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Section II

B72

Explanatory notes

H. Human disproportion.—[This is where natural knowledge leads us. If it is untrue, there is no truth in humanity; if it is true, we find in it great cause for humiliation, compelled to lower ourselves in one way or the other. And since we cannot live without believing it, I wish, before entering into greater investigations of nature, that we should consider it once, seriously and at leisure, that each person should look also

at himself, and, knowing what proportion there is…] Let humanity therefore contemplate all nature in its full and lofty majesty, turning its sight away from the lowly objects around it. Let it look at that brilliant light, set like an everlasting lamp to illuminate the universe. Let the earth appear a point beside the immense circuit that this star describes, and let it marvel that this immense circuit is itself only the finest point beside the circuit embraced by the stars revolving in the heavens. But if our sight stops there, let imagination go further: it will tire of conceiving before nature tires of supplying. This entire visible world is only an imperceptible stroke in nature’s vast embrace. No idea approaches it. We may swell our conceptions beyond imaginable spaces; we bring forth only atoms beside the reality of things. It is an infinite sphere whose center is everywhere and circumference nowhere. Finally, the greatest perceptible mark of God’s omnipotence is that our imagination loses itself in this thought.

Let a person return to himself and consider what he is beside what exists; let him see himself as lost in this remote corner of nature. From the little dungeon where he is lodged—I mean the universe—let him learn to value the earth, kingdoms, cities and himself at their proper worth. What is a human being within infinity?

But to present another marvel equally astonishing, let him seek out the most delicate things he knows. Let a mite show him, within its tiny body, incomparably smaller parts: legs with joints, veins in its legs, blood in its veins, fluids in that blood, drops in those fluids, vapors in those drops. Let him divide these last things further, exhausting his powers in such conceptions; and let the last object he can reach now become the subject of our discourse. He may think he has reached nature’s smallest extreme. I wish to show him a new abyss within it. I wish to depict, within the confines of this diminished atom, not only the visible universe but nature’s conceivable immensity. Let him see there infinitely many universes, each with its heavens, planets and earth in the same proportion as the visible world; on this earth, animals, and finally mites, within which he will find again what the first ones showed. Finding the same thing again in the others, without end or rest, let him lose himself in these marvels, as astonishing in their smallness as the others in their extent. For who will not marvel that our body, just now imperceptible in the universe, itself imperceptible within the whole, should now be a colossus, a world—or rather, a whole—beside the nothingness we cannot reach?

Whoever considers himself in this way will be frightened by himself. Seeing himself sustained in the bodily mass nature has given him, between these two abysses of infinity and nothingness, he will tremble at the sight of its marvels. And I believe that, as his curiosity changes into wonder, he will be readier to contemplate them in silence than to investigate them presumptuously.

For ultimately, what is humanity in nature? Nothing beside infinity, everything beside nothingness, a middle between nothing and everything. Infinitely removed from comprehending the extremes, it finds the end of things and their principles unconquerably hidden in an impenetrable secret, equally unable to see the nothingness from which it is drawn and the infinity in which it is engulfed.

What can it do, then, except perceive [some] appearance of the middle of things, in everlasting despair of knowing either their beginning or their end? All things have come from nothingness and are carried to infinity. Who will follow these astonishing movements? The author of these marvels comprehends them. No other can.

Failing to contemplate these infinities, people have rashly embarked on investigating nature, as though they stood in some proportion to it. It is strange that they have wanted to comprehend the principles of things and from there arrive at knowing everything, with a presumption as infinite as their object. For there is no doubt that such a design cannot be formed without either presumption or a capacity infinite as nature itself.

Once instructed, we understand that, since nature has engraved its own image and its author’s upon all things, almost all share in its double infinity. Thus we see that all sciences are infinite in the extent of their inquiries: who doubts, for example, that geometry has an infinity of infinities of propositions to set forth? They are also infinite in the multitude and subtlety of their principles: who does not see that those proposed as ultimate do not stand by themselves, but rest on others, which in turn rest on still others, never allowing an ultimate one? Yet we designate as ultimate those that appear so to reason, just as in material things we call a point indivisible when our senses perceive nothing beyond it, though by its nature it is infinitely divisible.

Of these two infinities of knowledge, the infinity of greatness is much more perceptible, and that is why few people have claimed to know everything. “I shall speak of everything,” Democritus said.

But infinity in smallness is much less visible. Philosophers have been much readier to claim they could reach it, and there they have all stumbled. Hence those familiar titles, On the Principles of Things, On the Principles of Philosophy, and the like: in reality as ostentatious, though less obviously so, as that other title which assaults the eyes, On Everything Knowable.

We naturally believe ourselves far more capable of reaching the center of things than of embracing their circumference. The world’s visible extent visibly exceeds us; but since we exceed small things, we believe ourselves more capable of possessing them. Yet reaching nothingness requires no less capacity than reaching the whole: it must be infinite in either case. And it seems to me that whoever comprehended the ultimate principles of things could also arrive at knowing infinity. One depends on the other, and one leads to the other. These extremes touch and unite through the very force of their separation, and meet in God, and in God alone.

