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Section II continued

Section II continued

Historical thematic sequence · Section II continued

B82

Explanatory notes

Imagination.—This is the deceptive part of a human being, the mistress of error and falsehood, all the more fraudulent because it is not always so. For it would be an infallible rule of truth if it were an infallible rule of falsehood. But, though usually false, it gives no indication of its quality, stamping truth and falsehood with the same mark.

I am not speaking of fools, but of the wisest; among them imagination has the great gift of persuading people. Reason may cry out: it cannot set a value on things.

This proud power, reason’s enemy, which enjoys checking and dominating it, has established a second nature in humanity to show how powerful it is in everything. It has its happy and unhappy, its healthy and sick, its rich and poor; it makes reason believe, doubt and deny; it suspends the senses and makes them feel; it has its fools and its wise. Nothing vexes us more than seeing it fill its hosts with a satisfaction far fuller and more complete than reason’s. Those made clever by imagination please themselves quite differently from the way prudent people can reasonably please themselves. They look at others imperiously; they argue boldly and confidently, the others fearfully and mistrustfully. This cheerful expression often gives them the advantage in their listeners’ opinion, so much favor do the supposedly wise enjoy with judges of the same kind. Imagination cannot make fools wise, but it makes them happy, in rivalry with reason, which can only make its friends wretched: one covers them with glory, the other with shame.

Who distributes reputation? Who grants respect and veneration to people, works, laws and the great, except this imagining faculty? All the earth’s riches are insufficient without its consent!

Would you not say that this magistrate, whose venerable age commands an entire people’s respect, governs himself by pure and elevated reason, judging things according to their nature, without dwelling on empty circumstances that trouble only weak imaginations? Watch him enter a sermon with thoroughly devout zeal, strengthening the solidity of his reason with the ardor of his charity. There he is, ready to listen with exemplary respect. Let the preacher appear; let nature have given him a hoarse voice and a strange face; let his barber have shaved him badly, and chance have smeared his face into the bargain: however great the truths he announces, I wager that our senator will lose his gravity.

The world’s greatest philosopher, on a plank wider than necessary above a precipice, will be overcome by imagination, though reason convinces him of his safety. Many could not bear even the thought without turning pale and sweating.

I do not intend to recount all its effects.

Who does not know that the sight of cats or rats, the crunching of charcoal, etc., throw reason off its hinges? A tone of voice overawes the wisest and changes the force of a speech or poem.

Affection or hatred changes justice’s face. How much more just a lawyer well paid in advance finds the cause he pleads! How much better his bold gestures make it appear to judges duped by this appearance! A fine reason, blown about by a breath, in every direction!

I could recount almost all human actions, which move almost entirely through its jolts. For reason has been obliged to yield, and the wisest reason takes as its principles those that human imagination has rashly introduced in each place.

[Anyone who wished to follow reason alone would be a fool in most people’s judgment. We must judge according to the judgment of the greater part of the world. Since it has pleased the world, we must work and tire ourselves all day for goods acknowledged to be imaginary. And when sleep has refreshed us from the labors of our reason, we must immediately spring up to chase these vapors and undergo the impressions of this mistress of the world. Here is one principle of error, but not the only one. Humanity has been quite right to ally truth with falsehood, though imagination has a very ample advantage in this peace; for in war its advantage is far greater. Reason never overcomes imagination, whereas imagination often throws reason completely out of its seat.]

Our magistrates have understood this mystery well. Their red robes, the ermine in which they swaddle themselves like furred cats, the courts where they judge, the fleurs-de-lis—all this august apparatus was very necessary. And if physicians had no gowns and slippers, and university doctors no square caps and robes four times too large, they would never have duped a world unable to resist this apparently authoritative display. If they possessed true justice, and physicians the true art of healing, they would have no need of square caps: these sciences’ own majesty would command sufficient veneration. But since their sciences are imaginary, they must take up these empty instruments, which strike the imagination with which they have to deal; and through them they do indeed attract respect. Soldiers alone have not disguised themselves in this way, because their share is more substantial: they establish themselves through force, the others through a show.

Thus our kings have not sought these disguises. They have not masked themselves in extraordinary clothes to appear as kings, but surrounded themselves with guards and halberds. These armed faces, whose hands and strength serve them alone, the trumpets and drums marching ahead, and the legions around them make the firmest tremble. They possess force as well as dress. One would need a very purified reason to regard the Grand Seigneur, surrounded in his splendid seraglio by forty thousand janissaries, as just another man.

We cannot even see a lawyer in his gown and cap without forming a favorable opinion of his competence.

