Indeed, one fears souls more than the body. For one dreads men’s opinion more than their arm.
Beauty is born of accord; it is a harmony. People say beautiful features do not suffice to form beauty. They are then like sounds that are not joined closely enough.
Beauty is a harmony, the beautiful a perfection. The beautiful is the ideal of beauty. Innocence is a character inseparable from the beautiful. Remorse is innocence after crime. The beautiful is the beauty of the soul (in the artist and in his subject). Innocence is to the beautiful what health is to beauty. The beautiful can do without health, but beauty cannot. And beauty can do without innocence, but the true beautiful cannot.
June 30.
“The girl of the house.” This printing error is fortunate. The girl of the house is sensibility itself; imagination is its madwoman. Reason is its mistress, or “the lady of the place.”
He killed the duc d’Enghien, but the duc d’Enghien killed his glory.
June 29.
This man does not have the head of a man of wit, only his tongue. There is nothing lively and artless in his opinions, everything in them is reasoned. His metaphors are always cold and never arise from movement. He has neither the means to enter others’ ideas nor the means to make others enter his. Phrases come out of his head. He sees only phrases in the ideas that come out of others’ heads.
June 28.
[Montesquieu.] “Law in general (he says) is the reason of man.” Not so. Law properly so called, true law, is the reason of God. True law is what binds, even if the human legislator had not prescribed it.
Montesquieu (chap. 2, book II): “Libanius says that at Athens a foreigner who mingled in the assembly of the people was punished with death. That is because such a man usurped the right of sovereignty.” What constituted his offense was not usurpation, but adultery. Such a man, by his presence and his vote, could make the law’s legitimacy doubtful or false. I mean its civil legitimacy, which is the majority of citizens’ votes. That was a great disadvantage and a great crime, worthy of the ultimate punishment. Had one kept to Mr de Montesquieu’s reason, one would have punished him from a point of honor. Such pride had no part in the manners of the ancients.
“The people (says Montesquieu) are admirable at choosing.” They are perhaps more infallible in their esteem than in their preferences. Athens had its Cleon, and Rome its Varro. The people use their reason to assess men. But it is not always their reason, it is their passions that choose. Never did they choose so badly as in France, so long as their power lasted there. But two circumstances explain their errors. They could choose only among unknown men: they chose those who flattered them. The aim was to overturn everything: they chose the most violent, the wickedest, and the most hate-filled enemies of those they believed their enemies.
Montesquieu says of the people: “They need, like monarchs and even more than they, to be guided by a council or Senate.” Beautiful words, which, warning peoples and kings alike of their inability to govern themselves, urge them, through a fate they share and which belongs to mankind, to have recourse to wisdom in order to preserve authority.
Mr de Montesquieu said in his preface: “One will not find here those salient strokes that seem to characterize today’s works.” There are more of them in his work than in any other book. “If one views things at all with a certain [ ], the sallies vanish.” Mr de Montesquieu proved the contrary. “They ordinarily arise only because the mind throws itself wholly to one side and abandons all the others.” They sometimes arise from the need to make oneself understood, because the mind, after seeing all sides, quickly seizes the one it must choose to prick curiosity, attention, and leaves all the others to attention once alerted. Sallies are the resource of those impatient to be understood, who wish to show everything but not to say everything. They arise from a great need to be understood while explaining oneself very quickly. Extreme sagacity gives one the talent for them, because it makes that talent necessary to us. — All his strokes are goads that awaken intelligence. Such was Mr de Montesquieu’s mind, and such is the character of his sallies.
(Sallies of memory. Mr de Montesquieu has many of them: Italiam, Italiam... “paternal hands,” leaves to the winds ), etc.)
Sunday, July 1.
— When the places are taken (Homer in Greece, Confucius in China), then what had to be said has been said. Such books can be made only by explaining to men what they think and by telling them what they know.
The epic poem must be a better-arranged tale, and a fine treatise of philosophy must be prejudices justified.
July 2.
Of necessary prejudices, or those that form in the soul inevitably and without its knowledge (natural ideas). That they are truths; or at least the only appearances under which the soul can habitually conceive certain truths. In making them clear to men, one does not teach men to have them, but teaches them to keep them, which puts their minds at ease and gives them great pleasure.
Without prejudices, one could not judge. Of prejudices that precede experience, so to speak, thought, — or that one feels without holding them as opinions. Secret, involuntary acts, invisible impressions.
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The Notebooks of Joseph Joubert, Volume I · Book Mode · Diotimos