthai*, from *trachēlos*, “neck”, is to have one’s neck seized and bent back in wrestling. The athlete’s “unrubbed neck” at 134b answers it.

2. *Mousikē*, the art of the Muses, meant poetry, song and letters, not music alone.

3. “The one I had questioned” translates Schleiermacher’s *erōtōmenon*, which Ficino’s Latin supports; B and T have *erōmenon*, “the beloved”, and a later hand in B *eromenon*, “the one who asked”.

4. So in the *Charmides* Socrates says that where the beautiful are concerned he is “simply a white line”, a builder’s line that marks nothing on white stone: nearly everyone of that age looks beautiful to him (154b).

5. *Agōnian*, “to be on edge”, is the anxiety of a competitor before a contest (*agōn*), as in the *Charmides* (162c).

Τί οὖν, ἐγὼ ἔφην· ἡ δοκεῖ σοι οἶόν τ' εἶναι εἰδέναι
πρᾶγμα ὅτι οὖν εἴτε καλὸν εἴτε αἰσχρόν ἐστιν, ὃ μὴ εἰδείη
τις τὴν ἀρχὴν ὅτι ἔστιν;

Οὐκ ἔφη.

10

Οἶσθ' ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι ἔστιν τὸ φιλοσοφεῖν;

c

Πάνν γε, ἔφη.

Τί οὖν ἔστιν; ἔφην ἐγώ.

Τί δ' ἄλλο γε ἢ κατὰ τὸ Σόλωνος; Σόλων γάρ που
εἶπε—

5

γηράσκω δ' αἰεὶ πολλὰ διδασκόμενος·

καὶ ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ οὕτως αἰεὶ χρῆναι εἶν γέ τι μανθάνειν τὸν
μέλλοντα φιλοσοφήσειν, καὶ νεώτερον ὄντα καὶ πρεσβύ-
τερον, ἦν' ὥς πλείστα ἐν τῷ βίῳ μάθη. καὶ μοι τὸ μὲν
πρῶτον ἔδοξε τὶ εἰπεῖν, ἔπειτά πως ἐννοήσας ἡρόμην αὐτὸν
εἰ τὴν φιλοσοφίαν πολυμαθίαν ἡγοῖτο.

10

Κακεῖνος, Πάνν, ἔφη.

d

Ἦγῃ δὲ δὴ καλὸν εἶναι μόνον τὴν φιλοσοφίαν ἢ καὶ
ἀγαθόν; ἦν δ' ἐγώ.

Καὶ ἀγαθόν, ἔφη, πάνν.

Πότερον οὖν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ τι τοῦτο ἴδιον ἐνορᾶς, ἢ καὶ
ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις οὕτω σοι δοκεῖ ἔχειν; οἷον φιλογυμναστίαν
οὐ μόνον ἡγῇ καλὸν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀγαθόν; ἢ οὐ;

5

Ὁ δὲ καὶ μάλα εἰρωνικῶς εἶπε δύο· Πρὸς μὲν τόνδε
μοι εἰρήσθω ὅτι οὐδέτερα· πρὸς μέντοι σέ, ὦ Σώκρατες,
ὁμολογῶ καὶ καλὸν εἶναι καὶ ἀγαθόν· ἡγοῦμαι γὰρ ὀρθῶς.

e

Ἡρώτησα οὖν ἐγώ, Ἄρ' οὖν καὶ ἐν τοῖς γυμνασίοις τὴν
πολυπονίαν φιλογυμναστίαν ἡγῇ εἶναι;

c1 τὸ b: τι BT c2 πάνν γε B: καὶ μάλα ἔφη TW c4 τὸ b: τοῦ BT: τὸ τοῦ t c6 δ'
αἰεὶ Solo: αἰεὶ B: δ' αἰεὶ T διδασκόμενος T: δὴ διδασκόμενος B c10 ἔπειτά B: εἰτά T
c11 ἡγοῖτο T: ἡγείτο εἶναι B d6 τοῖς B: om. T d7 ἡγεί καλὸν B: καλὸν ἡγεί T
d8 εἶπε T: ἔφη B d9 μέντοι T: δὲ B e1 ὁμολογῶ καὶ καλὸν εἶναι καὶ ἀγαθόν B:
καὶ καλὸν καγαθὸν ὁμολογῶ εἶναι T ἡγοῦμαι . . . e2 ἐγώ B: om. TW e2 ἄρ'
οὖν TW: om. B e3 εἶναι T: τι εἶναι B

“What, then?” I said. “Do you think it is possible to know of anything whatever whether it is fine or shameful, if one did not know at all what it is?”

He said not.

“Then you know,” said I, “what philosophizing is?” c

“Certainly,” he said.

“What is it, then?” said I.

“What else but what Solon says? For Solon, I believe, said—

I grow old always learning many things;

and it seems to me too that the man who is going to philosophize must in this way always be learning one thing at least, both when he is younger and when he is older, so as to learn as much as possible in his life.”¹

At first he seemed to me to be saying something; then somehow, thinking it over, I asked him whether he thought philosophy was much learning.²

And he said, “Entirely.” d

“And do you think philosophy is only fine, or good as well?” said I.

“Good as well,” he said, “entirely.”

“Then is this something peculiar that you see in philosophy, or does it seem to you to be so in the other things too? For instance, do you think the love of exercise is not only fine, but good as well? Or not?”

And he, very ironically, gave two answers: “To this fellow let my answer be that it is neither; to you, however, Socrates, I agree that it is both fine and good; for I think rightly.”³ e

So I asked, “Then in exercises too, do you think much labor is the love of exercise?”

1. Solon, the Athenian lawgiver and poet of the early sixth century BC (fragment 18 West). Plato alludes to the line also in the *Laches* (188b, 189a) and the *Republic* (536d).

2. *Polymathia*, “much learning”. Heraclitus’ saying “Much learning does not teach one to have sense” (DK 22 B 40, in Diogenes Laertius 9.1) was a known rebuke of it.

3. *Eirōnikōs*, “ironically”: *eirōneia* is saying less than, or other than, one means. It is Thrasymachus’ charge against Socrates in the *Republic* (337a).

Κακέινος ἔφη, Πάνυ γε, ὥσπερ γε καὶ ἐν τῷ φιλοσοφεῖν
τὴν πολυμαθίαν φιλοσοφίαν ἡγοῦμαι εἶναι. 5

Κἀγὼ εἶπον, Ἥγη δὲ δὴ τοὺς φιλογυμναστούντας ἄλλου
του ἐπιθυμεῖν ἢ τούτου, ὅτι ποιήσει αὐτοὺς εὖ ἔχειν τὸ
σῶμα;

Τούτου, ἔφη.

Ἦ οὖν οἱ πολλοὶ πόνοι τὸ σῶμα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ποιοῦσιν 10
εὖ ἔχειν;

Πῶς γὰρ ἄν, ἔφη, ἀπὸ γε ὀλίγων πόνων τὸ σῶμά τις εὖ 134
ἔχει;

Καί μοι ἔδοξεν ἤδη ἐνταῦθα κινητέος εἶναι ὁ φιλογυ-
μναστής, ἵνα μοι βοηθήσῃ διὰ τὴν ἐμπειρίαν τῆς γυμναστικῆς·
κᾶπειτα ἡρόμην αὐτόν, Σὺ δὲ δὴ τί σιγᾶς ἡμῖν, ὦ λῶστε, 5
τούτου ταῦτα λέγοντος; ἢ καὶ σοὶ δοκοῦσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι εὖ
τὰ σώματα ἔχειν ἀπὸ τῶν πολλῶν πόνων, ἢ ἀπὸ τῶν
μετρίων;

Ἐγὼ μὲν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, ὥμην τὸ λεγόμενον δὴ τοῦτο
κἂν ἔνιν γινῶναι ὅτι οἱ μέτριοι πόνοι εὖ ποιοῦσιν ἔχειν τὰ 10
σώματα, πόθεν δὲ οὐχὶ ἄνδρα γε ἄγρυπνόν τε καὶ ἄσιτον b
καὶ ἀτριβὴ τὸν τράχηλον ἔχοντα καὶ λεπτόν ὑπὸ μεριμνῶν;
καὶ αὐτοῦ ταῦτα εἰπόντος ἦσθη τὰ μειράκια καὶ ἐπεγέλασεν,
ὁ δ' ἕτερος ἡρυθρίασε.

Καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον, Τί οὖν; σὺ ἤδη συγχωρεῖς μήτε πολλοὺς 5
μήτε ὀλίγους πόνους εὖ ποιεῖν ἔχειν τὰ σώματα τοὺς ἀνθρώ-
πους, ἀλλὰ τοὺς μετρίους; ἢ διαμάχῃ δυοῖν ὄντοι νῶν περὶ
τοῦ λόγου;

Κακέινος, Πρὸς μὲν τοῦτον, ἔφη, κἂν πάνυ ἡδέως δια- c
γωνισαίμην, καὶ εὖ οἶδ' ὅτι ἱκανὸς ἂν γενοίμην βοηθήσαι
τῇ ὑποθέσει ἣν ὑπεθέμην, καὶ εἰ ταύτης ἔτι φαυλοτέραν
ὑπεθέμην—οὐδὲν γάρ ἐστι—πρὸς μέντοι σὲ οὐδὲν δέομαι

e 4 γε B: om. T e 6 δὲ δὴ recc.: δὲ δεῖ T: δὲ B a 1 ἀπὸ γε ὀλίγων B: ἀπ' ὀλίγων γε T
a 4 βοηθήσῃ B: βοηθήσει T a 6 τούτου ταῦτα B: ταῦτα τούτου T a 10 κἂν ἔνιν
Hermann: καὶ νῦν BT b 3 ἐπεγέλασε B: ἐγέλασεν T

And he said, "Certainly, just as in philosophizing too I think much learning is philosophy."

And I said, "And do you think that those who love exercise desire anything else than this, which will make them have their bodies in good condition?"

"This," he said.

"Then is it many labors," said I, "that put the body in good condition?"

"Why, how could anyone," he said, "have his body in good condition from few labors, at least?" 134

And it seemed to me that at this point the lover of exercise must now be nudged, so that he might come to my help through his experience of gymnastics; and then I asked him, "And you, my good friend, why are you silent on us while this fellow says such things? Or do you too think that men have their bodies in good condition from many labors, or from moderate ones?"

"I, Socrates," he said, "for my part thought that, as the saying goes, even a pig would know that moderate labors put bodies in good condition;¹ so how could a man not know it—a man, at any rate, sleepless and unfed, with an unrubbed neck, and thin with worries?"² And when he said this, the lads were delighted and laughed at it, and the other blushed. b

And I said, "Well then? Do you, for your part, now concede that neither many nor few labors put men's bodies in good condition, but moderate ones? Or are you fighting it out with the two of us over the argument?"

And he said, "With this fellow I would very gladly contend, and I know well that I would prove able to come to the help of the position I laid down, even if I had laid down one still poorer than this—for he is nothing—with you, however, I have no need to c

1. "Even a pig would know" is Hermann's correction, *kan hyn*, "even a pig", for the manuscripts' *kai nyn*, "and now". The proverb is played on in the *Laches* (196d).

2. The athlete's picture of his rival is the comic poets' picture of the philosopher: in Aristophanes' *Clouds* Socrates' pupils are pale (103), and the would-be pupil, promised happiness if he can bear cold and hunger and keep away from exercises, boasts of a sleepless worry and a frugal belly (412–421).

παρὰ δόξαν φιλονικεῖν, ἀλλ' ὁμολογῶ μὴ τὰ πολλὰ ἀλλὰ 5
τὰ μέτρια γυμνάσια τὴν εὐεξίαν ἐμποιεῖν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις.

Τί δὲ τὰ σιτία; τὰ μέτρια ἢ τὰ πολλά; ἔφην ἐγώ.

Καὶ τὰ σιτία ὠμολόγει.

Ἔτι δὲ καὶ γὰρ προσηνάγκαζον αὐτὸν ὁμολογεῖν καὶ τὰλλα d
πάντα τὰ περὶ τὸ σῶμα ὠφελιμώτατα εἶναι τὰ μέτρια ἀλλὰ
μὴ τὰ πολλὰ μηδὲ τὰ ὀλίγα· καὶ μοι ὠμολόγει τὰ μέτρια.

