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Section V

B324

Explanatory notes

The people have very sound opinions. For example:

1. In choosing diversion and hunting over poetry. The half-learned mock them, and triumphantly show the world's folly on this point; but people are right, for a reason these critics do not grasp.

2. In distinguishing people by outward things, such as nobility or wealth. Here again the world triumphantly shows how unreasonable this is; yet it is very reasonable—cannibals laugh at a child king.

3. In taking offense at a slap, or desiring glory so greatly. Yet this is very desirable because of the other essential advantages bound up with it; a man who has been slapped and shows no resentment is overwhelmed with insults and privations.

4. Working for what is uncertain; going to sea; crossing on a plank.

B325

Explanatory notes

Montaigne is wrong: custom should be followed only because it is custom, and not because it is reasonable or just. But the people follow it solely because they believe it just. Otherwise they would no longer follow it, even though it remained customary; for people wish to be subject only to reason or justice. Without that, custom would pass for tyranny; but the rule of reason and justice is no more tyrannical than the rule of delight: these are principles natural to human beings.

It would therefore be good for people to obey laws and customs because they are laws; for the people to know that there is no true and just law to introduce, that we understand nothing of the matter, and that we must therefore simply follow those already accepted. By this means, they would never abandon them. But the people are not receptive to this doctrine; and so, since they believe that truth can be found, and that it lies in laws and customs, they believe in them and take their antiquity as proof of their truth, rather than merely of their authority without truth. Thus they obey them; but they are liable to revolt as soon as anyone shows them that these laws are worthless—which can be shown of them all, if they are viewed from a certain side.

B326

Injustice.—It is dangerous to tell the people that the laws are not just, for they obey them only because they believe them just. That is why they must be told at the same time that the laws must be obeyed because they are laws, just as superiors must be obeyed, not because they are just, but because they are superiors. By this means all sedition is prevented, if this can be made understood, together with [what] the definition of justice properly [is].

B327

The world judges things well, because it lives in natural ignorance, which is the true human station. The sciences have two extremes that touch: the first is the pure natural ignorance in which all people find themselves at birth; the other is reached by great souls who, having traversed everything human beings can know, discover that they know nothing, and find themselves in the same ignorance from which they set out. But this is a learned ignorance that knows itself. Those in between, who have left natural ignorance and have been unable to reach the other, have a smattering of this self-satisfied learning and act like experts. They disturb the world and judge everything badly. The people and the able keep the world going; those in between despise it and are despised. They judge everything badly, and the world judges it well.

B328

Reason for effects.—A continual reversal from for to against.

We have therefore shown that people are vain in their esteem for things that are not essential; and all these opinions are demolished. We have then shown that all these opinions are very sound, and that, since all these vanities are very well founded, the people are not as vain as is said. Thus we have demolished the opinion that demolished the people's opinion.

But now this last proposition must be demolished, and it must be shown that it remains true that the people are vain, although their opinions are sound: because they do not sense the truth where it is, and, placing it where it is not, their opinions are always very false and very unsound.

B329

Reason for effects.—Human weakness is the cause of so many accomplishments that we set up as beautiful, such as knowing how to play the lute well.

It is an evil only because of our weakness.

B330

The power of kings is founded on the people's reason and folly, and much more on their folly. The greatest and most important thing in the world has weakness as its foundation, and that foundation is wonderfully secure; for nothing is more [certain] than this: the people will be weak. What is founded on sound reason is very poorly founded, as is esteem for wisdom.

B331

Explanatory notes

We imagine Plato and Aristotle only in the long gowns of pedants. They were cultivated people who laughed with their friends like anyone else; and when they amused themselves by writing their Laws and Politics, they did it in play. This was the least philosophical and least serious part of their lives; the most philosophical was living simply and peacefully. If they wrote about politics, it was as if to set rules for a hospital of madmen; and if they pretended to speak of it as a great thing, it was because they knew that the madmen they were addressing thought they were kings and emperors. They entered into these people's principles to moderate their madness as well as they could.

B332

Explanatory notes

Tyranny consists in the desire for domination, universal and outside its proper order.

Different chambers: of the strong, the beautiful, the gifted, the devout. Each rules at home, nowhere else; and sometimes they meet, and the strong and the beautiful foolishly fight over which will be the other's master, for their kinds of mastery are different. They do not understand one another, and their fault is wishing to rule everywhere. Nothing can do so, not even force: it can do nothing in the kingdom of the learned; it is master only of outward actions.

Tyranny.—… Thus these statements are false and tyrannical: I am beautiful, therefore I should be feared.—I am strong, therefore I should be loved.—I am…

Tyranny means wishing to obtain by one means what can be obtained only by another. Different merits call for different duties: a duty of love toward charm; a duty of fear toward force; a duty of belief toward knowledge.

These duties must be rendered; it is unjust to refuse them, and unjust to demand others. It is equally false and tyrannical to say: He is not strong, therefore I will not esteem him; he is not able, therefore I will not fear him.

B333

Have you never seen people who, to complain of the little regard you have for them, parade examples of people of rank who esteem them? I would answer them: Show me the merit by which you charmed these people, and I will esteem you in the same way.

B334

Explanatory notes

Reason for effects.—Disordered desire and force are the sources of all our actions: disordered desire produces voluntary actions; force, involuntary ones.

B335

Reason for effects.—It is therefore true to say that everyone is under an illusion: for, although the people's opinions are sound, they are not sound in their own minds, because they think truth is where it is not. Truth is indeed in their opinions, but not at the point where they imagine it. It is true that noblemen should be honored, but not because birth is an actual personal advantage, etc.

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