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Diotimos Library · Journals, Notebooks & Fragments Collection · Bilingual Edition

Marcus Aurelius

Meditations

Books I–XII · Ancient Greek and English

MeditationsKey Terms

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English Introduction · Branch 3 of 155

Key Terms

Meditations: Key Terms

p. 9

Key Terms

These are a dozen of the words on which the Meditations turn, the ones a reader is most likely to take in the wrong sense. Each is rendered by one English word throughout, so that it can be followed from book to book; the Glossary at the back lists many more, with their places.

Ruling centre (ἡγεμονικόν)

The Stoics held that the soul has one commanding part, where impressions are received and judged, and from which impulses go out; they placed it in the heart. Marcus names it in nearly forty chapters, and it is the hinge of his ethics, because it is the one thing in a man that is in his power. “The ruling centre is that which wakes itself and turns itself, and makes itself whatever it wants” (6.8). It is not the brain, nor the self in a modern sense, nor simply the reason: it is the faculty that governs, and it can govern badly. When the body is cut or burned, “let the part that forms opinions about these things keep quiet” (4.39); when others wrong you, their acts are “in their ruling centres” and cannot reach yours (11.18.3). At the end of the book it has become the whole of the matter: “How does the ruling centre use itself? For in this lies everything” (12.33). The edition keeps “ruling centre” apart from “that which rules within” (4.1), from “understanding” (διάνοια) and from “mind” (νοῦς), which Marcus uses beside it but not for it.

Impression (φαντασία)

An impression is whatever presents itself to the mind: a sight, a thought, a report that one has been wronged. It is not “imagination” or “fancy”, and it is not yet a judgement. The Stoic point is that an impression comes to us, but whether we assent to it is ours. Hence Marcus’ constant advice to look at the impression before accepting it, to strip it to what it shows (3.11.1), to wipe away “every impression that is vexing or foreign” (5.2), and to “wipe out” impression (7.29, 9.7). A rational nature goes well when “in impressions, it assents to nothing false or unclear” (8.7). And because the soul becomes what it habitually takes in, “the soul is dyed by the impressions” (5.16). The verb, φαντάζεσθαι, is “form an impression (of)”, kept even where “imagine” or “picture” would read more easily, so that the word’s technical sense stays in view: when Marcus tells himself, “Form an impression of our bondage” (10.28), he means a deliberate act of the mind, not a daydream.

Opinion and principle (ὑπόληψις, δόγμα)

An opinion is what the ruling centre makes of an impression: the judgement that this is harmful, that one has been wronged. Marcus’ most repeated claim is that the harm lies in the opinion, not in the thing: “Take away the opinion, ‘I have been harmed’ is taken away” (4.7). “The universe is alteration; life is opinion” (4.3.4). In the last book the claim is pressed as far as it will go, “that all is opinion, and this is in your power” (12.22). A principle is a settled conviction by which a man lives, one of the few fixed points that the notebook exists to keep alive: the edition renders δόγμα “principle” throughout and keeps it apart from θεώρημα, “doctrine”, the propositions of philosophy as taught. Principles cannot be put to death unless the impressions that correspond to them are quenched (7.2), and so the impressions must be kept alight; that is what the repetitions of the book are for.

Impulse (ὁρμή)

In Stoic psychology an impulse is the movement of the soul towards an action, which follows on assent to an impression of something as fitting. It is not “instinct” or “urge”: a rational man’s impulses are themselves rational, and the training of them is the second of Epictetus’ three fields (11.37). Marcus asks that his impulses be directed “to social works alone” (8.7), that they go out “with reservation” (4.1, 11.37), and that none go “at no target” (2.16). The opposite condition is to be “jerked like a puppet by unsocial impulse” (2.2), an image he returns to often. The verb ὁρμᾶν is “have an impulse” (at 3.1.1 “feel impulses”, and in its everyday sense “set out”, 5.14). Impulse is kept apart from desire (ὄρεξις) and from craving (ἐπιθυμία), which is a passion.

Reason (λόγος)

The word covers both the faculty in man and the order of the universe, and Marcus moves between the two without warning, because for a Stoic they are one: the reason in each man is a share of the reason that governs the whole. The edition renders it “reason” in both senses and never “Word”; where it has an ordinary sense (“word”, “speech”, “reply”), the Glossary says so, and in set phrases it is rendered as the idiom requires. Hence the force of phrases like “the reason of the whole” (10.7.2) and “seminal reason” (4.14, 4.21.1), the formative principles by which nature brings things into being, and of the command to “follow reason and God” (12.31). Right reason (ὀρθὸς λόγος) is reason as it should be; to live “according to reason” is the same as to live according to nature.

Nature (φύσις)

Nature means both the order of the whole and the constitution of each thing in it, and to live “according to nature” means to live as one’s own nature, rational and social, requires, which is also how the nature of the whole requires. It is not the countryside, and not the instincts. “What the nature of the whole is, and what mine is, and how this stands to that” (2.9) is a question Marcus sets himself again and again. Because nature does nothing in vain, whatever it brings is good for the part it brings it to (2.3), and death, which is a natural change, cannot be bad: “nothing according to nature is bad” (2.17.2). The edition keeps “nature” and “according to nature” for φύσις and κατὰ φύσιν throughout; πέφυκα, “be by nature (able)”, belongs to the same family.