Τί δ', ἔφην, τὰ περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν; τὰ μέτρια ὠφελεῖ ἢ 5
τὰ ἄμετρα τῶν προσφερομένων;

Τὰ μέτρια, ἔφη.

Οὐκοῦν ἐν τῶν προσφερομένων ψυχῇ ἐστὶ καὶ τὰ μαθη-
ματα;

Ὁμολόγει.

Καὶ τούτων ἄρα τὰ μέτρια ὠφελεῖ ἀλλ' οὐ τὰ πολλά; 10

Συνέφη.

Τίνα οὖν ἐρόμενοι ἂν δικαίως ἐροίμεθα ὅποιοι μέτριοι e
πόνιοι καὶ σιτία πρὸς τὸ σῶμά ἐστιν;

Ὁμολογοῦμεν μὲν τρεῖς ὄντες, ὅτι ἱατρὸν ἢ παιδοτρίβην.

Τίνα δ' ἂν περὶ σπερμάτων σπορᾶς ὅποσον μέτριον;

Καὶ τούτου τὸν γεωργὸν ὠμολογοῦμεν. 5

Τίνα δὲ περὶ μαθημάτων εἰς ψυχὴν φυτεύσεώς τε καὶ
σπορᾶς ἐρωτῶντες δικαίως ἂν ἐροίμεθα ὅποσα καὶ ὅποια
μέτρια;

Τοῦντεῦθεν ἤδη ἀπορίας μεστοὶ ἦμεν ἅπαντες· καὶ γὰρ 135
προσπαίζων αὐτοὺς ἡρόμην, Βούλεσθε, ἔφην, ἐπειδὴ ἡμεῖς
ἐν ἀπορίᾳ ἐσμέν, ἐρώμεθα ταντὶ τὰ μειράκια; ἢ ἴσως
αἰσχνυόμεθα, ὥσπερ ἔφη τοὺς μνηστήρας Ὅμηρος, μὴ
ἀξιούντων εἶναι τίνα ἄλλον ὅστις ἐντενεί τὸ τόξον; 5

δ2 ὠφελιμώτατα εἶναι τὰ μέτρια Schanz: ὠφελιμώτατα εἶναι μέτρια B: τὰ μέτρια μάλιστα ὠφελεῖν T δ4 ὠφελεῖ Stephanus: ὠφελεῖν BT e1 μέτριοι πόνοι B: πόνοι μέτριοι T e3 ὠμολογοῦμεν B: ὁμολογοῦμεν T μὲν BT: om. al. ὅτι B: ἢ TW (sed ὅτι s. v.) e4 σπερμάτων B: σπέρματος T e5 καὶ τούτου BT: καὶ τούτῳ ci. Schanz ὁμολογοῦμεν pr. BT e6 περὶ B: om. TW a5 ἀξιούντων BT: ἀξιούντας b: ἀξιούντες Cobet

strive for victory against my own opinion; rather, I agree that it is not the many but the moderate exercises that produce good condition in men."

"And what about food: moderate or much?" said I.

He agreed about food too.

And further I went on to compel him to agree that in all the other things to do with the body as well, what is moderate is most beneficial, not what is much or little; and he agreed with me: what is moderate.

"And what," I said, "of what concerns the soul? Does what is moderate benefit it, or what is immoderate, of the things given to it?"

"What is moderate," he said.

"Then are not the subjects of learning, too, one of the things given to the soul?"

He agreed.

"Then of these too what is moderate benefits, and not what is much?"

He concurred.

"Whom, then, would we justly ask what kind of labors and food are moderate for the body?"

We agreed, the three of us, that it is the doctor or the trainer.

"And whom about the sowing of seeds, how much is moderate?"

For this too we agreed on the farmer.

"And about the planting and sowing of subjects of learning in the soul, whom would we justly ask, how many and what kind are moderate?"

From there on we were all of us now full of perplexity; and I, teasing them, asked, "Since we are in perplexity," I said, "shall we ask these lads here? Or are we perhaps ashamed, as Homer said of the suitors, who did not think it fit that there be anyone else who would string the bow?"¹

1. In the *Odyssey* none of the suitors can string Odysseus' bow, and when the disguised Odysseus asks to try, they protest, ashamed that it should be said that a beggar strung it (21.285-329).

Ἐπειδὴ οὖν μοι ἐδόκουν ἀθυμεῖν πρὸς τὸν λόγον, ἄλλη ἐπειρώμην σκοπεῖν, καὶ εἶπον, Ποῖα δὲ μάλιστα ἅττα τοπάζομεν εἶναι τῶν μαθημάτων ἃ δεῖ τὸν φιλοσοφοῦντα μανθάνειν, ἐπειδὴ οὐχὶ πάντα οὐδὲ πολλά;

Ὑπολαβὼν οὖν ὁ σοφώτερος εἶπεν ὅτι Κάλλιστα ταῦτ' b
εἷη τῶν μαθημάτων καὶ προσήκοντα ἀφ' ὧν ἂν πλείστην δόξαν ἔχοι τις εἰς φιλοσοφίαν· πλείστην δ' ἂν ἔχοι δόξαν, εἰ δοκοῖη τῶν τεχνῶν ἔμπειρος εἶναι πασῶν, εἰ δὲ μή, ὡς πλείστων γε καὶ μάλιστα τῶν ἀξιολόγων, μαθὼν αὐτῶν 5
ταῦτα ἃ προσήκει τοῖς ἐλευθέροις μαθεῖν, ὅσα συνέσεως ἔχεται, μὴ ὅσα χειρουργίας.

Ἄρ' οὖν οὕτω λέγεις, ἔφην ἐγώ, ὥσπερ ἐν τῇ τεκτονικῇ; καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖ τέκτονα μὲν ἂν πρίατο πέντε ἢ ἕξ μνῶν, ἄκρον c
ἀρχιτέκτονα δὲ οὐδ' ἂν μυρίων δραχμῶν· ὀλίγοι γε μὴν καὶ ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς Ἑλλήσι γίνονται. ἄρα μὴ τι τοιοῦτον λέγεις; Καὶ ὃς ἀκούσας μου συνεχώρει καὶ αὐτὸς λέγειν τοιοῦτον.

Ἡρόμην δ' αὐτὸν εἰ οὐκ ἀδύνατον εἷη δύο μόνας τέχνας 5
οὕτω μαθεῖν τὸν αὐτόν, μὴ ὅτι πολλὰς καὶ μεγάλας· ὁ δέ, Μὴ οὕτως μου, ἔφη, ὑπολάβης, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὡς λέγοντος ὅτι δεῖ ἐκάστην τῶν τεχνῶν τὸν φιλοσοφοῦντα ἐπίστασθαι ἀκριβῶς ὥσπερ αὐτὸν τὸν τὴν τέχνην ἔχοντα, ἀλλ' ὡς d
εἰκὸς ἄνδρα ἐλευθέρον τε καὶ πεπαιδευμένον, ἐπακολουθησαί τε τοῖς λεγομένοις ὑπὸ τοῦ δημιουργοῦ οἷόν τ' εἶναι διαφερόντως τῶν παρόντων, καὶ αὐτὸν ξυμβάλλεσθαι γνώμην, ὥστε δοκεῖν χαριέστατον εἶναι καὶ σοφώτατον τῶν αἰ 5
παρόντων ἐν τοῖς λεγομένοις τε καὶ πραττομένοις περὶ τὰς τέχνας.

Καὶ γὰρ, ἔτι γὰρ αὐτοῦ ἡμφεγνόουν τὸν λόγον ὅτι ἐβούλετο,

a7 μάλιστα αὐτὰ τοπάζομεν B: μάλιστα τοπάζομεν ἅττα T
a8 φιλοσοφοῦντα B: φιλόσοφον T a9 ἐπειδὴ B: ἐπεὶ T b3 δ' ἂν BT: δ'
Schanz b5 γε B: τε T μάλιστα T: μάλα B c2 καὶ... c3 γίνονται Schanz:
καὶ... γίνονται B: καὶ... γίνονται T c3 μὴ τι T: μὴ B c4 αὐτὸς T: αὐτοῦ B
λέγειν τοιοῦτον B: τοιοῦτον λέγειν T c5 μόνας B: μόνον T c6 μαθεῖν BT:
λαβεῖν ex emend. T d5 τῶν αἰεὶ B: αἰεὶ τῶν T

Then, since they seemed to me to have lost heart over the argument, I tried to look into it another way, and said, “What sort of subjects of learning, then, at our best guess, are the ones the man who philosophizes must learn, since it is not all, nor many?”

So the wiser one took this up and said that the finest of the subjects of learning, and the fitting ones, were those from which one would have the greatest reputation for philosophy; and he would have the greatest reputation if he seemed to be experienced in all the crafts, or if not, in as many as possible, at any rate, and especially in those worth mentioning, having learned of them what is fitting for free men to learn, whatever belongs to understanding, not whatever belongs to handiwork.

“Do you mean it, then,” said I, “as in carpentry? For there too a carpenter you could buy for five or six minae, but a top master builder not even for ten thousand drachmas; and there would be few of them, indeed, even in all Greece.¹ Can it be something like this that you mean?” And he, hearing me, conceded that he too meant something of the sort.

Then I asked him whether it was not impossible for one and the same man to learn only two crafts in this way, let alone many and great ones; and he said, “Don’t take me that way, Socrates, as saying that the man who philosophizes must know each of the crafts precisely, like the man who has the craft himself, but as is reasonable for a free and educated man: to be able to follow what is said by the craftsman better than those present, and to contribute a judgment of his own, so as to seem the most accomplished and the wisest of whoever is present at what is said and done about the crafts.”

And I—for I was still in doubt about his argument, what he meant—

1. A mina was a hundred drachmas, so that the master builder is worth more than sixteen carpenters at the higher price. “Top” is *akros*; see the note at 136a.

Ἄρ' ἐννοῶ, ἔφην, οἷον λέγεις τὸν φιλόσοφον ἄνδρα; δοκεῖς e
 γάρ μοι λέγειν οἷοι ἐν τῇ ἀγωνίᾳ εἶσιν οἱ πένταθλοι πρὸς
 τοὺς δρομέας ἢ τοὺς παλαιστάς. καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι τούτων
 μὲν λείπονται κατὰ τὰ τούτων ἄθλα καὶ δεύτεροί εἰσι πρὸς
 τούτους, τῶν δ' ἄλλων ἀθλητῶν πρῶτοι καὶ νικῶσιν αὐτούς. 5
 τάχ' ἂν ἴσως τοιοῦτόν τι λέγοις καὶ τὸ φιλοσοφεῖν ἀπερ-
 γάζεσθαι τοὺς ἐπιτηδεύοντας τοῦτο τὸ ἐπιτήδευμα· τῶν μὲν
 πρῶτων εἰς σύνεσιν περὶ τὰς τέχνας ἐλλείπεσθαι, τὰ δευ- 136
 τερεῖα δ' ἔχοντας τῶν ἄλλων περιεῖναι, καὶ οὕτως γίνεσθαι
 περὶ πάντα ὑπακρόν τινα ἄνδρα τὸν πεφιλοσοφηκότα·
 τοιοῦτόν τινά μοι δοκεῖς ἐνδείκνυσθαι.

Καλῶς γέ μοι, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, φαίνει ὑπολαμβάνειν 5
 τὰ περὶ τοῦ φιλοσόφου, ἀπεικάσας αὐτὸν τῷ πεντάθλῳ.
 ἔστιν γὰρ ἀτεχνῶς τοιοῦτος οἷος μὴ δουλεύειν μηδενὶ πρά-
 γματι, μηδ' εἰς τὴν ἀκρίβειαν μηδὲν διαπεπονηκέναι, ὥστε
 διὰ τὴν τοῦ ἐνὸς τούτου ἐπιμέλειαν τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων
 ἀπολελείφθαι, ὥσπερ οἱ δημιουργοί, ἀλλὰ πάντων μετρίως b
 ἐφήφθαι.

