Diotimos Library · Renaissance Collection · Bilingual Edition
Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume I
Proem and Books I–IV · Latin with an independent English translation
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Latin Page · Branch 91 of 174
Book II · Chapter 11 · §§ 6–8
Latin
p. 184Quicquid libertatis bonique esse potest usquam, id totum per summi principis bonique potentiam esse potest. Quamobrem Deus iam actu illa ipsa substantia est quae potest esse, immo quae est ab accidentibus libera. Conducit ad idem quod effectus modo quodam praestantiore in superioribus causis quam in se ipsis esse reperiuntur, atque idcirco in causa summa modo aliquo praestantissimo. Cum vero effectus Dei in se ipsis substantiae sint, nullo modo in Deo tamquam accidentia esse debent. Non tamen illic multae substantiae sunt. Itaque sunt illic una quaedam, id est ipsamet Dei substantia.
Quandoquidem oportet in Deo cuncta modo quam perfectissimo inveniri, atque uniri illi sibique invicem perfectissime. Nequeunt autem modo sublimiore in Deo esse, atque sublimius uniri tum Deo tum sibi ipsis, quam si in Deo sint ipse Deus. Non sunt igitur in Deo rerum formae secundum modum naturae distinctae, per quas naturali quadam necessitate non aliter ducatur ad operandum quam ignis ad comburendum.
Secunda ratio. Natura cuiusque est una quaedam forma virtusque ad unum quoddam opus certo modo determinata, toto suo impetu faciens quicquid facit et faciens necessario. Natura siquidem ignis calida unum quoddam, caloris videlicet, opus facit praecipue, atque eodem semper calefacit tenore, et quantum in se est omnes caloris gradus exercet ubique. Igitur quod uno gradu ab ea calefiat materia haec et duobus gradibus illa, non ex agentis ordinatione procedit, sed ex ordine graduum qui in praeparationibus materiarum reperiuntur. Itaque ignis toti operi non dominatur. Non enim auctor est ordinis graduum qui sunt in opere.
Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume I: Book II
p. 185Whatever freedom and goodness can exist anywhere can exist in its fullness through the power of the supreme principle and the supreme good. Thus God already is in actuality that very substance which can be—indeed, which is—free from accidents. The same conclusion follows from the fact that effects are found to exist in higher causes in a manner more excellent than they do in themselves, and therefore in the supreme cause in a manner most excellent of all. Since God's effects are substances in themselves, they must in no way exist in God as accidents. Yet there are not many substances there. They are there as a single substance, namely God's own substance.
For all things must be found in God in the most perfect manner and be united most perfectly both to him and to one another. They cannot exist in God in any more exalted manner, or be united more sublimely either to God or among themselves, than if in God they are God himself. The forms of things are therefore not distinct in God after the manner of nature, so that through them he is driven to act by a certain natural necessity, just as fire is driven to burn.
Second argument. The nature of each thing is a certain single form and power, determined in a fixed manner to one particular work; whatever it does, it does with its whole impetus and of necessity. The hot nature of fire, for example, performs chiefly one work, namely the work of heat; it always heats with the same intensity and, so far as lies in it, exerts every degree of heat everywhere. Thus, when one piece of matter is heated by it to one degree and another to two, this proceeds not from the ordering of the agent but from the order of degrees found in the preparations of the materials. Fire therefore is not master of its whole work, for it is not the author of the order of degrees within that work.
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Reading Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume I · Book II · II.11.6–II.11.8
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Socrates will begin with this book and its sources.About This Reading Edition
Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology places the immortality of the soul at the center of an extended philosophical ascent through body, soul, angel, and God. This exact page-aligned Renaissance edition presents the authorial Proem and Books I–IV in a newly established Latin reading text with an independent English translation prepared by Diotimos Editions.
Historical Text and Translation
The Latin reading text is based on the Florence editio princeps printed by Antonio Miscomini on 7 November 1482 and principally collated against the Paris 1559 printing, with a 1641 Opera printing used only as a late control and OCR aid. Abbreviations are expanded, spelling and punctuation are conservatively normalized, and substantive departures among the witnesses are documented in the edition’s apparatus.
About Diotimos Editions
Diotimos Editions prepared this independently worded English translation in house. It aims for a dignified but readable modern register while preserving Ficino’s argumentative sequence, metaphors, technical distinctions, repetitions, conditions, purpose clauses, and direct appeals; long periods are divided only where clarity requires it.
Rights
Ficino’s Latin source work is in the public domain. The 2026 English translation and Diotimos editorial matter are original to this edition and remain © 2026 Diotimos.