Minos

look into it in common with me by finding something out from me; or again, if you like, by answering.

Comp. Why, I am willing, Socrates, to answer whatever you like.

Soc. Come then, you tell me: do you accept that just things are unjust and unjust things just, or that just things are just and unjust things unjust?—Comp. For my part I accept that just things are just and unjust things 316a unjust.—Soc. Then among all people too it is accepted so, as here?—Comp. Yes.—Soc. Then among the Persians too?—⟨Comp. Among the Persians too⟩.¹—Soc. But always, surely?—Comp. Always.—Soc. And are things that weigh more accepted here as heavier, and those that weigh less as lighter, or the opposite?—Comp. No: those that weigh more as heavier, and those that weigh less as lighter.—Soc. Then in Carthage and in Lycaea too?—Comp. Yes.—Soc. Fine things, it seems, are accepted everywhere 316b as fine, and shameful things as shameful, but not shameful things as fine, nor fine things as shameful.—Comp. Just so.—Soc. Then, to speak of all things, it is the things that are that are accepted as being, not the things that are not, both among us and among all others.—Comp. I think so.—Soc. Whoever misses what is, then, misses the lawful.

Comp. Put in the way you put it, Socrates, these things do appear lawful both to us, always, and to the others; but when I think of 316c how we never stop changing our laws up and down, I cannot be persuaded.

Soc. That may be because you do not think of these things, moved about as at draughts, as being the same.² But look at them with me in this way. Have you ever come across a writing about the health of the sick?—Comp. I have.—Soc. Then do you know which craft this writing belongs to?