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imus, then Secunda; Epitynchanus Diotimus, then Epitynchanus; Antoninus Faustina, then Antoninus. Such is everything. Celer Hadrian, then Celer. And those sharp men, either foreseers or puffed up with vanity, where are they? For example, sharp men: Charax and Demetrius the Platonist and Eudaemon and anyone else of the kind. All of a day, long dead; some not remembered even for a little, others turned into legends, and others already vanished even from legends.235 Remember, then, these things: that it will be necessary either for your little compound to be scattered, or for the little breath to be quenched, or to be removed and posted elsewhere.
26. The gladness of a man is to do what is peculiar to a man; and peculiar to a man is goodwill towards the kindred stock, disregard of the motions of sense, discernment of convincing impressions, observation of the nature of the whole and of what comes about according to it.
27. Three relations: one to the surrounding vessel; one to the divine cause, from which all things happen to all; one to those who live alongside us.236
28. Pain is bad either for the body (then let it declare itself) or for the soul; but it is open to the soul to guard its own clear sky and calm, and not to form the opinion that it is bad. For every judgement and impulse and desire and avoidance is within, and nothing climbs up so far.
29. Wipe out the impressions, saying continually to yourself: Now it is in my power that there be in this soul no wickedness, no craving, no trouble of any kind at all; but, seeing all things as they are, I use each according to worth. Remember this authority, which is according to nature.
30. Speak, both in the senate and to anyone whatever, in good order, not obtrusively; use sound speech.
31. The court of Augustus: wife, daughter, grandchildren, ancestors, sister, Agrippa, kinsmen, intimates, friends, Arius, Maecenas, doctors, sacrificers: the death of a whole court. Then go on to the others . . . not the death of a single man, as of the Pompeys.237 And that, too, which is written on tombs, “last of his own family”: reckon up how much those before them were dragged about to leave some successor, and then it is necessary that someone be last; here again, the death of a whole family.
32. One must compose life action by action, and be content if each, so far as possible, provides its own; and that it should provide its own, not one man can prevent you.—But something from outside will stand in the way.—Nothing, at least, against acting justly and with self-control and with sound reckoning;238 but something else active, perhaps, will be prevented. But by being well pleased with the hindrance itself, and by a fair-minded passing over to what is given, another action at once takes its place, which will fit into the composition in question.
33. Take without vanity; let go as one ready to be released.
34. If you have ever seen a hand cut off, or a foot, or a head severed, lying somewhere apart from the rest of the body: such does he make himself, so far as in him lies, who does not want what happens and splits himself off, or who does something unsocial. You have been thrown off, somewhere, from the unity according to nature; for you grew as a part; and now you have cut yourself off. But here is the fine thing: that it is open to you to unite yourself again. This to no other part has God239
granted, once separated and cut apart, to come together again. But look at the kindness with which he has honoured man: for he has made it in his power not to be broken off from the whole in the first place, and, once broken off, to come back and grow together and take up again the post of a part.
35. As the nature of rational beings has given each of the rational beings, more or less, the other faculties, so we have received this one too from it. For in the way that that nature reverses everything that stands in the way and opposes, and sets it in its place in fate, and makes it a part of itself, so the rational living being too can make every hindrance material for itself, and use it for whatever it had its impulse towards.240
36. Do not let the impression of life as a whole confound you; do not take in together, in thought, what painful things and how many are likely to have followed; but at each of the present ones question yourself: what is there in the work that is unbearable and insupportable? For you will be ashamed to admit it. Then remind yourself that neither the future nor the past weighs on you, but always the present; and this is made small if you mark its bounds alone and convict the understanding, if it cannot hold out against this, bare as it is.
37. Surely Panthea or Pergamus does not now sit beside the tomb of Verus? What, Chabrias or Diotimus beside Hadrian’s? Laughable. And if they were sitting there, would they perceive it? And if they perceived, would they feel pleasure? And if they felt pleasure, would these be immortal? Was it not for these too first241
to become old women and old men, so it was fated, then to die? What, then, would those have done afterwards, when these were dead? All this is stink and gore in a bag.242
38. If you can see sharply, look, judging, he says, by the wisest.243
39. A virtue that rises in revolt against justice I do not see in the constitution of the rational living being; but against pleasure I see continence.
40. If you take away your opinion about what seems to distress you, you yourself stand in complete safety.—Who is “yourself”?—Reason.—But I am not reason.—So be it. Then let reason not distress itself; and if something else in you is in a bad way, let it form its own opinion about itself.
41. Impediment to sensation is bad for the vital nature; impediment to impulse is likewise bad for the vital nature. And there is likewise something else that impedes and is bad for the constitution of plants. So, then, impediment to mind is bad for the intelligent nature. Now transfer all these to yourself. Do pain, pleasure touch you? Sensation will see to it. Did an obstacle arise when you had an impulse? If you had your impulse without reservation, already it is bad, as for a rational being; but if you take what is common, you are not yet harmed nor impeded. But the things peculiar to the mind no one else is accustomed to impede; for fire does not touch it, nor iron, nor a tyrant, nor slander, nor anything at all, when it has become “a sphere, round, in its solitude”.244
42. I am not worthy to distress myself; for I have never willingly distressed even another.
43. One thing gladdens one man, another another; and me, if I have the ruling centre sound, not turning away from any man nor from ⟨anything⟩ that happens to men, but looking on everything with kindly eyes, and receiving and using each according to worth.245
44. Look: make a gift of this time to yourself. Those who rather pursue fame after death do not reckon that those others will be just such as these whom they find burdensome; and they too are mortal. And what is it to you at all if those others echo with such voices, or have such an opinion about you?
45. Take me up and throw me where you want. For there too I shall have my daimon serene, that is, content, if it should fare and act according to what follows from its own constitution.
Is this worth it, that because of it the soul should fare ill with me, and be worse than itself, abased, desiring, shrinking, cowering? And what will you find worth this?
46. Nothing can happen to any man that is not a human occurrence, nor to an ox that is not of an ox’s kind, nor to a vine that is not of a vine’s kind, nor to a stone that is not peculiar to a stone. If, then, there happens to each what it is used to and is by nature, why would you resent it? For the common nature did not bring you anything unbearable.
47. If you are distressed because of something external, it is not that which vexes you but your own verdict about it; and to wipe this out at once is in your power. And if something in your own disposition distresses you, who prevents you from setting right the principle? And likewise, if you are distressed because you are not doing some particular thing that appears sound to you, why do you not rather do it than be distressed?—But something stronger246