Diotimos Library · Esotericism & Spirituality Collection · Bilingual Edition
Sal Lumen and Spiritus Mundi Philosophici
Treatises on the True Salt and the Universal Spirit of the World
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French Page · Branch 115 of 251
Book Two · Chapter 3
French
1621 pp. 131–134 · scans FR151, FR152, FR153, FR154D’ailleurs, suivant l’exemple que j’ay naguères baillé, les feuilles & le fruict, le bois & l’escorce, les branches & la racine, ne sont pas separees & divisees comme contraires, mais bien sont distinguees chacune en son ornement & endroict: ayant neantmoins certaine parentelle & liaison, sans que l’un occupe l’autre, mais s’accordent, s’aydent, & supportent l’un l’autre. La seconde espece de separation est le desassemblement ou desliement des choses totallement estrangeres, contraires & superflues: qui n’ont aucune connexion de nature avec la substance des choses: comme l’impur d’avec le pur, le froid d’avec le chaud, le grossier d’avec le subtil, & choses semblables. Non pas que je veuille dire ces choses ne pouvoir estre ensemble, mais que leur assemblement & meslange cause par leur diversité la destruction, ou du moins empesche l’action des vertus naturelles innees en la pure substance. Et cette maniere de separation doit proprement estre dicte division ou retranchement, lequel Nature pratique en toutes ses productions, afin de rendre libres ses propres actions & vertus en chacune chose. La premiere est donc seulement comme une distinction des parties vrayement dissemblables en situation & figure, mais toutesfois homogenes en substance & vertu. Car c’est une chose certaine que le bois, l’escorce & tout ce qui est de l’arbre, participe à cette vertu innee qui luy est proprement particuliere, mais generale à toutes ses parties. Quant est des autres subalternes, il y en peut avoir de dissemblables, c’est à dire, qui reçoivent plus ou moins de substance, mais non pas de contraires: car un mesme effect ne produit point choses diametrales en une seule matiere: comme d’une plante salutaire ne peut sortir une vertu veneneuse, encore qu’elle soit salutaire à un corps & mortelle à un autre; ainsi que le veratre qui nourrit & engraisse les cailles, & tue l’homme: ne pouvant pourtant exercer ces contraires vertus en un mesme subject. C’est à dire que le veratre ne peut nourrir & tuer la caille, ny empoisonner & nourrir l’homme tout ensemble. La vertu propre à la plante est donc en toute la plante: & chacune des parties de la plante est veritablement dissemblable en situation & figure, mais non pas contraire en vertu ny substance; car la feuille & le fruit sont de la substance de la plante, & ont plus ou moins les vertus d’icelle. On me voudra peut estre objecter que les choux produisent deux effects divers, selon l’opinion vulgaire, qui estime que leur jus lasche le ventre; & leur marc le reserre.
Sal Lumen and Spiritus Mundi Philosophici: Book Two · Chapter 3
1621 pp. 131–134 · scans FR151, FR152, FR153, FR154Moreover, following the example I gave just now, leaves and fruit, wood and bark, branches and root are not separated and divided as contraries, but distinguished, each in its own adornment and place. They nevertheless possess a certain kinship and bond, so that one does not occupy another’s place; instead they agree, assist and support one another. The second kind of separation is the disassembly or unbinding of things wholly alien, contrary and superfluous, which have no natural connection with the substance of things: the impure from the pure, the cold from the hot, the coarse from the subtle, and similar things. I do not mean that these things cannot be together, but that, through their diversity, their conjunction and mixture causes destruction, or at least prevents the action of the natural powers innate in the pure substance. And this manner of separation should properly be called division or removal, which Nature practises in all her productions to give free scope to her own actions and powers in each thing. The first is therefore merely a distinction between parts truly dissimilar in situation and shape, yet homogeneous in substance and power. For it is certain that wood, bark and everything belonging to a tree shares in the innate power that is peculiar to it, yet common to all its parts. As for the other subordinate powers, they may be dissimilar, that is, receive more or less substance, but cannot be contrary: for one and the same effect does not produce diametrically opposed things in a single matter, just as a wholesome plant cannot yield a poisonous power, although it may be wholesome for one body and deadly to another, as hellebore nourishes and fattens quails but kills man, yet cannot exercise these contrary powers upon the same subject. That is, hellebore cannot nourish and kill a quail, or poison and nourish a man, at the same time. The power peculiar to the plant therefore exists throughout the plant; and each of its parts is indeed dissimilar in situation and shape, but not contrary in power or substance, for the leaf and fruit belong to the plant’s substance and possess its powers in greater or lesser measure. It may perhaps be objected that cabbages produce two different effects, according to the common opinion that their juice loosens the bowels and their residue binds them.
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Reading Sal Lumen and Spiritus Mundi Philosophici · Book Two · Chapter 3 · Book Two · Chapter 3 · Unit 4
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Socrates will begin with this book and its sources.About This Reading Edition
The complete French text of 1621 with a new English translation, all three books, preliminary texts, nine concluding sonnets, original errata, 299 annotations and the complete supplied study apparatus.
Historical Text and Translation
Clovis Hesteau de Nuysement, Traittez de l’harmonie et constitution generalle du vray sel, secret des Philosophes, & de l’Esprit universelle du Monde. Paris: Jérémie Périer and Abdias Buisard, 1621. The governing witness is the BnF/Gallica reproduction, ark:/12148/bpt6k656273. The reproduced privilege is dated 6 November 1620; the separate eighty-page Poème philosophic of 1620 is outside this edition.
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This historical edition credits Diotimos Editions as its English translator.
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The historical text printed in 1621 is in the public domain. The supplied 2026 French reading text, new English translation, introduction, notes and complete study apparatus are published with the site owner’s authorization.
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