Μετὰ ταύτην δὴ τὴν ἀπόκρισιν ἐγὼ προθυμούμενος σαφῶς
 εἰδέναι ὅτι λέγοι, ἐπυνθανόμην αὐτοῦ τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς πότερον
 χρησίμους ἢ ἀχρήστους εἶναι ὑπολαμβάνοι. 5

Χρησίμους δήπου, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη.

Ἄρ' οὖν, εἶπερ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ χρήσιμοι, οἱ πονηροὶ
 ἀχρηστοί;

Ὁμολόγει.

Τί δέ; τοὺς φιλοσόφους ἄνδρας χρησίμους ἡ γῇ ἢ οὐ; 10

Ὁ δὲ ὠμολόγει χρησίμους, καὶ πρὸς γε ἔφη χρησιμω- c
 τάτους εἶναι ἡγεῖσθαι.

Φέρε δὴ γινώμεν, εἰ σὺ ἀληθῆ λέγεις, ποῦ καὶ χρήσιμοι

e2 οἷοι corr. Coisl.: οἷον BT

e4 κατὰ τὰ T: κατὰ B

e6 λέγοις T: λέγεις B

a1 πρῶτων T: πρῶτον B

a4 δοκεῖς T: δοκεῖ B

a5 φαίνει B: δοκεῖς T

ὑπολαμβάνειν B: ὑπολαβεῖν T

a7 οἷος TW: om. B

b1 ὥσπερ οἱ δημιουργοὶ

ἀλλὰ T: ἀλλ' ὥσπερ οἱ δημιουργοὶ B

b7 χρήσιμοι T: οἱ χρήσιμοι B

c3 σὺ T:

om. B

“Do I take in,” I said, “what sort of man you mean the philosopher e
to be? For it seems to me that you mean what the pentathletes are
in a contest, compared with racers or wrestlers. For indeed they fall
short of these in these men’s own events, and are second to them,
but are first among the other athletes and beat them.¹ Perhaps you
might mean that philosophizing too makes those who pursue this
pursuit something of this kind: that they fall short of the first in the 136
understanding of the crafts, but holding the second prizes they sur-
pass the others; and so the man who has philosophized becomes
a kind of runner-up in everything.² It is some such man that you
seem to me to be pointing to.”

“You appear to me, Socrates,” he said, “to take the philosopher’s
case finely indeed, likening him to the pentathlete. For he is simply
the sort not to be a slave to any one thing, nor to have labored at
anything to the point of precision, so as to be left behind in all the b
others through his care for this one, as the craftsmen are, but to
have laid hold of all of them in moderation.”³

After this answer, then, being keen to know clearly what he was
saying, I asked him whether he took the good to be useful or use-
less.

“Useful, of course, Socrates,” he said.

“Then if the good are useful, are the base useless?”

He agreed.

“Well? Do you think philosophers are useful or not?”

He agreed they were useful, and indeed said besides that he c
thought them most useful.

“Come, then, let us find out, if you are telling the truth: where
are they actually useful

1. The pentathlon joined running, the long jump, the discus, the javelin and wrestling. Thrasyllus, as Diogenes Laertius reports (9.37), thought that if the dialogue is Plato’s, the unnamed speaker for whom the philosopher is like a pentathlete would be Democritus, who was, the report goes on, a true pentathlete in philosophy.

2. *Hypakros*, a rare word, is “just under the top”, *akros*, the word of the “top master builder” at 135c: second to the specialist in each event, ahead of all the rest.

3. *Metriōs*, “in moderation”, is the adverb of *metrios*, “moderate”, the word of the moderate labors, food and subjects of 134a–e.

ἡμῖν εἰσιν οἱ ὕπακροι οὔτοι; δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι ἐκάστου γε τῶν
τὰς τέχνας ἐχόντων φαυλότερός ἐστιν ὁ φιλόσοφος. 5

Ὁμολόγει.

Φέρε δὴ σύ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἰ τύχοις ἢ αὐτὸς ἀσθενήσας ἢ
τῶν φίλων τις τῶν σῶν περὶ ὧν σὺ σπουδὴν μεγάλην ἔχεις,
πότερον ὑγείαν βουλόμενος κτήσασθαι τὸν ὕπακρον ἐκείνον
[τὸν φιλόσοφον] εἰσάγοις ἂν εἰς τὴν οἰκίαν ἢ τὸν ἱατρὸν 10
λάβοις;

Ἀμφοτέρους ἔγωγ' ἄν, ἔφη. d

Μή μοι, εἶπον ἐγώ, ἀμφοτέρους λέγε, ἀλλ' ὁπότερον
μᾶλλον τε καὶ πρότερον.

Οὐδεὶς ἄν, ἔφη, τοῦτό γε ἀμφισβητήσειεν, ὥς οὐχὶ τὸν
ἱατρὸν καὶ μᾶλλον καὶ πρότερον. 5

Τί δ'; ἐν νηὶ χεμαζομένη ποτέρῳ ἂν μᾶλλον ἐπιτρέποις
σαντόν τε καὶ τὰ σεαυτοῦ, τῷ κυβερνήτῃ ἢ τῷ φιλοσόφῳ;

Τῷ κυβερνήτῃ ἔγωγε.

Οὐκοῦν καὶ τᾶλλα πάνθ' οὕτως, ἕως ἄν τις δημιουργὸς ᾦ,
οὐ χρήσιμός ἐστιν ὁ φιλόσοφος; 10

Φαίνεται, ἔφη.

Οὐκοῦν νῦν ἄχρηστός τις ἡμῖν ἐστιν ὁ φιλόσοφος; εἰσὶ e
γὰρ ἡμῖν αἰεὶ πού δημιουργοί· ὠμολογήσαμεν δὲ τοὺς μὲν
ἀγαθοὺς χρήσιμους εἶναι, τοὺς δὲ μοχθηροὺς ἀχρήστους.

Ἦναγκάζεται ὁμολογεῖν.

Τί οὖν μετὰ τούτου; ἔρωμαί σε ἢ ἀγροικότερόν ἐστιν 5
ἐρέσθαι—

Ἐροῦ ὅτι βούλει.

Οὐδὲν δὴ, ἔφην ἐγώ, ζητῶ ἄλλο ἢ ἀνομολογήσασθαι τὰ

c 4 γε T: τε B c 7 δὴ B: δὲ T c 8 ὧν B: οὗ T c 9 βουλόμενος κτήσασθαι B:
κτῆσασθαι βουλόμενος T c 10 τὸν φιλόσοφον T: τὸν σοφὸν B: φιλόσοφον
Stephanus: secl. Cobet εἰσάγοις BT: εἰσαγάγοις b c 11 λάβοις B: ἂν λάβοις T:
secl. Cobet d 1 ἔφη recc.: ἔφην BT d 2 ἐγώ * B: ἔγωγ' T d 3 τε B: γε T
d 7 σαντόν recc.: εἰσάγον B: αὐτόν T τὰ σεαυτοῦ B: τὰς εἰσαυτοῦ T d 10 ὁ B: om. T
e 1 ἐστὶν ὁ φιλόσοφος B: ὁ φιλόσοφος ἐστίν T e 2 ἡμῖν B: om. T αἰεὶ Hermann:
δὴ BT e 3 ἀχρήστους B γρ. T: ἀχρεῖους T e 5 τί BT: τὸ Baiter e 8 ζητῶ T:
ζητῶν B

to us, these runners-up? For it is plain that the philosopher is poorer than each of those who have the crafts, at least."

He agreed.

"Come, then," said I, "if either you yourself or some friend of yours about whom you are greatly in earnest should in fact fall sick, would you, wishing to acquire health, bring that runner-up into the house, or would you get the doctor?"¹

"Both, I would," he said. d

"Don't say both to me," I said, "but which one of the two rather, and first."

"No one," he said, "would dispute this, at least: that it would be the doctor, both rather and first."

"Well? In a ship in a storm, to which of the two would you rather entrust both yourself and what is yours: to the pilot or to the philosopher?"

"To the pilot, I would."

"Then so too in everything else: as long as there is any craftsman, the philosopher is not useful?"

"It appears so," he said.

"Then is the philosopher now a useless sort of man for us? For there always are craftsmen for us, I suppose; and we agreed that the good are useful, and the worthless useless."² e

He was compelled to agree.

"What, then, after this? Shall I ask you, or is it rather boorish to ask—"

"Ask whatever you wish."

"Why, I seek nothing else," said I, "than to agree over again on what

1. After "that runner-up" Burnet brackets "the philosopher" as an addition to the text, with Cobet; the words are not translated.

2. "Always" is Hermann's *aei*; B and T have *dē*, "of course".

εἰρημένα. ἔχει δέ πως ᾧδί. ὠμολογήσαμεν καλὸν εἶναι 137
 τὴν φιλοσοφίαν καὶ αὐτοὶ φιλόσοφοι εἶναι, τοὺς δὲ φιλοσό-
 φους ἀγαθοὺς, τοὺς δὲ ἀγαθοὺς χρησίμους, τοὺς δὲ πονηροὺς
 ἀχρήστους· αὐθις δ' αὖ τοὺς φιλοσόφους ὠμολογήσαμεν, ἕως
 ἂν οἱ δημιουργοὶ ὦσιν, ἀχρήστους εἶναι, δημιουργοὺς δὲ αἰ 5
 εἶναι. οὐ γὰρ ταῦτα ὠμολόγηται;

Πάνυ γε, ἦ δ' ὅς.

Ὡμολογοῦμεν ἄρα, ὥς ἔοικε, κατὰ γε τὸν σὸν λόγον,
 εἴπερ τὸ φιλοσοφεῖν ἐστὶ περὶ τὰς τέχνας ἐπιστήμονας
 εἶναι ὃν σὺ λέγεις τὸν τρόπον, πονηροὺς αὐτοὺς εἶναι καὶ 10
 ἀχρήστους, ἕως ἂν ἐν ἀνθρώποις τέχνηι ὦσιν. ἀλλὰ μὴ b
 οὐχ οὕτως, ὧ φίλε, ἔχωσι, μὴδ' ἦ τοῦτο φιλοσοφεῖν, περὶ
 τὰς τέχνας ἐσπουδακῆναι, οὐδὲ πολυπραγμονοῦντα κυπτά-
 ζοντα ζῆν οὐδὲ πολυμαθοῦντα, ἀλλ' ἄλλο τι, ἐπεὶ ἐγὼ ὦμην
 καὶ ὄνειδος εἶναι τοῦτο καὶ βαναύσους καλεῖσθαι τοὺς περὶ τὰς 5
 τέχνας ἐσπουδακότας. ὧδε δὲ σαφέστερον εἰσόμεθα εἰ ἄρα
 ἀληθῆ λέγω, ἐὰν τοῦτο ἀποκρίνη· τίνες ἵππους ἐπίστανται
 κολάζειν ὀρθῶς; πότερον οἵπερ βελτίστους ποιοῦσιν ἢ ἄλλοι; c

Οἵπερ βελτίστους.

Τί δέ; κύνας οὐχ οἱ βελτίστους ἐπίστανται ποιεῖν, οὗτοι
 καὶ κολάζειν ὀρθῶς ἐπίστανται;

Ναί.

Ἡ αὐτὴ ἄρα τέχνη βελτίστους τε ποιεῖ καὶ κολάζει
 ὀρθῶς;

Φαίνεται μοι, ἦ δ' ὅς.

Τί δέ; πότερον ἤπερ βελτίστους τε ποιεῖ καὶ κολάζει

a 1 καλὸν εἶναι B: εἶναι καλὸν T a 2 καὶ αὐτοὶ φιλόσοφοι εἶναι secl. Schanz
 auctore Forster a 5 οἱ del. Heusde a 7 γε B: om. T ἦ δ' ὅς B: ἔφη T
 a 8 ὠμολογοῦμεν T: ὁμολογοῦμεν B a 10 ὃν σὺ corr. Coisl.: ὦν ὥς σὺ BT: ὥς
 σὺ vulg. καὶ ἀχρήστους... b 1 ὦσιν secl. Schanz b 2 ἔχωσι B: ἔχουσι T
 μὴδ' ἦ Mudge: μὴ δὴ BT b 3 ἐσπουδακῆναι... πολυπραγμονοῦντα secl. Co-
 bet κυπτάζοντα B: κτυπάζοντα T b 4 ἐγὼ B: γ' T c 1 πότερον B: πρότερον T
 βελτίστους BT: βελτίους al. c 3, 6, 9 βελτίστους B: βελτίους T c 8 φαίνεται
 μοι B et in marg. γρ. T: φημὶ TW c 9 ἤπερ] ἤπερ T: om. B

has been said. It stands roughly as follows. We agreed that philosophy is fine, and that we ourselves are philosophers, and philosophers good, and the good useful, and the base useless;¹ and then again, in turn, we agreed that philosophers are useless as long as there are craftsmen, and that there always are craftsmen. Has this not been agreed?" 137

"Certainly," said he.

