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B26
Eloquence is a painting of thought; thus those who add more after painting it make a picture instead of a portrait.
B27
Miscellaneous. Language.—Those who force words to make antitheses are like people who build false windows for symmetry: their rule is to make balanced figures rather than speak accurately.
B28
Symmetry in what we see at a glance: founded on there being no reason to do otherwise, and also founded on the human figure. Hence we want symmetry only across the width, not in height or depth.
B29
When we encounter a natural style, we are astonished and delighted: we expected to see an author and find a person. Conversely, those with good taste, who expect to find a person when they see a book, are very surprised to find an author: “You have spoken more like a poet than a human being.” Those who teach nature that it can speak of everything, even theology, do it great honor.
B30
[Look at the Jansenist’s speeches in the second, fourth and fifth: they are elevated and serious.
I hate the buffoon and the bombastic man equally]: one would make a friend of neither.
People consult only the ear because they lack heart: propriety is the rule. A poet rather than a cultivated person.
[After my eighth, I thought I had answered sufficiently.]
Beauty of omission, of judgment.
B31
All the false beauties we criticize in Cicero have admirers, and many of them.
B32
There is a certain model of charm and beauty consisting in a certain relation between our nature—weak or strong, such as it is—and the thing that pleases us.
Everything formed on this model pleases us: house, song, speech, verse, prose, woman, birds, rivers, trees, rooms, clothes, etc. Everything not made on this model displeases those with good taste.
And just as there is a perfect relation between a song and a house made on this good model, because both resemble this single model, though each according to its kind, so there is a perfect relation between things made on the bad model. The bad model is not unique: there are infinitely many. But every bad sonnet, for example, whatever false model it follows, perfectly resembles a woman dressed according to that model.
Nothing makes the absurdity of a false sonnet clearer than considering its nature and model, and then imagining a woman or a house made on that model.
B33
Poetic beauty.—Since we speak of poetic beauty, we should also speak of geometrical beauty and medicinal beauty, but we do not. The reason is that we know the object of geometry, which consists in proofs, and the object of medicine, which consists in healing. But we do not know what constitutes charm, the object of poetry. We do not know what this natural model is that we must imitate. Lacking that knowledge, we have invented certain strange expressions: “golden age,” “wonder of our days,” “fateful,” etc.; and we call this jargon poetic beauty.
But whoever imagines a woman on this model, which consists in saying small things with grand words, will see a pretty young lady covered in mirrors and chains, and laugh at her, because we know better what constitutes a woman’s charm than the charm of verse. Those who knew nothing about it, however, would admire her in this outfit. In many villages she would be taken for the queen; and that is why we call sonnets made on this model village queens.
B34
In society, people do not think you understand verse unless you have hung out a sign saying poet, mathematician, etc. But people of broad cultivation want no sign, and see little difference between the trade of poet and that of embroiderer.
People of broad cultivation are called neither poets nor geometers, etc.; yet they are all these things, and judges of all those people. You cannot guess what they are. They will speak about whatever was being discussed when they entered. No single accomplishment stands out above another, unless there is need to use it; then we remember it. It is equally characteristic of such people that nobody says they speak well when language is not the subject, and that people say they speak well when it is.
It is therefore false praise to say of a man as he enters that he is highly skilled in poetry; and it is a bad sign when nobody turns to a man when some verses need judging.
B35
One should be unable to [say] either “He is a mathematician,” or “a preacher,” or “eloquent,” but “He is a cultivated person.” This comprehensive quality alone pleases me. When seeing a man reminds us of his book, that is a bad sign. I would have no accomplishment noticed except when an encounter supplies an occasion to use it—“Nothing in excess”—for fear that one accomplishment should prevail and give him his label. Nobody should think he speaks well except when good speaking is called for; but then they should think it.
B36
Human beings are full of needs: they love only those who can meet them all. “He is a good mathematician,” someone will say.—But I have no use for mathematics: he would take me for a proposition.—“He is a good soldier.”—He would take me for a besieged fortress. What I need, then, is a cultivated person who can accommodate all my needs generally.
B37
[A little of everything.—Since we cannot be universal and know everything that can be known about everything, we must know a little of everything. For it is far finer to know something of everything than everything about one thing: this breadth is finest. If we could have both, so much the better; but if we must choose, we must choose the former. Society senses this and acts on it, for society is often a good judge.]