Let us therefore know our reach: we are something, and we are not everything. The being we possess conceals from us knowledge of first principles, which arise from nothingness; and the little being we possess hides infinity from our view.

Our intelligence holds the same place in the order of intelligible things that our body holds in the extent of nature.

Limited in every kind, we find this condition midway between two extremes in all our powers. Our senses perceive no extreme: too much noise deafens us, too much light dazzles us, too much distance or proximity prevents sight, excessive length or brevity obscures a discourse, too much truth astonishes us—I know people who cannot understand that taking four from zero leaves zero. First principles are too evident for us; too much pleasure troubles us; too many harmonies displease us in music; and too many benefits irritate us, since we want the means to repay the debt with more: “Benefits are welcome so long as they seem repayable; when they far exceed that measure, hatred is returned instead of gratitude.” We feel neither extreme heat nor extreme cold. Excessive qualities are hostile to us rather than perceptible: we no longer feel them, we suffer them. Too much youth or age hinders the mind, as do too much or too little instruction. Finally, extreme things are for us as though they did not exist, and we do not exist in relation to them: they escape us, or we them.

This is our true condition. It makes us incapable of certain knowledge and of absolute ignorance. We sail across a vast middle, always uncertain and adrift, driven from one end toward the other. Whatever boundary we think to fasten onto and make ourselves secure, it shakes and leaves us. If we follow it, it escapes our grasp, slips away and flees in an everlasting flight. Nothing stays still for us. This condition is natural to us, yet most contrary to our inclination. We burn with desire to find firm ground and an ultimate, unchanging base on which to build a tower rising to infinity; but our entire foundation cracks, and the earth opens into the depths.

Let us therefore seek neither assurance nor stability. Our reason is always deceived by the instability of appearances; nothing can fix the finite between the two infinities that enclose it and elude it.

Once this is well understood, I believe people will remain at rest, each in the condition where nature has placed them. Since the middle allotted to us is always distant from the extremes, what does it matter if someone has a little more understanding of things? If he does, he takes them from a little higher up: is he not still infinitely far from the end? And is our lifetime not equally infinitely removed from eternity if it lasts ten years longer?

Viewed against these infinities, all finite things are equal; I see no reason to settle our imagination on one rather than another. Only the comparison we make between ourselves and the finite troubles us.

If a person first studied himself, he would see how incapable he is of going further. How could a part know the whole?—But perhaps he will aspire to know at least the parts proportionate to him?—Yet the world’s parts are all so related and interconnected that I believe it impossible to know one without another and without the whole.

A human being, for example, is related to everything he knows. He needs place to contain him, time to endure, movement to live, elements to compose him, warmth and food to nourish [him], air to breathe. He sees light, feels bodies; finally, everything enters into relation with him. To know humanity, then, we must know why it needs air to subsist; and to know air, we must know how it bears this relation to human life, etc.

A flame does not subsist without air: therefore, to know one we must know the other.

Therefore, since all things are caused and causing, helped and helping, mediate and immediate, and all sustain one another through a natural, imperceptible bond joining the most distant and dissimilar, I hold it impossible to know the parts without knowing the whole, or to know the whole without knowing the parts individually.

[The eternity of things, in themselves or in God, must also astonish our brief duration. Nature’s fixed, constant immobility, compared with the continual change within us, must have the same effect.]

And what completes our inability to know things is that they are simple in themselves, while we are composed of two opposed natures of different kinds: soul and body. For the part of us that reasons cannot be other than spiritual. Even if we claimed to be purely bodily, that would exclude us still further from knowing things: nothing is so inconceivable as saying that matter knows itself. We cannot know how it would know itself.

Thus, if we [are] purely material, we can know nothing at all; and if we are composed of mind and matter, we cannot perfectly know simple things, whether spiritual or bodily.

This is why almost all philosophers confuse the ideas of things, speaking of bodily things spiritually and spiritual things bodily. They boldly say that bodies tend downward, aspire to their center, flee their destruction, fear the void; that matter has inclinations, sympathies and antipathies—all things belonging only to minds. And when speaking of minds, they consider them as located in a place and attribute movement from one place to another to them, things belonging only to bodies.

Instead of receiving ideas of these things in their purity, we tinge them with our own qualities and stamp all the simple things we contemplate [with] our own composite being.

Seeing us compose everything of mind and body, who would not believe that this mixture would be very comprehensible to us? Yet it is what we understand least. Humanity is to itself nature’s most prodigious object: it cannot conceive what body is, still less what mind is, and least of all how a body can be united with a mind. This crowns its difficulties, yet it is its own being: “The manner in which spirits adhere to bodies cannot be comprehended by human beings; and yet this is what a human being is.”

Finally, to complete the proof of our weakness, I shall end with these two considerations…

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