"Then, it seems, we were agreeing, by your argument at least, that if philosophizing is having knowledge about the crafts in the way you mean, philosophers are base and useless as long as there are crafts among men. But I suspect, my friend, that they are not so, nor is philosophizing this, being in earnest about the crafts, nor living as a busybody, stooping over things, nor learning much, but something else; since I, for my part, thought both that this was a disgrace and that those who are in earnest about the crafts are called menial.² But we shall know more clearly in this way whether, after all, what I say is true, if you answer this: who know how to punish horses rightly? Is it the very ones who make them best, or others?" b c

"The very ones who make them best."

"Well? Dogs: is it not those who know how to make them best who also know how to punish them rightly?"

"Yes."

"Then the same craft both makes them best and punishes them rightly?"

"It appears so to me," said he.

"Well? The craft that makes them best and punishes

1. "And that we ourselves are philosophers" was not agreed in so many words; Schanz, following Forster, deleted the clause.

2. *Polypragmonein*, "to be a busybody", as in the *Charmides* (161d). *Banausos*, "menial", was the word of contempt for the manual trades; Xenophon's Socrates says that such crafts are despised in cities because they ruin the bodies of those who work at them (*Oeconomicus* 4.2).

ὀρθῶς, ἡ αὐτὴ δὲ καὶ γινώσκει τοὺς χρηστοὺς καὶ τοὺς 10
μοχθηροὺς, ἢ ἑτέρα τις;

Ἡ αὐτὴ, ἔφη.

Ἐθελήσεις οὖν καὶ κατ' ἀνθρώπους τοῦτο ὁμολογεῖν,
ἥπερ βελτίστους ἀνθρώπους ποιεῖ, ταύτην εἶναι καὶ τὴν d
κολάζουσιν ὀρθῶς καὶ διαγιγνώσκουσιν τοὺς χρηστοὺς τε
καὶ μοχθηροὺς;

Πάνν γ', ἔφη.

Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἥτις ἓνα, καὶ πολλοὺς, καὶ ἥτις πολλοὺς, καὶ 5
ἓνα;

Ναί.

Καὶ καθ' ἵππων δὴ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων οὕτως;

Φημί.

Τίς οὖν ἐστὶν ἡ ἐπιστήμη, ἥτις τοὺς ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν 10
ἀκολασταίνοντας καὶ παρανομοῦντας ὀρθῶς κολάζει; οὐχ ἡ
δικαστική;

Ναί.

Ἡ ἄλλην οὖν τινα καλεῖς καὶ δικαιοσύνην ἢ ταύτην;

Οὐκ, ἀλλὰ ταύτην. 15

Οὐκοῦν ἥπερ κολάζουσιν ὀρθῶς, ταύτη καὶ γινώσκουσι e
τοὺς χρηστοὺς καὶ μοχθηροὺς;

Ταύτη.

Ὅστις δὲ ἓνα γινώσκει, καὶ πολλοὺς γνώσεται;

Ναί. 5

Καὶ ὅστις γε πολλοὺς ἀγνοεῖ, καὶ ἓνα;

Φημί.

Εἰ ἄρα ἵππος ὢν ἀγνοοῖ τοὺς χρηστοὺς καὶ πονηροὺς
ἵππους, καὶ ἑαυτὸν ἀγνοοῖ ποῖός τις ἐστὶν;

c10 ἡ αὐτὴ δὲ B: αὕτη T: αὐτὴ Schanz c11 ἑτέρα τις B et γρ. T: ἄλλη T
c13 ἀνθρώπους] ἀνθρώπων Stephanus d1 βελτίστους BT: βελτίους al.
d3 καὶ T: καὶ τοὺς B d5 οὐκοῦν καὶ B: οὐκοῦν T ἥτις . . . ἥτις T: εἴ τις . . . εἴ
τις B d14 καὶ B: om. T d15 ἀλλὰ ταύτην B: ἄλλην TW e2 τοὺς μοχθηροὺς B:
πονηροὺς T e8 ἀγνοοῖ B: ἀγνοεῖ T τοὺς χρηστοὺς καὶ πονηροὺς ἵππους B:
τοὺς πονηροὺς καὶ τοὺς χρηστοὺς TW

them rightly—is it also the same one that knows the decent and the worthless, or another?"¹

"The same," he said.

"Then will you be willing to agree to this in the case of men too: that the craft that makes men best is also the one that punishes them rightly and distinguishes the decent and the worthless?"

"Certainly," he said.

"Then also the one that does so for one does so for many too, and the one that does so for many, for one too?"

"Yes."

"And so too in the case of horses and of everything else?"

"I say so."

"What, then, is the knowledge that rightly punishes those in cities who are unruly and break the law? Is it not the judge's?"²

"Yes."

"Is it, then, some other than this one that you call justice too?"

"No, but this one."

"Then by the very thing by which they punish rightly, by that they also know the decent and the worthless?"

"By that."

"And whoever knows one will also know many?"

"Yes."

"And whoever is ignorant of many, of one as well?"

"I say so."

"Then if one who is a horse were ignorant of the decent and base horses, would he also be ignorant of himself, of what sort he is?"³

1. "Decent" is *chrēstos*, "base" *ponēros* and "worthless" *mochthēros*: the dialogue uses both its words for "bad" of horses and of men alike, and the English keeps the three apart. "Useful" is *chrēsimos*, of the same root as *chrēstos*; "useless", *achrēstos*, is literally "not *chrēstos*".

2. *Akolastainein*, "to be unruly", is the verb of *akolastos*, literally "unchastened", from the root of *kolazein*, "punish".

3. The argument passes from knowing horses to being one; it takes the same step for oxen and dogs, and then for men (138a).

Φημί. 10
 Καὶ εἰ βοῦς ὢν ἀγνοοῖ τοὺς πονηροὺς καὶ χρηστοὺς
 (βοῦς), κὰν αὐτὸν ἀγνοοῖ ποῖός τις ἐστίν;
 Ναί, ἔφη.
 Οὕτω δὴ καὶ εἰ κύων;
 Ὡμολόγει. 15
 Τί δ'; ἐπειδὰν ἄνθρωπός τις ὢν ἀγνοῇ τοὺς χρηστοὺς 138
 καὶ μοχθηροὺς ἀνθρώπους, ἄρ' οὐχ αὐτὸν ἀγνοεῖ πότερον
 χρηστός ἐστιν ἢ πονηρός, ἐπειδὴ καὶ αὐτὸς ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν;
 Συνεχώρει.
 Τὸ δὲ αὐτὸν ἀγνοεῖν σωφρονεῖν ἐστίν ἢ μὴ σωφρονεῖν; 5
 Μὴ σωφρονεῖν.
 Τὸ ἑαυτὸν ἄρα γινώσκειν ἐστὶ σωφρονεῖν;
 Φημί, ἔφη.
 Τοῦτ' ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικε, τὸ ἐν Δελφοῖς γράμμα παρακελεύεται,
 σωφροσύνην ἀσκεῖν καὶ δικαιοσύνην. 10
 Ὡοικεν.
 Τῇ αὐτῇ δὲ ταύτῃ καὶ κολάζειν ὀρθῶς ἐπιστάμεθα;
 Ναί.
 Οὐκοῦν ἢ μὲν κολάζειν ὀρθῶς ἐπιστάμεθα, δικαιοσύνη b
 αὕτη ἐστίν, ἢ δὲ διαγιγνώσκειν καὶ ἑαυτὸν καὶ ἄλλους,
 σωφροσύνη;
 Ὡοικεν, ἔφη.
 Ταῦτὸν ἄρα ἐστὶ καὶ δικαιοσύνη καὶ σωφροσύνη; 5
 Φαίνεται.
 Καὶ μὴν οὕτω γε καὶ αἱ πόλεις εὖ οἰκοῦνται, ὅταν οἱ
 ἀδικοῦντες δίκην διδῶσιν.

e 11 ἀγνοεῖ BT: ἀγνοοίη recc. χρηστοὺς BT: τοὺς χρηστοὺς al. e 12 βοῦς add. Bekker ἀγνοοῖ B: ἀγνοοίη T ποῖός τις B: ποῖός T a 1 τις ὢν B: ὢν τις T a 2 μοχθηροὺς B: τοὺς μοχθηροὺς Stobaeus: πονηροὺς T ἀγνοεῖ T Stobaeus: ἀγνοοῖ T a 3 πονηρός BT: μοχθηρός Stobaeus a 5 ἐστίν ἢ μὴ σωφρονεῖν; μὴ σωφρονεῖν B: ἢ οὐ σωφρονεῖν ἐστίν; οὐ σωφρονεῖν T Stobaeus a 13 ναί B: φημί TW Stobaeus b 2 ἄλλους B: ἄλλον T Stobaeus b 5 καὶ δικαιοσύνη καὶ σωφροσύνη B: δικαιοσύνη σωφροσύνη T b 7 καὶ αἱ B: καὶ T

"I say so."

"And if one who is an ox were ignorant of the base and decent oxen, would he also be ignorant of himself, of what sort he is?"

"Yes," he said.

"And so too if he is a dog?"

He agreed.

"Well? When someone who is a man is ignorant of the decent 138 and worthless men, is he not ignorant of himself, whether he is decent or base, since he too is himself a man?"

He conceded.

"And is being ignorant of oneself being temperate, or not being temperate?"

"Not being temperate."

"Then knowing oneself is being temperate?"

"I say so," he said.

"This, then, it seems, is what the inscription at Delphi urges: to practice temperance and justice."¹

"It seems so."

"And is it by this same thing that we also know how to punish 139 rightly?"

"Yes."

"Then that by which we know how to punish rightly—this is b justice; and that by which we know how to distinguish both oneself and others, temperance?"

"It seems so," he said.

"Then it is the same thing, both justice and temperance?"

"It appears so."

"And indeed it is in this way that cities, too, are well ordered: when wrongdoers pay the penalty."

1. The inscription "Know thyself" at Apollo's temple at Delphi. In the *Charmides* (164d–165a) Critias reads it as the god's greeting, meaning "Be temperate"; here it is said to urge justice too.

