Diotimos Library · Renaissance Collection · Bilingual Edition
Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume I
Proem and Books I–IV · Latin with an independent English translation
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Facing Pages · Branch 96 of 174
Book II · Chapter 11 · §§ 24–28
Latin
p. 194Probabimus deinceps, volente Deo, non operari eum externos effectus per meram intelligentiam nisi accedat voluntatis assensus. Quod quidem disputationis huius erat propositum.
Prima ratio. Causa prima omnia per se, ut in sequentibus ostendemus, ad finem optimum per vias rectissimas modo congruentissimo dirigit. Hoc facere nequit nisi per intellectum anticipet finem, discernat vias, metiatur proportionem quae inter vias est ac finem, per voluntatem rursus finem approbet.
Ac viam talem prae ceteris eligat. Hic Plato in Timaeo, Phaedone, Philebo, Politico illos philosophos detestatur qui naturalium rerum causas vel ad fortunam vel ad ipsam sive materiae sive naturae necessitatem referunt. Ipse vero naturalia quidem existimat instrumenta quaedam intelligentiae potius quam agentia, singulosque effectus praecipue ad finalem, efficientem, formalem causam ubique reducit.
Quamobrem si quis quaerat quam ob causam terra sit rotunda, respondet quia videlicet rotunditatis idea participat; ad cuius similitudinem sapientia mundi artifex idcirco terram disposuit, quoniam iudicavit voluitque boni ipsius gratia fore melius ita sese habere.
Secunda ratio. Quod comitatur quicquid est, id enti, quantum ens est, convenit. Quod tale est, in eo quod primum ens est reperiatur oportet.
Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume I: Book II
p. 195Next, God willing, we shall prove that he does not produce external effects through intelligence alone unless the assent of will is added. This was indeed the proposition at issue in the present discussion.
First argument. The first cause directs all things by itself—as we shall show in what follows—toward the best end, along the most direct paths and in the most fitting manner. It cannot do this unless by intellect it anticipates the end, discerns the paths, measures the proportion between the paths and the end, and then by will approves the end.
Nor can it do so unless it chooses such a path in preference to the others. Here Plato, in the Timaeus, Phaedo, Philebus, and Statesman, denounces those philosophers who refer the causes of natural things either to chance or to the very necessity of either matter or nature. He, by contrast, regards natural things as instruments of intelligence rather than as agents, and everywhere traces every effect primarily to final, efficient, and formal causes.
Therefore, if someone asks why the earth is round, he answers that it is because the earth participates in the idea of roundness. Wisdom, the artisan of the world, therefore arranged the earth in that idea's likeness, since it judged and willed that for the sake of the good itself it would be better for the earth to be so.
Second argument. Whatever accompanies everything that exists belongs to a being insofar as it is a being. What is of this kind must be found in that which is the first being.
Socrates
Reading Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume I · Book II · II.11.24–II.11.28
Ask about a concept, passage, contradiction, or connection.
Socrates will begin with this book and its sources.About This Reading Edition
Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology places the immortality of the soul at the center of an extended philosophical ascent through body, soul, angel, and God. This exact page-aligned Renaissance edition presents the authorial Proem and Books I–IV in a newly established Latin reading text with an independent English translation prepared by Diotimos Editions.
Historical Text and Translation
The Latin reading text is based on the Florence editio princeps printed by Antonio Miscomini on 7 November 1482 and principally collated against the Paris 1559 printing, with a 1641 Opera printing used only as a late control and OCR aid. Abbreviations are expanded, spelling and punctuation are conservatively normalized, and substantive departures among the witnesses are documented in the edition’s apparatus.
About Diotimos Editions
Diotimos Editions prepared this independently worded English translation in house. It aims for a dignified but readable modern register while preserving Ficino’s argumentative sequence, metaphors, technical distinctions, repetitions, conditions, purpose clauses, and direct appeals; long periods are divided only where clarity requires it.
Rights
Ficino’s Latin source work is in the public domain. The 2026 English translation and Diotimos editorial matter are original to this edition and remain © 2026 Diotimos.