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Section I

Section I

Historical thematic sequence · Brunschvicg edition

B1

Explanatory notes

Difference between the geometrical mind and the discerning mind.—In the former, the principles are tangible but removed from everyday use, so that lack of familiarity makes it hard to turn our heads in that direction. Yet once we turn them even a little, we see the principles fully; our minds would have to be utterly unsound to reason badly from principles so obvious that it is almost impossible to miss them.

But for the discerning mind, the principles are in everyday use and before everyone’s eyes. There is no need to turn our heads or force ourselves; we need only good eyesight, but it must be good, because the principles are so subtle and so numerous that it is almost impossible not to miss some. Now, overlooking a principle leads to error. Our sight must therefore be very clear to see all the principles, and our minds then accurate enough not to reason falsely from principles we know.

All geometers would therefore be discerning if they had good eyesight, since they do not reason falsely from the principles they know; and discerning minds would be geometers if they could direct their sight toward geometry’s unfamiliar principles.

What prevents certain discerning minds from being geometers, then, is that they cannot turn at all toward the principles of geometry. But what prevents geometers from being discerning is that they fail to see what is before them. Accustomed to geometry’s clear, broad principles, and to reasoning only after thoroughly seeing and handling their principles, they lose their way in matters requiring discernment, where principles cannot be handled like this. We scarcely see them; we sense them rather than see them. We take endless trouble to make people sense them who do not sense them for themselves. These things are so delicate and so numerous that we need a very delicate and clear sense to apprehend them, and to judge soundly and accurately in accordance with that sense. Usually we cannot demonstrate them in sequence as in geometry, because we do not possess their principles in that way, and attempting it would be an endless undertaking. We must see the thing all at once, at a single glance, rather than through successive steps of reasoning, at least up to a certain point. Thus geometers are rarely discerning and people of discernment rarely geometers, because geometers want to treat these subtle matters geometrically. They make themselves ridiculous by wanting to begin with definitions and then principles, which is not how this kind of reasoning proceeds. The mind does perform the reasoning, but tacitly, naturally and without a technique: expressing it exceeds everyone’s powers, and few people have a direct sense of it.

Discerning minds, on the other hand, accustomed as they are to judging at a single glance, are so astonished when presented with propositions they cannot understand, and which can be entered only through definitions and principles so barren, so unfamiliar to them in their detail, that they recoil from them in disgust.

But minds that judge falsely are never either discerning or geometrical.

Geometers who are nothing but geometers therefore have sound minds, provided everything is thoroughly explained to them through definitions and principles. Otherwise they judge falsely and are intolerable, for they reason soundly only from principles that have been clearly explained.

And people of discernment who have nothing but discernment cannot find the patience to descend to the first principles of speculative and imagined things that they have never seen in ordinary life and that lie entirely outside common use.

B2

Explanatory notes

Different kinds of sound judgment: some people possess it in a particular order of things, but not in other orders, where their judgments run wild.

Some draw consequences correctly from a few principles, and this is soundness of judgment.

Others draw consequences correctly in matters involving many principles.

For example, some people thoroughly understand the effects of water, which involve few principles; but the consequences are so subtle that only an extremely sound mind can reach them.

Yet that might not make them great geometers, because geometry involves a great many principles. A mind may be constituted so that it can penetrate a few principles to their depths, while being wholly unable to penetrate matters involving many principles.

There are therefore two kinds of mind: one penetrates the consequences of principles sharply and deeply, and this is a mind for exact inference; the other grasps many principles without confusing them, and this is the geometrical mind. One is strength and soundness of mind; the other is breadth of mind. Either may exist without the other: the mind can be strong and narrow, or broad and weak.

B3

Those accustomed to judging by a direct sense of things understand nothing of matters of reasoning: they want to penetrate them at once, at a glance, and are not accustomed to seeking principles. Conversely, those accustomed to reasoning from principles understand nothing of matters apprehended directly: they look for principles there and cannot see at a glance.

B4

Explanatory notes

Geometry, discernment.—True eloquence makes light of eloquence; true morality makes light of morality. That is, the morality of judgment makes light of the morality of the intellect—which has no rules.

For direct apprehension belongs to judgment, as the sciences belong to the intellect; discernment is judgment’s share, geometry the intellect’s.

To make light of philosophy is truly to philosophize.

B5

Those who judge a work without a rule stand in relation to others as those who have [no] watch stand in relation to others. One says, “Two hours have passed”; another says, “Only three quarters of an hour.” I look at my watch and tell the first, “You are bored,” and the second, “Time hardly drags for you,” since an hour and a half has passed. And I make light of those who say that time drags for me and that I judge it by whim: they do not know that I judge by my watch.

B6

Just as we spoil our minds, we also spoil our sense of things.

Conversation cultivates our minds and our sense of things; conversation spoils our minds and our sense of things. Good or bad conversations therefore cultivate or spoil them. It is consequently of the utmost importance to know how to choose well, so as to cultivate them without spoiling them; yet we cannot make that choice unless they are already cultivated and unspoiled. This makes a circle, and fortunate are those who escape it.

B7

The greater our understanding, the more people we find who are original; ordinary people find no difference between one person and another.

B8

Explanatory notes

Many people listen to a sermon in the same way that they listen to vespers.

B9

Explanatory notes

To correct someone usefully and show that they are mistaken, we must observe the side from which they view the matter, since it is usually true from that side. We must acknowledge that truth, while revealing the side from which it is false. They are satisfied with this, because they see that they were not mistaken but had merely failed to see every side. People do not mind failing to see everything, but they do not want to have [been] mistaken. Perhaps this is because by nature we cannot see everything, and by nature cannot be mistaken about the side we view—just as sensory apprehensions are always true.

B10

As a rule, we are more readily persuaded by reasons we have found for ourselves than by those that have occurred to others.

B11

Explanatory notes

All great diversions are dangerous to Christian life, but of all those the world has invented, none is more to be feared than the theater. It represents the passions so naturally and delicately that it stirs them and brings them to life in our hearts, especially love—particularly when [it] is represented as very chaste and decent. For the more innocent it seems to innocent souls, the more susceptible they are to its touch. Its violence pleases our self-love, which immediately forms a desire to produce the same effects we see so well represented. At the same time, we fashion a conscience founded on the decency of the feelings portrayed there. Those feelings remove the fear of pure souls, who imagine that loving with a love that seems so sensible does not injure their purity.

Thus we leave the theater with our hearts so full of all love’s beauties and sweetness, and our souls and minds so convinced of its innocence, that we are quite prepared to receive its first impressions—or rather, to seek an opportunity to awaken them in someone’s heart, so as to receive the same pleasures and the same sacrifices we have seen so well depicted in the theater.

B12

Explanatory notes

Scaramouche, who thinks of only one thing.

The Doctor, who speaks for a quarter of an hour after saying everything, so full is he of the desire to speak.

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