Ἀληθῇ λέγεις, ἔφη.
 Καὶ πολιτικὴ ἄρα αὕτη ἐστίν. 10
 Συνεδόκει.
 Τί δὲ ὅταν εἰς ἀνὴρ ὀρθῶς πόλιν διοικῇ, ὄνομά γε
 τούτῳ οὐ τύραννός τε καὶ βασιλεύς;
 Φημί.
 Οὐκοῦν βασιλικῇ τε καὶ τυραννικῇ τέχνῃ διοικεῖ; 15
 Οὕτως.
 Καὶ αὗται ἄρ' αἱ αὐταὶ τέχναι εἰσὶν ἐκείναις;
 Φαίνονται.
 Τί δ' ὅταν εἰς ὢν ἀνὴρ οἰκίαν διοικῇ ὀρθῶς, τί ὄνομα c
 τούτῳ ἐστίν; οὐκ οἰκονόμος τε καὶ δεσπότης;
 Ναί.
 Πότερον οὖν καὶ οὗτος δικαιοσύνη εὖ ἂν τὴν οἰκίαν
 διοικοῖ ἢ κάλλη τινὲ τέχνη; 5
 Δικαιοσύνη.
 Ἔστιν ἄρα ταῦτόν, ὡς ἔοικε, βασιλεύς, τύραννος, πολι-
 τικός, οἰκονόμος, δεσπότης, σώφρων, δίκαιος. καὶ μία
 τέχνη ἐστὶν βασιλική, τυραννική, πολιτική, δεσποτική, οἰκο-
 νομική, δικαιοσύνη, σωφροσύνη. 10
 Φαίνεται, ἔφη, οὕτως.
 Πότερον οὖν τῷ φιλοσόφῳ, ὅταν μὲν ἱατρὸς περὶ τῶν d
 καμνόντων τι λέγῃ, αἰσχρὸν μὴθ' ἔπεσθαι τοῖς λεγομένοις
 δύνασθαι μῆτε συμβάλλεσθαι μηδὲν περὶ τῶν λεγομένων
 ἢ πραττομένων, καὶ ὁπόταν ἄλλος τις τῶν δημιουργῶν,
 ὡσαύτως· ὅταν δὲ δικαστὴς ἢ βασιλεὺς ἢ ἄλλος τις ὢν 5
 νυνδὴ διεληλύθαμεν, οὐκ αἰσχρὸν περὶ τούτων μῆτε ἔπεσθαι
 δύνασθαι μῆτε συμβάλλεσθαι περὶ αὐτῶν;

b 10 αὕτη Schanz: ἡ αὕτη B: αὕτη T b 12 γε B: om. T b 17 εἰσὶν ἐκείναις B:
 ἐκείναις εἰσὶν T c 2 οὐκ T: om. B c 5 κάλλη B: ἄλλη T c 7 ταῦτόν] ταὐτὸ B:
 τοῦτο T c 9 δεσποτική TW: om. B c 11 ἔφη οὕτως B: om. TW d 1 πότερον B:
 τί T ἱατρὸς B: ὁ ἱατρὸς T d 2 λεγομένοις Tb: δυναμένοις pr. B (ut videtur)
 d 3 περὶ . . . d 4 πραττομένων B: om. TW d 6 διεληλύθαμεν B: διήλθομεν T

"What you say is true," he said.

"Then the statesman's art too is the same."

He thought so too.

"Well, when one man orders a city rightly, is not his name, at least, tyrant and king?"¹

"I say so."

"Then he orders it by the kingly and tyrannical craft?"

"Just so."

"Then these crafts too are the same as those?"

"They appear so."

"Well, when one man on his own orders a household rightly, what is his name? Is it not household manager and master?"

"Yes."

"Then is it by justice that this man too would order the household well, or by some other craft as well?"

"By justice."

"Then king, tyrant, statesman, household manager, master, temperate man, just man are, it seems, the same. And there is one craft: the kingly, the tyrannical, the statesman's, the master's, the household manager's, justice, temperance."²

"It appears to be so," he said.

"Then is it shameful for the philosopher, when a doctor says something about the sick, to be able neither to follow what is said nor to contribute anything about what is said or done, and likewise whenever some other craftsman does; but when a judge does, or a king, or some other of those we have just gone through, not shameful, in these matters, to be able neither to follow nor to contribute about them?"

1. *Tyrannos* was the name of a sole ruler whose power rested on no lawful or traditional title; it was not always a word of blame.

2. The *Statesman* argues that the knowledge of the statesman, the king, the master of slaves and the household manager is one (258e–259c); the tyrant, whom the *Lovers* adds, it sets apart from the king (276e).

Πῶς δ' οὐκ αἰσχρόν, ὦ Σώκρατες, περί γε τοσούτων πραγμάτων μηδὲν ἔχειν συμβάλλεσθαι;

Πότερον οὖν καὶ περὶ ταῦτα λέγωμεν, ἔφην, πένταθλον e
αὐτὸν δεῖν εἶναι καὶ ὑπακρον, καὶ ταύτης μὲν τὰ δευτερεῖα
ἔχοντα πάντων τὸν φιλόσοφον, καὶ ἀχρεῖον εἶναι ἕως ἂν
τούτων τις ᾗ, ἣ πρῶτον μὲν τὴν αὐτοῦ οἰκίαν οὐκ ἄλλα
ἐπιτρεπτέον οὐδὲ τὰ δευτερεῖα ἐν τούτῳ ἐκτέον, ἀλλ' αὐτὸν 5
κολαστέον δικάζοντα ὀρθῶς, εἰ μέλλει εὖ οἰκεῖσθαι αὐτοῦ
ἢ οἰκία;

Συνεχώρει δὴ μοι.

Ἐπειτά γε δήπου ἔάντε οἱ φίλοι αὐτῷ διαίτας ἐπιτρέ-
πωσιν, ἔάντε ἡ πόλις τι προστάτῃ διακρίνειν ἢ δικάζειν, 10
αἰσχρόν ἐν τούτοις, ὦ ἐταῖρε, δεύτερον φαίνεσθαι ἢ τρίτον 139
καὶ μὴ οὐχ ἡγείσθαι;

Δοκεῖ μοι.

Πολλοῦ ἄρα δεῖ ἡμῖν, ὦ βέλτιστε, τὸ φιλοσοφεῖν πολυ-
μαθία τε εἶναι καὶ ἡ περὶ τὰς τέχνας πραγματεία. 5

Εἰπόντος δ' ἐμοῦ ταῦτα ὁ μὲν σοφὸς αἰσχυνθεὶς τοῖς
προειρημένοις ἐσίγησεν, ὁ δὲ ἀμαθὴς ἔφη ἐκείνως εἶναι·
καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἐπήνεσαν τὰ εἰρημένα.

e1 ἔφην T: ἔφη B e2 καὶ ταύτης μὲν τὰ δευτερεῖα B: τὰ δευτερεῖα δ' TW: καὶ ἐν
τούτοις τὰ δευτερεῖα Hermann καὶ . . . e4 ἢ secl. Schanz e3 ἕως ἂν B: ἕως T
e4 ἢ ἢ T: ἢ B a4 δεῖ TW: om. B πολυμαθία B: φιλομαθία T a5 ἢ del. Schanz
a7 ἐκείνως b: ἐκείνος BT

"How could it not be shameful, Socrates, about matters so great, at least, to have nothing to contribute?"

"Then are we to say," I said, "that about these things too the philosopher must be a pentathlete and a runner-up, holding in this the second prizes among all, and be of no use as long as there is any one of these men; or that, first, he must not entrust his own household to another, nor hold the second prizes in this, but must himself punish, judging rightly, if his household is to be well ordered?"

So he conceded this to me.

"And then, surely, whether his friends entrust arbitrations to him, or the city assigns him something to decide or judge, it is shameful in these matters, my friend, to appear second or third and not to lead?"

"I think so."

"Then, my excellent friend, for us philosophizing is far from being either much learning or busying oneself with the crafts."

When I said this, the wise one, ashamed of what had been said before, fell silent, and the unlearned one said that it was so;¹ and the others praised what had been said.

1. *Amathēs*, "unlearned", is of the same root as *polymathia*, "much learning", which the wise one had taken philosophy to be (133c).

OUTLINE

The divisions follow the argument. References are to Stephanus pages and sections, which stand in the margins of both pages of the text.

I. THE SCHOOL OF DIONYSIUS: IS PHILOSOPHIZING FINE? (132A–133B)

- 132a–b** Socrates goes into the school of Dionysius the writing-master and finds two lads who appear to be quarreling “about either Anaxagoras or Oenopides”, drawing circles and “miming some inclinations” with their hands. He asks the lover beside him what they are so earnest about.
- 132b–c** The athlete: “No: these two are prattling about the things up in the sky, and talking nonsense, philosophizing.” Socrates: “Young man, do you think philosophizing is shameful?”
- 132c** His rival lover answers for him: “It is not like you, Socrates, even to ask this fellow”, who “has spent his whole life having his neck twisted, stuffing himself and sleeping”.
- 132d** One lover had spent his time on music, the other on gymnastics. Socrates lets the athlete go and asks “the one who laid claim to being wiser” whether he thinks “philosophizing is fine or not”.
- 133a–b** The lads fall silent and listen; Socrates is “dazzled”, and the wiser lover “no less on edge”. “If ever I thought philosophizing shameful, I would not even consider myself a man”, he says, loudly, “so that his beloved should hear him”.

II. PHILOSOPHY AS MUCH LEARNING (133B–134C)

- 133b–c** Can one know whether a thing is fine or shameful “if one did not know at all what it is”? Then what is philosophizing? “What else but what Solon says?”: “I grow old always learning many things”. The philosopher “must in this way always be learning one thing at least”.
- 133c–d** Socrates asks “whether he thought philosophy was much learning”. “Entirely.” Fine, and “Good as well”.
- 133d–e** Is the love of exercise also fine and good? The wiser lover answers “very ironically”: “To this fellow let my answer be that

it is neither; to you, however, Socrates, I agree that it is both fine and good". "Then in exercises too, do you think much labor is the love of exercise?" "Certainly, just as in philosophizing too I think much learning is philosophy."

133e-134a Those who love exercise desire to have their bodies in good condition; "how could anyone ... have his body in good condition from few labors, at least?"

134a-b The athlete, nudged into the argument: "even a pig would know that moderate labors put bodies in good condition; so how could a man not know it—a man, at any rate, sleepless and unfed, with an unrubbed neck, and thin with worries?" The lads laugh; the other blushes.

134b-c Socrates turns to the wiser lover: "Do you, for your part, now concede ...?" He answers: "With this fellow I would very gladly contend ... with you, however, I have no need to strive for victory against my own opinion": "it is not the many but the moderate exercises that produce good condition in men."

III. THE MODERATE IN BODY AND SOUL: PERPLEXITY (134c-135a)

134c-d So with food and everything to do with the body, "what is moderate is most beneficial, not what is much or little"; and of the things given to the soul, the subjects of learning too.

134e The doctor or the trainer judges the moderate labors and food for the body, the farmer the sowing of seeds; "And about the planting and sowing of subjects of learning in the soul, whom would we justly ask, how many and what kind are moderate?"

135a "From there on we were all of us now full of perplexity". Socrates, teasing, offers to ask the lads: "Or are we perhaps ashamed, as Homer said of the suitors ...?"

IV. THE PHILOSOPHER AS RUNNER-UP (135a-136b)

135a-b Which subjects of learning must the philosopher learn, "since it is not all, nor many"? The wiser lover: those that give "the greatest reputation for philosophy", by seeming "experienced in all the crafts, or if not, in as many as possible", knowing of them "whatever belongs to understanding, not whatever belongs to handiwork".

135b-c As in carpentry, where "a top master builder" costs more than ten thousand drachmas? He agrees. Is it not impossible for one man to learn only two crafts in this way?

135c-d "Don't take me that way, Socrates": not "precisely, like the

man who has the craft himself, but as is reasonable for a free and educated man", able to follow the craftsman and "to contribute a judgment of his own, so as to seem the most accomplished and the wisest".

- 135e–136a** Socrates: the pentathletes fall short of the racers and wrestlers "in these men's own events" but are "first among the other athletes"; so the man who has philosophized "becomes a kind of runner-up in everything".
- 136a–b** The wiser lover accepts the likeness: the philosopher is "not to be a slave to any one thing ... but to have laid hold of all of them in moderation".

V. WHERE IS THE PHILOSOPHER USEFUL? (136B–137B)

- 136b–c** The good are useful, the base useless; philosophers useful, and "most useful". "Come, then, let us find out ... where are they actually useful to us, these runners-up? For it is plain that the philosopher is poorer than each of those who have the crafts, at least."
- 136c–d** In sickness, the doctor rather than "that runner-up"; in a storm at sea, the pilot rather than the philosopher. "Then so too in everything else: as long as there is any craftsman, the philosopher is not useful?"
- 136e** "Then is the philosopher now a useless sort of man for us? For there always are craftsmen for us, I suppose ..." "He was compelled to agree."
- 136e–137b** Socrates goes over what was agreed: by the wiser lover's argument, "if philosophizing is having knowledge about the crafts in the way you mean, philosophers are base and useless as long as there are crafts among men". "But I suspect, my friend, that they are not so": philosophizing is not "being in earnest about the crafts, nor living as a busybody, stooping over things, nor learning much, but something else", since being in earnest about the crafts is "a disgrace" and such men "are called menial".

VI. PUNISHING, KNOWING ONESELF, TEMPERANCE AND JUSTICE (137B–138B)

- 137b–c** The craft that makes horses and dogs best also punishes them rightly, and knows "the decent and the worthless".
- 137c–d** So with men: "the craft that makes men best is also the one that punishes them rightly and distinguishes the decent and the

worthless", for one and for many alike.