Imagination controls everything: it makes beauty, justice and happiness, which is the whole world’s concern. I would dearly like to see the Italian book of which I know only the title—a title worth many books by itself: On Opinion, Queen of the World. I endorse it without knowing it, except for anything bad it may contain.

Such, roughly, are the effects of this deceitful faculty, seemingly given to us expressly to lead us into necessary error. We have many other principles of error. Old impressions are not alone in deceiving us: novelty’s charms have the same power. Hence all human disputes, in which people reproach one another either for following false childhood impressions or for rashly chasing new ones. Who keeps the proper middle? Let him appear and prove it. There is no principle, however natural, even from childhood, [that cannot] be passed off as a false impression received from instruction or the senses.

“Because,” they say, “you believed from childhood that a chest was empty when you saw nothing in it, you believed a void possible. This is an illusion of your senses, strengthened by custom, which science must correct.”—Others say: “Because you were told in the schools that no void exists, your common sense was corrupted; it understood the void so clearly before this bad impression, which must be corrected by returning to your original nature.” Which, then, has deceived us: the senses or instruction?

Illness is another principle of error: it spoils our judgment and our sense of things. And if great illnesses alter them noticeably, I do not doubt that small ones make a proportionate impression.

Our own interest is another wonderful instrument for pleasantly putting out our eyes. The world’s most equitable person may not judge his own cause. I know people who, to avoid falling into this self-love, have become supremely unjust in the opposite direction: a sure way to lose an entirely just case was to have their close relatives recommend it to them.

Justice and truth are two points so fine that our instruments are too blunt to touch them exactly. If they reach them, they flatten the point and press all around it, more upon falsehood than upon truth.

[Humanity is therefore so happily fashioned that it has no sound principle of truth and several excellent ones of falsehood. Let us now see how much… But the most amusing cause of these errors is the war between the senses and reason.]

B83

Explanatory notes

The chapter on deceptive powers must begin here. A human being is only a subject full of error, natural and ineradicable without grace. Nothing shows him truth. Everything deceives him. These two principles of truth, reason and the senses, not only each lack sincerity but mutually deceive one another. The senses deceive reason through false appearances; and the very trickery they bring to reason they receive from it in their turn: reason takes revenge. The soul’s passions disturb the senses and give them false impressions. They vie with each other in lying and deceiving.

But besides these errors arising accidentally and from lack of understanding, with its heterogeneous faculties…

B84

Imagination magnifies small objects until, through a fantastic valuation, they fill our souls; and with rash insolence it reduces great ones to its own measure, as when speaking of God.

B85

The things that hold us most firmly—concealing how little we possess, for example—often amount to almost nothing. It is a nothing that imagination enlarges into a mountain; another turn of imagination makes us disclose it without difficulty.

B86

[My fancy makes me hate a croaker and someone who blows while eating. Fancy carries great weight. What shall we learn from this? That we should follow that weight because it is natural? No: that we should resist it…]

B87

He will indeed have uttered great nonsense with great exertion.

583. As though anything were more unfortunate than a person ruled by his own inventions. (Pliny.)

B88

Children frightened by the face they have smeared are children; but how can something so weak in childhood be very strong when older? We only change our fancies. Everything perfected by degrees also perishes by degrees; everything once weak can never be absolutely strong. We may say, “He has grown, he has changed”; he is also the same.

B89

Custom is our nature: whoever grows accustomed to faith believes it, can no longer avoid fearing hell, and believes nothing else. Whoever grows accustomed to believing that the king is fearsome…, etc. Who doubts, then, that our soul, accustomed to seeing number, space and movement, believes these and nothing else?

B90

What a person sees often does not astonish him, even if he does not know why it happens; if something he has never seen before occurs, he considers it a prodigy. (Cicero.)

B91

Explanatory notes

The sun’s sponge.—When we see an effect always occur in the same way, we infer a natural necessity—for example, that there will be daylight tomorrow, etc. But nature often contradicts us and does not submit to its own rules.

B92

What are our natural principles except our accustomed principles, and in children those received from their fathers’ custom, like hunting in animals?

A different custom will give us other natural principles: experience shows this. And if some principles cannot be erased by custom, there are also principles of custom contrary to nature that cannot be erased by nature or by a second custom. This depends on disposition.

B93

Fathers fear that their children’s natural love will fade. What, then, is this nature that can be erased? Custom is a second nature that destroys the first. But what is nature? Why is custom not natural? I greatly fear that this nature is itself only a first custom, just as custom is a second nature.

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