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32 (id.)
The expression of public reason ought to be found in manners as in laws. “We have thought that it mattered to the people’s happiness,” so laws should [speak]. “We have thought that it was required for leading an agreeable and gentle life,” so manners should speak. Thus the regard a citizen gains from the neat and cheerful appearance of his house is legitimate regard. There is no less merit in knowing how to use things well than in knowing how to speak well of them, and I rightly esteem the man who knows how to surround himself with life’s conveniences.
33 (Bundle 8.)
Do not exaggerate life’s evils to yourself, and do not fail to recognize its goods, if you seek to live happily.
34 (Same leaf.)
To be virtuous, it is not useless to make one’s testimony of oneself as satisfying as one can.
35 (id.)
The beauty of style depends on so many things! on the things one says; on the way one says them; on the feeling that animates us as we say them; on the impression we wish to produce through them. And above all on these last two things.
36 (id.)
What has corrupted human intelligence is the chimeras that have occupied it. What has corrupted human sensibility is... That is what has diverted human nature from its course.
37 (id.)
It is astonishing how far the human mind has gone backward since Plato. Only with infinite pains does it return to the point of light to which that philosopher had brought it. The moral notions of even our greatest geniuses have rarely attained and never surpassed the ideas of that Athenian who lived more than two thousand years ago. It seems that all the great truths of this kind slept throughout that time in the writings of that extreme spiritualist who carried his metaphysical errors as far as his political discoveries. Fortunately error and truth are so separate that the same mind can make great advances and great deviations. And that is what we see in Plato’s works. It ordinarily happens that the errors of great minds are less harmful than their discoveries are useful, were it only for this one reason: that, teaching us to walk with their step, which is the right one, accustoming us in their works to truth (for if they fall, it is only at the end of the course, in a manner of speaking), they teach us to judge them and their productions, and to see what they saw better than they themselves did. What has happened, on the contrary, is that so far people have adopted only Plato’s reveries on —..... the theologians employed them in the edifice of their absurd doctrine; and that people have rejected as chimeras all those truths so beautiful and so palpable, so to speak, about government, justice, etc., etc. One thing Plato knew little of is the nature of the arts and their destination. Apart from that, he seems to me to have gathered and fixed in his works everything that one [has] been able to know thus far of the science of government. One finds in him almost everything that has been thought since. Long attention to this matter. (That is written very limply, very loosely.)
38 (id.)
His hatred is weary and asks only to end.