- 137d** "What, then, is the knowledge that rightly punishes those in cities who are unruly and break the law? Is it not the judge's?" No other is justice.
- 137e** That by which men punish rightly is that by which they know the decent and the worthless ("By that"). Whoever knows one will know many, and whoever is ignorant of many is ignorant of one. A horse, an ox, a dog ignorant of the decent and base of its kind would be ignorant of itself.
- 138a** A man ignorant of the decent and worthless men is ignorant of himself, "whether he is decent or base". Being ignorant of oneself is "not being temperate"; then "knowing oneself is being temperate?" "I say so." "This, then, it seems, is what the inscription at Delphi urges: to practice temperance and justice."
- 138b** That by which we punish rightly is justice, that by which we distinguish oneself and others temperance: "Then it is the same thing, both justice and temperance?" "It appears so." "And indeed it is in this way that cities, too, are well ordered: when wrongdoers pay the penalty."

VII. ONE CRAFT OF KING AND HOUSEHOLD MANAGER (138B–C)

- 138b** The statesman's art is the same. When one man orders a city rightly, his name is "tyrant and king", and he orders it "by the kingly and tyrannical craft".
- 138c** When one man on his own orders a household rightly, his name is "household manager and master", and he orders it "by justice". "And there is one craft: the kingly, the tyrannical, the statesman's, the master's, the household manager's, justice, temperance."

VIII. THE PHILOSOPHER MUST LEAD (138D–139A)

- 138d** Is it shameful for the philosopher not to follow or contribute when a doctor or a craftsman speaks, but "not shameful" when a judge or a king does? "How could it not be shameful, Socrates, about matters so great, at least, to have nothing to contribute?"
- 138e** Is the philosopher "a pentathlete and a runner-up" here too, "of no use as long as there is any one of these men"? Or "must himself punish, judging rightly, if his household is to be well ordered"? He concedes the second.
- 138e–139a** When his friends or the city ask him to decide or judge, "it is shameful in these matters, my friend, to appear second or

third and not to lead?" "I think so."

139a "Then, my excellent friend, for us philosophizing is far from being either much learning or busying oneself with the crafts." The wise one falls silent, "ashamed of what had been said before"; "the unlearned one said that it was so; and the others praised what had been said."

EDITORIAL NOTE

The Greek text. The Greek is John Burnet's, from the second volume of his Oxford Classical Text of Plato (1901; second edition, 1910), in which the *Lovers* follows the *Hipparchus* and closes the volume. The copy reproduced is the one used for the *Alcibiades I*, the *Alcibiades II* and the *Hipparchus* of this series: an undated later impression of the second edition, printed at Oxford by John Johnson as Printer to the University and published by Humphrey Milford, and so printed between 1925 and 1945. The title page does not name the edition, but a list of the Oxford Classical Texts dated January 1935, bound in after the last page of the text, offers this volume as "Ed. 2", and the copy was therefore issued no earlier than January 1935. It carries Burnet's preface of March 1901 and the short addendum of April 1910 that marks the second edition, in which he records that he has added the readings of the Oxyrhynchus papyri in the *Symposium* and *Phaedrus* and used Hermann Schoene's collation of W in the *Symposium*; it names no change in the other dialogues. The text is reproduced page for page and line for line: each left-hand page of this edition is one page of Burnet, with his line-ends, his marginal section letters and line numbers, and his apparatus criticus at the foot. In the margin, "St. I p. 132" at the head of the dialogue gives the volume and page of Stephanus' edition at which it begins; where each later page of Stephanus begins, its number (133 to 139) stands in place of the letter a; and within each section every fifth line is numbered. Burnet sets these in the outer margin of his page, this edition in the right-hand margin; his running heads are not reproduced. The words were taken from the Perseus Digital Library's digital transcription of Burnet, and every line was then checked against the photographs of this copy; where the two differ, this edition prints what Burnet printed. Burnet's title, ΕΡΑΣΤΑΙ, "The Lovers", his paragraphing, and his capitals at the openings of paragraphs and of speeches are kept. The dialogue is narrated by Socrates and has no list of persons and no names of speakers. Burnet marks the speeches only by their capitals and most changes of speaker by a new, indented paragraph, but within a paragraph the narrative sometimes passes from one speaker to another: at

135c4 the wise lover's assent to Socrates' question is reported under a capital (*Καὶ ὃς ἀκούσας*), at 135c6–7 his answer follows in his own words (*ὁ δέ, Μὴ οὕτως μου, ἔφη*), and at 133c9 and 134b3 Socrates' narrative runs on after another's speech. The verse of Solon quoted at 133c6 is set as verse. The δ of *διοικῇ* at 138c1, whose upper stroke did not print in this copy, is read as the type intended, as at 138b12 and in the Perseus text. Square brackets [] enclose words Burnet believed spurious: *τὸν φιλόσοφον* at 136c10, which Cobet deletes. Angle brackets < > enclose a word that the manuscripts lack and that Burnet supplies by a scholar's conjecture: Bekker's *βοῦς* at 137e12.

Reading the apparatus. The notes at the foot of each Greek page are Burnet's, unaltered. Entries are keyed by section letter and line as numbered in the margin, so that "a 4" is the fourth line of section a; "c 3, 6, 9" at 137c is one entry for three lines. The section letters begin again with each Stephanus page, so that on page 2, which runs from 132c to 133b, "a 4" after "d 8" belongs to 133a. A further entry on the same line follows after a wider space without repeating the key. Usually the reading printed in the text comes first, followed by the witnesses that have it; a colon separates it from the alternatives, each followed by its witnesses. Where the text's reading is that of no witness listed, the entry gives only theirs: at 135a7 the text's *μάλιστα ἅττα τοπάζομεν* has T's *ἅττα* in B's order (*μάλιστα αὐτὰ τοπάζομεν* B: *μάλιστα τοπάζομεν ἅττα* T); at 137e2 its *καὶ μοχθηρούς* has B's word without B's article (*τοὺς μοχθηρούς* B: *πονηρούς* T); and at 137e11 its *ἀγνοοῖ* is the shorter form of the optative that the later manuscripts give as *ἀγνοοίη*, beside the *ἀγνοεῖ* of B and T. Where the text's reading is followed by a square bracket, no witnesses are listed for the text, and only the other readings follow (137c9, 137c13, 138c7). Other entries with no colon report a scholar's proposal without listing the witnesses for the text: a deletion (137a2, 137a5, 137a10, 137b3, 138e2, 139a5) or an addition (137e12). Burnet adopts the addition, printing (*βοῦς*), but none of these deletions, whose words stand unbracketed in his text; of Cobet's two deletions at 136c10–11, entered after the witnesses, he adopts the first ([*τὸν φιλόσοφον*]) and not the second (*λάβοις*). An entry may also give only a reading of some manuscripts, without the text's words: *ὁμολογοῦμεν* pr. BT at 134e5, the first hands of B and T, where the text prints *ὠμολογοῦμεν*. Three spaced points stand for the words between the first and last of a passage: at 133e1 "*ἡγοῦμαι . . . e 2 ἐγώ*" runs from *ἡγοῦμαι* in e1 to *ἐγώ* in e2, and at 137d5 "*ἥτις . . . ἥτις*" gives the two places of *ἥτις* in the line.

An asterisk marks an erasure in a manuscript (B's ἐγὼ * at 136d2). The apparatus reports each witness's own spelling, which may differ from the text's: B's αἰεὶ at 135d5, where the text prints αἰεῖ; ἡγεῖ at 133d7 and φαίνει at 136a5, where it prints ἡγη and φαίνη. Two entries are printed as they stand in this copy though they look like printer's faults: T's καγαθὸν at 133e1 lacks the mark of crasis, and at 138a2 the reading ἀγνοοῖ is assigned to T, which in the same entry has ἀγνοεῖ.

Names and abbreviations. Stephanus is Henri Estienne, whose edition of 1578 supplies the page numbers by which Plato is cited; the *Lovers* fills pages 132–139 of his first volume. A scholar's name standing alone after a reading marks that scholar's reading, from his edition or a study: at 134d4 ὠφέλει is the reading of Stephanus' edition. The names are of editors and critics: Stephanus; the editors Bekker, Baiter, Hermann and Schanz; Schleiermacher, Plato's German translator; Forster, on whose suggestion (*auctore*) Schanz deletes at 137a2; and Cobet, Heusde and Mudge. Ficinus is the Latin form of the name of Marsilio Ficino, whose Latin translation of Plato (Florence, 1484) Burnet cites at 132d3 by its words *quem prius interrogaveram*, "whom I had questioned before", as support for Schleiermacher's correction. *Solo* at 133c6 is Solon: δ' αἰεὶ is the reading of the line as Solon's own verse, against B's αἰεὶ and T's δ' αἰεῖ. Stobaeus is the anthologist of the fifth century AD, whose *Anthology* quotes 138a–b in its chapter on "Know thyself" (3.21 Wachsmuth–Hense). *add.*, "added", marks a scholar's addition; *del.*, "deleted", and *secl.*, "set apart", a scholar's deletion; *ci.*, "conjectured", a conjecture Burnet does not print (134e5); *om.* means that a witness leaves the words out. *corr.* *Coisl.* (135e2, 137a10) is a corrector of the Coislinianus. *γρ.* (*graphetai*, "it is written") marks a variant that a manuscript records beside its own reading: at 136e3 ἀχρήστους is in B and is recorded as a variant in T, whose own text has ἀχρεῖους; *in marg.* is "in the margin" and *s. v.* (*supra versum*) "above the line". *ex emend.* (135c6) and *ex* (132b1) mark a reading made by correcting an earlier one. *et* is "and", joining two witnesses (137c8, 137c11), and *sed* "but" (134e3). *ut videtur*, "as it seems", marks a reading that is hard to make out (138d2).

The witnesses. Burnet's apparatus to this dialogue rests chiefly on three manuscripts: B, the Bodleian Plato (MS. E. D. Clarke 39, written in 895); T, the Venice manuscript (Marcianus, Append. Class. 4, cod. 1); and W, the Vienna manuscript (Vindobonensis 54, suppl. phil. Gr. 7). Where W is not named, the apparatus does not report its reading. Later hands are marked by the small

letter: b for B (the marginal title, 132d3, 132d8, 133c1, 133c4, 135a5, 136c10, 139a7, and in "Tb" at 138d2, T together with a later hand in B), and t for T (133c4). *pr. B* is B's first hand, before correction (138d2), and *pr. BT* the first hands of B and T (134e5). Letters written together share a reading, so that "BT" is B and T. *recc.* (*recentiores*) are later manuscripts in general, *al.* (*alii*) other manuscripts, and *vulg.* (*vulgata*) the text of the early printed editions (137a10). Laur. lxxxv. 14 (132d8) is a manuscript in the Laurentian Library at Florence. Coisl. is the Coislinianus 155 in Paris, a later manuscript whose correctors' readings Burnet's preface regards as the conjectures of learned readers, not tradition.

The English. The translation is new. It aims to be exact, with every clause answering to a clause of the Greek, and to keep Socrates' manner as narrator: his asides, his teasing of the two lovers, and the timing of the short exchanges. Nothing is added to make it livelier; where a joke depends on the Greek, a note explains it. Burnet's Greek has no quotation marks; the English sets the speeches in quotation marks, as English narrative does. Words that Burnet prints in angle brackets are translated, without the brackets; the words he prints in square brackets (τὸν φιλόσοφον at 136c10) are not translated. The reading Burnet prints is translated, including his conjectures; where his choice changes the sense, a note says so.

Each right-hand page translates the Greek page opposite. When a sentence runs over the turn of Burnet's page, the English breaks at the nearest point English word order allows. The Stephanus section letters in the margin of the English mark where each section begins.

Key terms. The words on which the argument turns have one rendering each throughout. *Philosophia*, *philosophhein* and *philosophos* are "philosophy", "philosophize" and "philosopher", as in the *Charmides*; *erastēs* is "lover" and *anterastēs* "rival lover" ("his rival in love" at 132c, where it is predicative). *Polymathia* is "much learning" and *polyponia* "much labor", with *ponoi*, "labors"; *metrios* is "moderate". *Chrēsimos* is "useful" and *achrēstos* "useless". *Agathos* is "good"; *chrēstos* is "decent" and *ponēros* "base", as in the *Hipparchus*, and *mochthēros* "worthless", as in the *Alcibiades II*. *Kolazein* is "punish"; *sōphrosynē* is "temperance" and *dikaiosynē* "justice", as throughout the series; *technē* is "craft" and *dēmiourgos* "craftsman". Socrates' *skopein* is "look into".

