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← ExitPensées
Section VI

B410

Perseus, king of Macedonia, Aemilius Paulus.—Perseus was reproached for not killing himself.

B411

Despite the sight of all our miseries, which affect us and grip us by the throat, we have an instinct that we cannot suppress, which raises us up.

B412

Civil war within us, between reason and the passions.

If we had reason alone, without passions…

If we had the passions alone, without reason…

But having both, we cannot be without war, since we can have peace with one only by being at war with the other: so we are always divided and opposed to ourselves.

B413

Explanatory notes

This inward war of reason against the passions has divided those who wanted peace into two sects. Some wanted to renounce the passions and become gods; others wanted to renounce reason and become brute beasts: Des Barreaux. But neither group could do so. Reason always remains, accusing the passions of baseness and injustice and disturbing the repose of those who surrender to them; and the passions are always alive in those who want to renounce them.

B414

People are so necessarily mad that not to be mad would be madness by another turn of madness.

B415

Human nature can be considered in two ways: one according to its end, and then it is great and incomparable; the other according to the multitude, as we judge the nature of horses and dogs from the multitude, seeing in them speed and animum arcendi—the impulse to ward off—and then the human being is abject and vile. These are the two ways that lead to different judgments and make philosophers dispute so much.

For each denies the other’s supposition. One says: We were not born for that end, since all our actions oppose it. The other says: We depart from our end when we perform these base actions.

B416

Explanatory notes

A. P. R. Greatness and misery.—Since misery is inferred from greatness, and greatness from misery, some have inferred misery all the more because they took greatness as its proof; and others have inferred greatness with all the more force because they inferred it from misery itself. Everything the first group could say to show greatness served only as an argument for the other group to infer misery, since the higher the fall, the greater the misery; and conversely for the others. They have driven one another around an endless circle, since it is certain that the more understanding people have, the more they find both greatness and misery in humanity. In a word, we know that we are miserable: we are therefore miserable, since we are; but we are very great, since we know it.

B417

This duality in human beings is so visible that some have thought we had two souls. A single subject seemed to them incapable of such sudden and varied changes from boundless presumption to a dreadful dejection of heart.

B418

It is dangerous to show us too plainly how equal we are to animals without showing us our greatness. It is also dangerous to show us our greatness too plainly without our baseness. It is still more dangerous to leave us ignorant of both. But it is very beneficial to represent both to us.

We must not believe that we are equal to animals, or to angels, or be ignorant of both; we must know both.

B419

I will not allow anyone to rest in either position, so that, without firm ground and without rest…

B420

If someone boasts, I bring them low; if they bring themselves low, I praise them; and I always contradict them, until they understand that they are an incomprehensible monster.

B421

I blame equally those who take the side of praising humanity, those who take the side of blaming it, and those who take the side of diversion; and I can approve only those who seek with groaning.

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