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Section II continued

B94

Explanatory notes

Human nature is all nature: every animal.

There is nothing we cannot make natural, no natural thing we cannot make disappear.

B94 bis

Explanatory notes

The human being is, strictly speaking, every animal.

B95

Explanatory notes

Memory and joy are feelings; even geometrical propositions become feelings, for reason makes feelings natural, and natural feelings are erased by reason.

B96

Once accustomed to using bad reasons to explain natural effects, people no longer accept good ones when they are discovered. The example given concerned the circulation of blood, to explain why the vein swells below the ligature.

B97

The most important thing in a whole life is the choice of an occupation: chance decides it. Custom makes masons, soldiers and roofers. “He is an excellent roofer,” people say; and speaking of soldiers, “They are fools,” while others say the reverse: “Nothing is great except war; the rest of humanity are rogues.” By repeatedly hearing these occupations praised in childhood and all others despised, we choose. For we naturally love truth and hate folly; these words move us, and we err only in applying them. So great is custom’s force that, from those whom nature has made only human, it makes every human station: some countries are all masons, others all soldiers, etc. Surely nature is not so uniform. Custom therefore does this, since it constrains nature. Sometimes nature overcomes it and keeps a person within his instinct, despite every custom, good or bad.

B98

Explanatory notes

Preconception leading into error.—It is deplorable to see everyone deliberate only about means, never about the end. Each considers how to fulfill his station; but chance chooses our station and country for us.

It is pitiful to see so many Turks, heretics and unbelievers follow their fathers’ course for the sole reason that each has been taught beforehand that it is best. The same thing determines each person’s occupation: locksmith, soldier, etc.

That is why savages have no use for Provence.

B99

There is a universal and essential difference between actions of the will and all other actions.

The will is one of belief’s principal organs—not because it forms belief, but because things are true or false according to the side from which we look at them. Taking more pleasure in one side than another, the will turns the mind away from considering qualities it does not like to see. Thus the mind, moving as one with the will, stops to examine the side the will loves; and so it judges by what it sees there.

B100

Explanatory notes

Self-love.—The nature of self-love and of this human self is to love only itself and consider only itself. But what will it do? It cannot prevent the object it loves from being full of faults and miseries. It wants to be great and sees itself small; wants to be happy and sees itself wretched; wants to be perfect and sees itself full of imperfections; wants to be the object of people’s love and esteem and sees that its faults deserve only their aversion and contempt. This predicament produces in it the most unjust and criminal passion imaginable: it conceives a mortal hatred for the truth that corrects it and convicts it of its faults. It would like to annihilate that truth. Unable to destroy it in itself, it destroys it as far as possible in its own knowledge and in others’—that is, it takes every care to conceal its faults from others and itself, and cannot bear to have them shown to it or seen.

Being full of faults is undoubtedly an evil; being full of them and unwilling to acknowledge them is a greater evil, since it adds the fault of voluntary illusion. We do not want others to deceive us; we do not consider it just that they should wish us to esteem them more than they deserve. It is therefore equally unjust for us to deceive them and wish them to esteem us more than we deserve.

Thus, when they reveal only imperfections and vices we actually possess, they clearly do us no wrong, since they did not cause them. They do us a benefit, since they help free us from an evil: ignorance of those imperfections. We should not be angry that they know them and despise us. It is just that they should know us for what we are and despise us if we are contemptible.

These are the feelings that would arise from a heart full of equity and justice. What, then, should we say of ours, when we see an entirely contrary disposition there? Is it not true that we hate truth and those who tell it, love their being mistaken in our favor, and want them to esteem us as something other than what we really are?

Here is a proof that horrifies me. The Catholic religion does not oblige us to reveal our sins indiscriminately to everyone: it allows us to remain hidden from all other people, with one exception, to whom it commands us to disclose the depths of our hearts and show ourselves as we are. He is the only person in the world whose error about us it orders us to remove; and it binds him to inviolable secrecy, which makes this knowledge within him as though it were not there. Can anything more charitable and gentle be imagined? Yet human corruption is such that people still find this law harsh; and this is one of the principal reasons why a great part of Europe revolted against the Church.

How unjust and unreasonable the human heart is, to resent being obliged to do toward one person what it would in some sense be just to do toward everyone! For is it just that we deceive them?

There are different degrees of this aversion to truth, but it can be said to exist in everyone to some degree, since it is inseparable from self-love. This bad sensitivity obliges those who must correct others to choose so many circumlocutions and qualifications to avoid offending them. They must diminish our faults, pretend to excuse them, mix in praise and expressions of affection and esteem. Even so, this medicine remains bitter to self-love. It takes as little as possible, always reluctantly, often even with secret resentment against those offering it.

Hence, if someone has an interest in being loved by us, they avoid doing us a service they know we will dislike. They treat us as we want to be treated: we hate truth, and they hide it; we want flattery, and they flatter us; we love being deceived, and they deceive us.

Thus every degree of good fortune that raises us in the world removes us further from truth, because people are more afraid of offending those whose affection is more useful and whose aversion is more dangerous. A prince may be the laughingstock of all Europe and alone know nothing of it. I am not surprised: telling the truth benefits its hearer but harms its speakers, because they make themselves hated. Those who live with princes love their own interests more than the interest of the prince they serve; they therefore take care not to benefit him by harming themselves.

This misfortune is certainly greater and more common in the highest stations, but lesser ones are not exempt, since there is always some interest in winning people’s love. Thus human life is nothing but perpetual illusion: people do nothing but deceive and flatter one another. Nobody speaks of us in our presence as they speak in our absence. The union between people rests only on this mutual deception; and few friendships would survive if everyone knew what a friend said when they were away, even though the friend then spoke sincerely and without passion. Humanity is therefore only disguise, falsehood and hypocrisy, both within itself and toward others. It does not want to be told the truth and avoids telling others. All these dispositions, so distant from justice and reason, have a natural root in its heart.

B101

I maintain as a fact that if everyone knew what people said about one another, there would not be four friends in the world. This is shown by the quarrels caused when remarks are sometimes indiscreetly reported. [I say much more: everyone would be…]

B102

Some vices cling to us only through other vices and, when the trunk is removed, are carried away like branches.

B103

The example of Alexander’s chastity has not made as many people continent as his drunkenness has made intemperate. There is no shame in being less virtuous than he, and it seems excusable to be no more vicious. We believe we are not quite sharing ordinary people’s vices when we see ourselves sharing those of these great men; yet we overlook that in this they are ordinary people. We are joined to them at the end by which they join the people. However elevated they are, they remain connected somewhere to the lowest of humanity. They do not hang in the air, wholly detached from our society. No, no: if they are greater than we are, it is because their heads are higher; but their feet are as low as ours. There they are all on the same level, supported by the same earth; at that extremity they are as low as we are, as the smallest, as children, as animals.

B104

When passion moves us to do something, we forget our duty: we like a book and read it when we ought to do something else. But to remember duty, we must propose doing something we hate; then we excuse ourselves on the ground that we have something else to do, and so remember our duty.

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