The notes. The notes identify persons, places and quotations, explain what the English cannot carry, and mark the places where Burnet's choice of reading changes the sense or the words. Inter-

pretations are labelled as such. They are numbered afresh on each page.

GLOSSARY OF KEY TERMS

The English words on which the argument depends, in alphabetical order, with the Greek they render and the places where they matter, by Stephanus page. Where a word has a longer entry in the Key Words of the Dialogue, the Glossary says so.

agree, ὁμολογεῖν (*homologeîn*); **agree over again**, ἀνομολογεῖσθαι (*anomologeisthai*); **concede**, συγχωρεῖν (*synchōrein*); **concur**, συμφάναι (*symphanai*). The steps granted, 133e, 134c–e, 136b–c, 136e–137a, 137c, 137e; “agree over again on what has been said”, the recapitulation, 136e; “concede”, 134b, 135c, 138a, 138e; “He concurred”, 134d.

appear, φαίνεσθαι (*phainesthai*); **seem**, δοκεῖν (*dokein*). Kept apart: the lads “appeared” to be quarreling and drawing circles, 132a–b; “You appear to me”, 136a; “It appears so”, 136d, 137c, 138b, and “They appear so”, 138b; “It appears to be so”, 138c; “to appear second or third”, 139a. “Seem” renders δοκεῖν, as at 133a, 135b (“if he seemed to be experienced”), 135d (“so as to seem”) and 136a (“you seem to me”); and εἰοικε, “it seems” (137a, 138a, 138b, 138c); in questions δοκεῖ σοι is “do you think” (132c, 132d, 133b, 134a), except at 133d, “does it seem to you”.

argument, λόγος (*logos*). 134b, 135a, 135d, 137a (“by your argument”); “words”, against “deeds”, at 132d.

base, πονηρός (*ponēros*); **decent**, χρηστός (*chrēstos*); **worthless**, μοχθηρός (*mochthēros*). “Base”, 136b, 137a, 137e, 138a; “worthless”, 136e, 137c, 137d, 137e, 138a; “decent”, 137c, 137d, 137e, 138a. The same words for horses, oxen and men, 137c–138a. See **good** and Key Words, *Good, decent, base, worthless*.

beloved: see **lover**.

benefit, ὠφελεῖν (*ōphelēin*); **be benefited**, ὠφελεῖσθαι (*ōphelēisthai*); **beneficial**, ὠφέλιμος (*ōphelimos*). 132d (“be benefited by him”); 134d (“most beneficial”, “benefit it”, “benefits”).

best, βέλτιστος (*beltistos*). The craft that makes horses, dogs and men “best”, 137c–d; “my excellent friend”, ὦ βέλτιστε, 139a.

busybody, **be a**, πολυπραγμονεῖν (*polypragmonein*); **busy** **one-self**, πραγματεία (*pragmateia*). “Living as a busybody”, 137b, as in the *Charmides* (161d); “busy with the crafts”, 139a.

craft, τέχνη (*technē*); **craftsman**, δημιουργός (*dēmiourgos*). “Craft”, 135b, 135c, 135d, 136a, 136c, 137a–b, 137c, 138b, 138c, 139a (at 137d the English supplies it); “craftsman”, 135d, 136b, 136d, 136e, 137a, 138d. “Carpentry”, τεκτονική, “carpenter”, τέκτων, and “master builder”, ἀρχιτέκτων, 135b–c; “handiwork”, χειρουργία, 135b. See Key Words, *Craft and craftsman*.

decent: see **base**.

disgrace, ὄνειδος (*oneidos*). 137b.

distinguish, διαγιγνώσκειν (*diagignōskein*). 137d, 138b, where the *Charmides* (170e) and the *Alcibiades I* (109d) have “tell ... from”.

doctor, ἰατρός (*iatros*); **trainer**, παιδοτρίβης (*paidotribēs*); **farmer**, γεωργός (*geōrgos*); **pilot**, κυβερνήτης (*kybernētēs*). The judges of the moderate, 134e; the doctor and the pilot preferred to the philosopher, 136c–d; the doctor again, 138d.

earnest, be in, σπουδάζειν (*spoudazein*); **earnestness**, σπουδή (*spoudē*). The lads, 132b; friends “about whom you are greatly in earnest”, 136c; “being in earnest about the crafts”, 137b.

exercise, the love of, φιλογυμναστία (*philogymnastia*); **lover of exercise**, φιλογυμναστής (*philogymnastēs*); **love exercise**, φιλογυμναστειν (*philogymnastein*); **exercises**, γυμνάσια (*gymnasia*); **gymnastics**, γυμναστική (*gymnastikē*). The love of exercise, 133d–e; those who love exercise, 133e; the lover of exercise, 134a; exercises, 133e, 134c; gymnastics, 132d, 134a.

experienced, ἔμπειρος (*empeiros*); **experience**, ἐμπειρία (*empeiria*). “Experienced in words”, 132d; “his experience of gymnastics”, 134a; “experienced in all the crafts”, 135b.

fine, καλός (*kalos*); **more finely**, κάλλιον (*kallion*); **shameful**, αἰσχρός (*aischros*). Something “great and fine”, 132b; is philosophizing “shameful”, 132c, 133b, or “fine”, 132d, 133b; “fine” and “good”, 133d–e; “the finest”, 135b; “finely”, 136a; “philosophy is fine”, 137a; “shameful” for the philosopher, 138d, 139a. “Beautiful”, of the young, 133a. See Key Words, *Fine and shameful*.

follow, ἐπακολουθεῖν (*epakolouthēin*), ἑπεσθαι (*hepesthai*); **contribute**, συμβάλλεσθαι (*symballesthai*). One English verb for the two Greek verbs of following, since 138d restates 135d (ξυμβάλλεσθαι at 135d): to follow what the craftsman says and contribute a judgment, 135d; to follow and contribute when a doctor, a judge or a king speaks, 138d.

free, ἐλεύθερος (*eleutheros*); **educated**, πεπαιδευμένος (*pepaideu-menos*). What is fitting for free men to learn, 135b; “a free and educated man”, 135d.

good, ἀγαθός (*agathos*). Philosophy “good as well”, 133d; the love of exercise “both fine and good”, 133e; “the good are useful”, 136b, 136e; “the good useful”, 137a. See **base** and Key Words, *Good, decent, base, worthless*.

inscription, γράμμα (*gramma*). “The inscription at Delphi”, 138a, as in the *Charmides* (164d–165a).

judge, δικαστής (*dikastēs*); **to judge**, δικάζειν (*dikazein*); **the judge’s** (knowledge), δικαστική (*dikastikē*). 137d; “a judge”, 138d; “judging rightly”, “decide or judge”, 138e. See **just**.

just, δίκαιος (*dikaïos*); **justice**, δικαιοσύνη (*dikaiosynē*); **justly**, δικάως (*dikaōs*); **wrongdoers**, οἱ ἀδικοῦντες (*hoi adikountes*); **pay the penalty**, δίκην δίδοναι (*dikēn didonai*). “Justly”, 134e; “justice”, 137d, 138a, 138b, 138c; “just man”, 138c; “when wrongdoers pay the penalty”, 138b. See Key Words, *Justice*.

king, βασιλεύς (*basileus*), **kingly**, βασιλική (*basilikē*); **tyrant**, τύραννος (*tyrannos*), **tyrannical**, τυραννική (*tyrannikē*); **statesman**, πολιτικός (*politikos*), **the statesman’s** (art), πολιτική (*politikē*); **household manager**, οἰκονόμος (*oikonomos*), **the household manager’s**, οἰκονομική (*oikonomikē*); **master**, δεσπότης (*despotēs*), **the master’s**, δεσποτική (*despotikē*). 138b–c; “a king”, 138d. See **order** and Key Words, *King, tyrant, statesman, household manager, master*.

know, γιγνώσκειν (*gignōskein*), εἰδέναι (*eidenai*); **know how**, ἐπίστασθαι (*epistasthai*); **knowledge**, ἐπιστήμη (*epistēmē*); **have knowledge**, ἐπιστήμων εἶναι (*epistēmōn einai*); **be ignorant**, ἀγνοεῖν (*agnoein*); **find out**, γινῶναι (*gignōnai*) at 136c; **take in**, ἐννοεῖν (*ennoein*). “Know” (εἰδέναι), 133b, 133c (“Then you know ... what philosophizing is?”), 136b; “even a pig would know” (γινῶναι), 134a; “know each of the crafts precisely”, 135c; “having knowledge about the crafts”, 137a; “know how to punish”, 137b–c, 138a–b; “knows the decent and the worthless”, 137c, “know the decent and the worthless”, 137e; “the knowledge that rightly punishes”, 137d; “ignorant”, 137e, 138a; “knowing oneself”, 138a; “let us find out” (γινῶμεν), 136c; “Do I take in”, 135e (“thinking it over” at 133c). See **temperance**.

labor, πόνος (*ponos*); **much labor**, πολυπονία (*polyponia*); **labor at**, διαπονεῖν (*diaponein*). “Labors”, 133e, 134a, 134b, 134e; “much labor”, 133e; “to have labored at anything”, 136a. See Key Words, *Much learning, much labor*.

learn, μανθάνειν (*manthanein*); **much learning**, πολυμαθία (*polymathia*); **learn much**, πολυμαθεῖν (*polymathein*); **subjects of learning**, μαθήματα (*mathēmata*); **unlearned**, ἀμαθής (*am-*

- athēs*). “Learn”, 133c, 135a, 135b, 135c; “much learning”, 133c, 133e, 139a; “nor learning much”, 137b; “subjects of learning”, 134d, 134e, 135a, 135b; “the unlearned one”, 139a. “Learning” in Solon’s line, 133c, renders διδασκόμενος. See Key Words, *Much learning, much labor*.
- look into**, σκοπεῖν (*skopein*). 135a, Socrates’ method verb, as in the series.
- lover**, ἐραστής (*erastēs*); **rival lover**, ἀντεραστής (*anterastēs*); **beloved**, παιδικά (*paidika*). “Lovers”, 132a, 132d, 133a; “the lover of one of the two”, 132b; “his rival in love”, 132c; “his rival lover”, 133b; “his beloved”, 133b. The “lover of exercise” is φιλογυμναστής (see **exercise**). See Key Words, *Lover, rival lover, beloved*.
- menial**, βάνανσος (*banausos*). 137b, as in the *Alcibiades I* (131b).
- moderate**, μέτριος (*metrios*); **immoderate**, ἄμετρος (*ametros*); **in moderation**, μετρίως (*metriōs*). “Moderate”, 134a, 134b, 134c, 134d, 134e; “immoderate”, 134d; “in moderation”, 136b, where the *Alcibiades I* (130c) has “adequately” for μετρίως. See Key Words, *Moderate, in moderation*.
- opinion**, δόξα (*doxa*); **reputation**, δόξα; **judgment**, γνώμη (*gnōmē*). “Against my own opinion”, 134c; “the greatest reputation for philosophy”, 135b; “a judgment of his own”, 135d.
- order**, διοικεῖν (*dioikein*); **be ordered**, οἰκεῖσθαι (*oikeisthai*). “Cities ... are well ordered”, 138b; one man “orders a city”, “orders a household”, 138b–c; “if his household is to be well ordered”, 138e. As in the *Alcibiades I* (126a–b, 127b).
- perplexity**, ἀπορία (*aporia*). 135a, twice.
- philosophy**, φιλοσοφία (*philosophia*); **philosophize**, φιλοσοφεῖν (*philosophēin*); **philosopher**, φιλόσοφος (*philosophos*). “Philosophy”, 132c, 133c, 133d, 133e, 135b, 137a; “philosophize”, “philosophizing”, 132b, 132c, 132d, 133b, 133c, 133e, 135a, 135c, 135e, 137a, 137b, 139a; “the man who has philosophized”, 136a; “philosopher”, 135e, 136a, 136b, 136c, 136d, 136e, 137a, 138d, 138e. See the note at 132b and Key Words, *Philosophy, philosophize, philosopher*.
- precisely**, ἀκριβῶς (*akribōs*); **precision**, ἀκρίβεια (*akribeia*). 135d, 136a.
- punish**, κολάζειν (*kolazein*); **be unruly**, ἀκολασταίνειν (*akolastainein*). “Punish”, 137b–c, 137d, 137e, 138a, 138b, 138e; “unruly”, 137d. See Key Words, *Punish*.
- runner-up**, ὑπακρος (*hypakros*); **top**, ἄκρος (*akros*); **pentath-**

lete, πένταθλος (*pentathlos*); **second prizes**, τὰ δευτερεῖα (*ta deutereia*). “A top master builder”, 135c; the pentathletes, 135e; “likening him to the pentathlete”, 136a; “a kind of runner-up in everything”, “holding the second prizes”, 136a; “these runners-up”, 136c; “that runner-up”, 136c; “a pentathlete and a runner-up”, “holding in this the second prizes”, 138e. See Key Words, *Runner-up, pentathlete, second prizes*.

