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B386
If we dreamed the same thing every night, it would affect us as much as the things we see every day; and if a craftsman were sure of dreaming every night, for twelve hours, that he was a king, I think he would be almost as happy as a king who dreamed every night, for twelve hours, that he was a craftsman.
If every night we dreamed we were pursued by enemies and tormented by these painful phantoms, and spent every day in various occupations, as when traveling, we would suffer almost as much as if it were real, and dread sleep as we dread waking when we fear actually falling into such misfortunes. It would indeed cause nearly the same suffering as reality.
But because dreams are all different, and a single dream changes, what we see in them affects us much less than what we see while awake, because of continuity. Yet this continuity is not so steady and uniform that it too does not change, though less abruptly, except on rare occasions, as when traveling; and then we say: I feel as though I were dreaming. For life is a slightly less changeable dream.
B387
[It may be that there are true demonstrations; but that is not certain. Thus this shows only that it is not certain that everything is uncertain, to the glory of Pyrrhonism.]
B388
Common sense.—They are forced to say: You are not acting in good faith; we are not asleep, etc.—How I love to see this proud reason humbled and pleading! For that is not the language of someone whose right is disputed and who defends it with weapons and force in hand. Such a person does not waste time saying that the other side is acting in bad faith, but punishes that bad faith by force.
B389
Ecclesiastes shows that a human being without God knows nothing and is in unavoidable misery; for to want and be unable is to be miserable. We want to be happy and assured of some truth; yet we can neither know nor stop wanting to know. We cannot even doubt.
B390
My God! What foolish arguments these are: Would God have made the world to damn it? Would he demand so much of people so weak? Etc.—Pyrrhonism is the remedy for this evil and will bring down this vanity.
B391
Conversation.—Grand words: Religion, I deny it.
Conversation.—Pyrrhonism serves Religion.
B392
Against Pyrrhonism.—[… It is strange, then, that we cannot define these things without obscuring them. We speak of them with complete confidence.] We suppose that everyone conceives them in the same way; but this supposition is quite unwarranted, for we have no proof of it. I can certainly see that we apply these words on the same occasions, and that whenever two people see a body change place, both express their sight of this same object with the same word, each saying that it has moved; and from this agreement in application we draw a strong inference that their ideas agree. But this is not absolutely convincing, with a final conviction, although much can be wagered on the affirmative, since we know that the same conclusions are often drawn from different suppositions.
This is enough at least to confuse the matter. It does not utterly extinguish the natural light that assures us of these things—the Academics would have wagered—but it dims that light and unsettles the dogmatists, to the glory of the Pyrrhonian faction. This consists in that ambiguous ambiguity, and in a certain doubtful obscurity, from which our doubts cannot remove all light, nor our natural lights dispel all darkness.
B393
It is an amusing thing to consider that there are people in the world who have renounced all the laws of God and nature, yet made themselves laws that they obey precisely: Muhammad’s soldiers, for example, thieves, heretics, etc. And so with logicians.
It would seem that their license ought to have no limits or barriers at all, seeing that they have crossed so many so just and holy.
B394
All their principles are true—the Pyrrhonians’, the Stoics’, the atheists’, etc. But their conclusions are false, because the opposing principles are true as well.
B395
Instinct, Reason.—We have an inability to prove that no dogmatism can overcome. We have an idea of truth that no Pyrrhonism can overcome.
B396
Two things teach us our whole nature: instinct and experience.
B397
Human greatness is great in knowing itself miserable. A tree does not know itself miserable.
It is misery, then, to know [oneself] miserable; but it is greatness to know that one is miserable.