Daimon (δαίμων)

The divinity within each man, a fragment of the divine reason, which the Stoics, after Plato, called his daimon. Marcus speaks of it in the language of religion: it is “enshrined” within (3.6.2, 3.16.2), it must be kept “inviolate and unharmed” (2.17.2) and “pure” (3.12), and philosophy is nothing but its service (2.13, 2.17.2). It is not a demon, and “genius” or “guardian spirit” would import Roman and Christian senses that Marcus does not mean; the edition leaves the word as “daimon”. Happiness, εὐδαιμονία, is literally having a good daimon, and Marcus plays on this: “Happiness is a good daimon” (7.17).

Good and bad (ἀγαθόν, κακόν)

For the Stoics only virtue is good and only vice bad; everything else, health, wealth, fame, life itself, is neither. Marcus states the conclusion bluntly about death, life, fame and pain: “they are neither good nor bad” (2.11.4). The edition renders κακόν “bad” and never “evil”, because the argument of 2.11 and much else turns on the single word: death is not bad, a man who does wrong is not bad to me, nothing that happens according to nature is bad. “Evil” would add a moral and metaphysical weight that the Greek does not carry, and would hide the fact that “bad” is the same word whether Marcus is speaking of vice or of misfortune. The moral pair, καλόν and αἰσχρόν, is rendered “honourable” and “shameful”; where καλόν means beauty, it is “beautiful” (4.20, 12.23).

Things indifferent (τὰ μέσα, τὰ ἀδιάφορα)

The Stoics called the things that are neither good nor bad “indifferent”; they did not mean that they do not matter, only that they do not make a man better or worse. Marcus has two words for them, and the edition keeps them apart: τὰ μέσα, “things indifferent” (3.11.3, 9.42.4, 11.10), and τὰ ἀδιάφορα, “things that make no difference” (5.20, 6.32), with the verb ἀδιαφορεῖν, “treat as making no difference” (11.16), and the noun ἀδιαφορία, “indifference” (7.31). The faculty to live most honourably is in the soul, he says, “if one treats as making no difference the things that make no difference” (11.16). A reader who takes “indifferent” in its modern sense of “uncaring” will miss the point: Marcus cares a great deal about his duties among such things, and asks to act in them “according to worth” (3.11.3).

Social and civic (κοινωνικός, πολιτικός)

Man is by nature a social and civic living being, made for fellowship (κοινωνία) with others, and the social is “the leading thing … in the constitution of man” (7.55). The words do not mean “sociable” or “political” in the modern sense: they describe what a rational being is for, and the acts that suit it. Marcus calls his own nature “rational and civic” (6.44.2), and asks of every action whether its reference is to the social end (9.23; compare 12.20). The civic city is double: “for me as Antoninus, Rome; as a man, the universe” (6.44.2). The edition renders κοινωνικός “social”, πολιτικός “civic”, and ἀκοινώνητος “unsocial”.

Self-respect (αἰδώς)

Αἰδώς is the sense of shame that keeps a man from what is unworthy of him, and the respect he owes to himself and to others; neither “modesty” nor “shame” renders it, and the edition uses “self-respect” throughout (once, with an object, “respect”, 6.16.5), with “self-respecting” for αἰδήμων and “with self-respect” for the adverb. It is one of the virtues Marcus names most often, beside simplicity and good faith: “Make yourself bright with simplicity and self-respect” (7.31); “faith and self-respect and justice and truth” (5.33). It is among the qualities he first records, from his father (1.2), and among the names he sets for himself to live up to (10.8.1).

Change (μεταβολή)

All things change into one another, and the universe is kept young by the change of its parts (12.23; compare 2.3). Marcus uses change as an exercise: to see each thing as already dissolving (10.18), to look at a grape as unripe grape, ripe cluster and raisin (11.35), to remember that the body and its very substance are a river (2.17). Change is not loss: “Nothing is bad for things in the course of change” (4.42), and what has died “does not fall out of the universe” (8.18). The edition renders μεταβολή and μεταβάλλειν “change” (once, of men “turned into legends”, 8.25), and keeps ἀλλοίωσις, “alteration”, apart, as in “The universe is alteration; life is opinion” (4.3.4).

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About This Reading Edition

Marcus Aurelius’s complete notebooks, Books I–XII, in Leopold’s Greek text with the supplied new English translation, 357 linked notes, an introduction, key terms, outline, editorial note and glossary.

Historical Text and Translation

Greek: Marcus Aurelius, Τῶν εἰς ἑαυτόν, edited by J. H. Leopold (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1908), checked in the supplied edition against the first printed edition (Zurich: Andreas Gesner, [1558/9]) where it bears on the sense. The supplied English translation and editorial matter do not name an individual translator.

About English translation supplied by Diotimos

This historical edition credits English translation supplied by Diotimos as its English translator.

Rights

The ancient Greek work and Leopold’s 1908 printed Greek edition are in the public domain. The supplied new English translation and editorial matter name no individual translator and state no open license. They are included here as supplied for Diotimos, with public web distribution authorized by the site owner on 28 October 2026.