Diotimos Library · Renaissance Collection · Bilingual Edition
Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume I
Proem and Books I–IV · Latin with an independent English translation
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Facing Pages · Branch 98 of 174
Book II · Chapter 11 · §§ 33–36
Latin
p. 198Quarta ratio. Ubi non est voluntas, quae est inclinatio mentis ad bonum, ibi non est mentis voluptas, quae est dilatatio voluntatis in bonum et quies voluntatis in bono. Si non est ibi voluptas, ubi est ipsum bonum, nusquam voluptas erit, quae ubicumque est, fit ratione boni. In ipso igitur bono voluptas est et voluntas. Affectus huiusmodi si in creaturis est generationis initium, certe in creatore ipso est creationis origo. Quinta ratio. Si agentia omnia tam secundum naturam quam secundum artem opera sua semper ad finem, id est ad bonum, ordinant et bonitate sua id faciunt, accipiunt autem operandi ordinem ab agente primo, atque illud est ipsum bonum.
Constat ipsum opera sua ad finem optimum ordinare. Si enim bona particularia quia bona sunt et quia ordinantur a summo bono ad bonum aliquod ordinant singula, quanto magis universale bonum ordinabit ad bonum cuncta, videlicet ad universale bonum?
Deus igitur ad se ipsum tamquam finem ducit omnia. Nullus enim actionis divinae finis est extra Deum, quoniam finis in eodem ordine locatur una cum eo quod agit ad finem. Estque bonum quiddam et causam movet agentem. Nihil autem in eodem ordine cum Deo locatur nisi ipse Deus. Deus alieno non servit bono. Nunquam enim particulari bono servit omne bonum. Deus insuper non movetur ab aliquo.
Si Dei finis est ipsa sua bonitas, Deus suo modo suam appetit et diligit bonitatem.
Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume I: Book II
p. 199Fourth argument. Where there is no will, which is the mind's inclination toward the good, there is no pleasure of mind, which is the dilation of will in the good and the repose of will in the good. If there is no pleasure where the good itself is, there will be pleasure nowhere, for wherever pleasure exists it exists by reason of the good. In the good itself, therefore, there are both pleasure and will. If an affection of this kind is the beginning of generation in creatures, it is surely the origin of creation in the creator himself. Fifth argument. Consider this: all agents, whether by nature or by art, always order their works toward an end—that is, toward the good—and do so through their goodness; they receive the order of acting from the first agent; and that first agent is the good itself.
It is evident that he orders his works toward the best end. For if particular goods, because they are good and because they are ordered by the highest good, order individual things toward some good, how much more will the universal good order all things toward the good—namely, toward the universal good?
God therefore leads all things toward himself as their end. For no end of divine action lies outside God, since an end is placed in the same order as that which acts toward the end; it is also a kind of good and moves the acting cause. Nothing, however, is placed in the same order with God except God himself. God serves no alien good, for the good as a whole never serves a particular good. Furthermore, God is moved by nothing.
If God's end is his own goodness, God in his own manner desires and loves his goodness.
Socrates
Reading Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume I · Book II · II.11.33–II.11.36
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Socrates will begin with this book and its sources.About This Reading Edition
Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology places the immortality of the soul at the center of an extended philosophical ascent through body, soul, angel, and God. This exact page-aligned Renaissance edition presents the authorial Proem and Books I–IV in a newly established Latin reading text with an independent English translation prepared by Diotimos Editions.
Historical Text and Translation
The Latin reading text is based on the Florence editio princeps printed by Antonio Miscomini on 7 November 1482 and principally collated against the Paris 1559 printing, with a 1641 Opera printing used only as a late control and OCR aid. Abbreviations are expanded, spelling and punctuation are conservatively normalized, and substantive departures among the witnesses are documented in the edition’s apparatus.
About Diotimos Editions
Diotimos Editions prepared this independently worded English translation in house. It aims for a dignified but readable modern register while preserving Ficino’s argumentative sequence, metaphors, technical distinctions, repetitions, conditions, purpose clauses, and direct appeals; long periods are divided only where clarity requires it.
Rights
Ficino’s Latin source work is in the public domain. The 2026 English translation and Diotimos editorial matter are original to this edition and remain © 2026 Diotimos.