seem: see **appear**.

shameful: see **fine**.

temperance, σωφροσύνη (*sōphrosynē*); **be temperate**, σωφρονεῖν (*sōphronein*); **temperate** (man), σώφρων (*sōphrōn*). knowing oneself as “being temperate”, 138a; temperance and justice, 138a–b; “temperate man”, “temperance”, 138c. See Key Words, *Temperance and knowing oneself*.

think, ἡγεῖσθαι (*hēgeisthai*), οἶεσθαι (*oiesthai*); **consider**, νομίζω (*nomizein*); **take**, ὑπολαμβάνειν (*hypolambanein*); **lead**, ἡγεῖσθαι. “Think”, 132c, 132d, 133b, 133c, 133d–e, 134a, 136b–c, 137b; “consider myself a man”, 133b; “took this up”, 135b, “Don’t take me that way”, 135c, “to take the philosopher’s case”, 136a, “whether he took the good to be”, 136b; “not to lead”, 139a.

tyrant: see **king**.

understanding, σύνεσις (*synesis*). “Whatever belongs to understanding”, 135b; “the understanding of the crafts”, 136a.

useful, χρήσιμος (*chrēsimos*); **useless**, ἄχρηστος (*achrēstos*); **of no use**, ἀχρεῖος (*achreios*). “Useful”, 136b, 136c, 136d, 136e, 137a; “useless”, 136b, 136e, 137a, 137b; “of no use”, 138e. See Key Words, *Useful and useless*.

wise, σοφός (*sophos*); **wiser**, σοφώτερος (*sophōteros*); **wisest**, σοφώτατος (*sophōtatos*). “Laid claim to being wiser”, 132d; “the wiser one”, 135b; “the wisest”, 135d; “the wise one”, 139a.

worthless: see **base**.

writing-master, γραμματιστής (*grammatistēs*). 132a, as in the *Charmides* and the *Alcibiades I*.

NOTE ON THIS EDITION

HOW THE VOLUME WAS MADE

The Greek was taken from the Perseus Digital Library's digital transcription of Burnet and cut into Burnet's lines by reading every line-end from the photographs of his page, in the impression described in the Editorial Note. Accents, breathings and iota subscripts were read on the sharpest image of each page that the scan provides, and a doubtful mark was settled by setting it beside sure examples of each form in the same fount, and, where that image was in doubt, on the full photograph of the page. The section letters and line numbers in the margin were computed from the Stephanus divisions rather than copied, and were then compared with Burnet's: across the 345 lines of the dialogue they fall where he prints them, and every mark in the margins was checked on the full photograph. Burnet's apparatus was transcribed from the same images. Where the digital text differs from Burnet's page, chiefly in the small letters it gives to the openings of speeches, this edition follows Burnet.

The dialogue is short, and it was made as a single block. The block was checked by four independent reviewers: two, dividing its pages between them, compared the Greek and the apparatus with the page images letter by letter, one compared the English with the Greek clause by clause, and one checked every fact and reference in the notes and the Editorial Note. Each finding was examined again against the evidence before it was adopted, and not all were adopted. What that check caught is recorded at the end of this Note.

The volume was then read through again as one text, since a check made clause by clause cannot see some kinds of error: a word rendered one way here and another way there, a recapitulation that states a step in other words than the step itself, a rendering that departs from the earlier volumes of the series. The translator read the whole, and four further reviewers read it independently: one for the consistency of terms across the whole book and with the earlier volumes, two for sense, omissions and continuity in its two halves, and one for the Editorial Note against the scan of Bur-

net's volume. The Introduction, the Key Words of the Dialogue, the Outline and the Glossary were then written from the finished text, and their claims and references were checked against it, and against the ancient sources they cite, by three more reviewers.

WHAT THE FINAL READING CAUGHT

It found some fifty faults that the block check had passed, most of them small and a few substantive. They fall into a few classes.

The most consequential concerned the witness. The copy reproduced was described, in the Editorial Note and on the title page, as the edition of 1901 in a later impression. Its preface is of 1901, but it also carries Burnet's addendum of April 1910, which marks the second edition, and the publisher's list bound in after the text, dated January 1935, offers the volume as "Ed. 2". The title page and the Editorial Note now describe it as a later impression of the second edition, and the Editorial Note shows that it was issued no earlier than January 1935. The Editorial Note also gained what a reader of the Greek page needs to know: that at 135a7, 137e2 and 137e11 the text prints a reading that no listed witness has in that form, which of the scholars' proposals Burnet adopts, and that within one paragraph the narrative sometimes passes from one speaker to another.

In the English, a few renderings changed the sense. At 137b Socrates' "But I suspect, my friend, that they are not so" had read "that this is not how things are": the Greek verb is plural, and its subject is the philosophers just called base and useless, whom Socrates is about to rescue. At 138d the second half of Socrates' question had read "is it not shameful", which in English presses for a yes; the Greek offers the opposite, that it is "not shameful" to be unable to follow a judge or a king, and the reply, "How could it not be shameful", rejects that proposal. At 137d the question "some other than this one" now matches its answer, "No, but this one". At 139a "far from being either much learning or busying oneself with the crafts" replaces "both ... and", which after "far from" could be read as "not both"; and the wise one is now "ashamed of what had been said before", as in the Greek, so that the dialogue's last words, "what had been said", answer it. Tenses and moods were set right at 132a ("were thought"), 134b ("are you fighting it out") and 135b ("were those", a reported statement, not a guess); and at 136a the wise one's "You appear to me" now renders the verb Burnet prints, not the "seem" of another manuscript.

Next came renderings that had not been checked against the se-

ries. *Grammatistēs* is “writing-master”, as in the *Charmides* and the *Alcibiades I*; *oiesthai* is “think” (it had twice been “suppose”); the answer *Panu men oun* is “Certainly”, as in the earlier volumes; *banauos* is “menial”, as in the *Alcibiades I*; and *oikeisthai*, of cities and households “well ordered”, now answers *dioikein*, “order”, as in the *Alcibiades I*; it had been “managed”. Words were kept off the English of other key words: *ennoein* at 135e is “take in”, not “understand”, which is kept for *synesis*; *gnōnai* at 136c is “find out”, not “learn”, which is kept for *manthanein*; the runners of 135e are “racers”, since “runners” beside “runner-up” made a pun the Greek does not make; and at 136d “so too in everything else” replaces “it is the same”, since “the same” is the argument’s word from 137c. *Mathēmata* is “subjects of learning” each time, and *legein* of the wise one’s position “mean” in Socrates’ questions (135b–e, 137a). A step and its recapitulation now share their words: “there always are craftsmen” (136e and 137a). At 134c the wise lover’s “with you, however” now repeats the shape of his own two-faced answer of 133d, as the Greek does. Some phrases that followed Lamb’s Loeb were rewritten.

In the notes, the description of Democritus as “a true pentathlete in philosophy” is now given as the continuation of Thrasyllus’ report, which it seems to be, rather than as Diogenes’ own; the runner-up is no longer “first overall”, which the dialogue does not say; the *Clouds* promise happiness to the would-be pupil rather than question him (412–421); the *Charmides*’ “white line” is quoted as Plato wrote it; Hermann’s correction at 134a is given as the two words he changed; and Heraclitus’ saying is rendered “Much learning does not teach one to have sense”, since “understanding” belongs to another word of the dialogue. Two sentences of the block record below, which misdescribed corrections it reports, were put right.

WHAT REMAINS UNDONE

Two entries in the apparatus are printed as this copy has them though they look like printer’s faults (133e1, 138a2), and the damaged δ of διουκῆ at 138c1 is read as the type intended; they should be checked against another copy of the volume. The place of Stobaeus’ quotation of 138a–b is given by chapter only.

The apparatus is Burnet’s alone. It has not been collated against the manuscripts, and readings proposed since 1910 are not reported. The translation follows Burnet’s text even where later scholars would print something else.

The notes are a reader's aid, not a commentary. They were chosen to explain what the English cannot carry, and they label the more doubtful interpretations as such. The question of who wrote the dialogue, and when, is set out in the Introduction but not argued; a reader who wants the scholarly debate will need a commentary.

The checks described above were made by independent reviewers working from the same page images. The volume has not been read by a specialist outside the project, and a reader who finds an error is asked to report it.

THE RECORD OF THE BLOCKS

The notes that follow were written when the block was finished, and are kept as a record of what its check found. Where the final reading changed something they report, the text above says so.

BLOCK I: 132A–139A (BURNET PAGES 1–13)

The block is the whole dialogue, from Socrates' arrival at the school of Dionysius to the silence of the wise lover. It was drafted on 8 October 2026.

The checks. Four independent reviewers then read the block. Two compared the Greek and Burnet's apparatus with the photographs letter by letter, one the English with the Greek clause by clause, and one every note and the Editorial Note with its sources. Every finding was examined against the photographs or the text before it was adopted.

The Greek. The text was found right letter for letter. Three readings of T in the apparatus were corrected: *ἄττα* at 135a7 and *ἦπερ* at 137c9, both with the smooth breathing the copy prints, and *δικαιοσύνη* at 138b5, with its iota subscript. The doubtful places were settled on the full photographs: *καγαθὸν* at 133e1, the second T at 138a2 and the lemma at 137e2 are printed as this copy has them, and the δ of *διοικῆ* at 138c1 shows no trace of its upper stroke.

The English. At 136a *τοιούτὸν τινα* is masculine, "some such man", not "something of this sort"; at 137a the imperfect *ὁμολογοῦμεν* became "we were agreeing"; the "second prizes" of 136a are now the same words in the recapitulation at 138e. "Having his neck wrung", which in English means killing, became "having his neck twisted", the wrestler's hold. Words left untranslated were restored: the emphatic "you" at 134b, "rather" at 134c,

“both ... and” at 137b, “in these matters” at 138d, “laughed at it” at 134b. The question at 136c is again a question, and *κινητέος* at 134a is “nudged”, as Socrates nudged the same man at 132b. Six Stephanus letters were moved to the first word of their sections (132b, 133b, 134b, 136b, 137b, 137c), the turn of page at 132c was set where the Greek turns, and *ἀντιστατής* at 133b is “rival lover”, as ruled. Phrases that followed the Loeb translation of W. R. M. Lamb word for word were rewritten.

The notes. Thrasyllus (Diogenes Laertius 9.37) took for Democritus the unnamed speaker for whom the philosopher is like a pentathlete, not the philosopher of the likeness; Plato alludes to Solon’s line in the *Laches* and the *Republic* but does not quote it; the note on “decent”, “base” and “worthless” no longer claims a precedent that no single earlier volume bears out; the places in the *Clouds* were corrected; the folk etymology of *banausos* was dropped; the definition of *tyrannos* was put right; sources were added for Anaxagoras (Xenophon, *Memorabilia* 4.7.7), Oenopides (Theon of Smyrna), Heraclitus and the *Statesman*. In the Editorial Note the account of entries without a colon was corrected and completed, and the copy’s preface and addendum were added.

Typesetting. A Stephanus letter at the head of an English paragraph stood beside the last line of the paragraph before; it now stands beside the first line of its own.