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Section II

B73

Explanatory notes

[But perhaps this subject exceeds reason’s reach. Let us therefore examine its discoveries concerning things within its power. If there is anything to which its own interest ought to have made it apply itself most earnestly, it is the search for its highest good. Let us see, then, where these strong, clear-sighted souls have placed it, and whether they agree.

[One says the highest good lies in virtue; another places it in pleasure; one [in the] knowledge of nature, another in truth: “Happy the person who could know the causes of things”; another in total ignorance, another in freedom from pain, others in resisting appearances, another in wondering at nothing: “To wonder at nothing is almost the one thing that can make and keep us happy.” And true Pyrrhonists place it in their tranquility, doubt and perpetual suspension; others, wiser still, think they can find something a little better. A fine return we have received.

[Move after the laws, under the next heading.

[Still, we must see whether this fine philosophy has acquired anything certain through such long and intense labor. Perhaps the soul will at least know itself. Let us hear the world’s masters on this subject. What have they thought about its substance? 395. Have they been more successful in lodging it? 395. What have they discovered of its origin, its duration and its departure? 399.

[Is the soul, then, still too noble a subject for reason’s feeble light? Let us bring the soul down to matter, and see whether it knows what constitutes the very body it animates and the others it contemplates and moves at will. What have these great dogmatists, who are ignorant of nothing, known of them? 393. “Of these opinions.”

[This would surely suffice if reason were reasonable. It is reasonable enough to admit that it has not yet found anything firm, but it has not yet despaired of succeeding. On the contrary, it is as eager as ever in this search, and assures itself that it possesses the powers needed for this conquest. We must therefore finish it off. Having examined its powers in their effects, let us recognize them in themselves; let us see whether it has any forms or holds capable of grasping truth.]

B74

Explanatory notes

A letter on the folly of human knowledge and philosophy.

This letter before diversion.

“Happy the person who could…” “To wonder at nothing.”

280 kinds of highest good in Montaigne.

B74 bis

Explanatory notes

For the philosophers, 280 highest goods.

B75

Explanatory notes

Part I, book 2, chapter 1, section 4.

[Conjecture. It will not be difficult to lower it another degree and make it appear ridiculous. For, to begin with it in itself], what could be more absurd than saying that inanimate bodies have passions, fears and horrors? That insensible bodies, without life and even incapable of life, have passions that presuppose at least a sentient soul to feel them? Further, that the object of this horror is the void? What is there in the void that could frighten them? What could be lower or more ridiculous? It is not enough that they contain a principle of movement to avoid the void: do they have arms, legs, muscles, nerves?

B76

Write against those who pursue the sciences deeply: Descartes.

B77

Explanatory notes

I cannot forgive Descartes: throughout his philosophy he would gladly have dispensed with God, but he could not help having him give a little flick to set the world in motion. After that, he has no further use for God.

B78

Descartes: useless and uncertain.

B79

[Descartes.—We must say in general, “This happens through shape and movement,” for that is true. But to say which shapes and movements, and construct the machine, is ridiculous. For it is useless, uncertain and laborious. Even if it were true, we do not consider all philosophy worth an hour’s trouble.]

B80

Why does a person with a limp not irritate us, while a limping mind does? Because the person with a limp acknowledges that we walk straight, while the limping mind says that we are the ones who limp. Without that, we would feel pity rather than anger.

Epictetus asks much more forcefully: Why are we not angry if someone says we have a headache, but become angry when someone says we reason badly or choose badly?—The cause is that we are quite certain we do not have a headache and do not limp; but we are not so sure that we choose what is true. Since our assurance comes only from seeing it with all our powers of sight, when someone else sees the contrary with all theirs, this suspends our judgment and astonishes us—still more when a thousand others mock our choice. For we must prefer our insight to that of so many others, and that is bold and difficult. No such contradiction ever arises in the senses concerning a person with a limp.

B81

The mind naturally believes, and the will naturally loves, so that, lacking true objects, they must attach themselves to false ones.

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