Diotimos Library · Renaissance Collection · Bilingual Edition
Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume I
Proem and Books I–IV · Latin with an independent English translation
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English Page · Branch 90 of 174
Book II · Chapter 11 · §§ 1–5
Latin
p. 182Deus voluntatem habet; perque illam extra se efficit omnia.
Omnis causa per aliquam agit formam et agit effectum ipsius in forma quodammodo similem. Ideoque oportet effectus formam a causa comprehendi. Cum vero Deus sit omnium causa, necessarium est in eo omnium formas esse. Est ergo Deus essentia omniformis. Unde Orphicum illud: Ζεὺς εἶδος πάντων, id est, Iupiter species omnium. Quemadmodum vero in potentia pura, id est materia, sunt omnes naturales formae secundum confusam quandam potentiam, sic oportet in actu puro, id est Deo, omnes secundum actum distinctum formas esse. Sed numquid hae formae in Deo distinctae sunt secundum quendam naturae modum, quemadmodum in igne lux, calor, siccitas, levitas, perque eas agit ductus quadam naturae suae necessitate? Nequaquam.
Prima ratio. Deus cum omnia faciat, si per formas huiusmodi operatur, multo magis multiplex compositusque erit quam quaevis alia causa, sive illae formae in eo essentiales sint, sive accidentales. Oportet tamen illum esse omnium simplicissimum. Proinde neque essentiales esse possunt. Nulla enim essentia usquam minus una in se esset quam divina. Neque rursum accidentales.
Nam quo pacto potest Deus capere qualitates? Non aliunde, cum pati aliquid ab aliquo nequeat. Non a se ipso. Quippe si a se illas accipit, quantum eas dat vicem gerit efficientis; quantum capit, gerit subiecti vicem.
Conditionem vero subiecti subire non potest agens primum purusque actus, cui subiecta sunt omnia. Item substantia non dependet ab accidente, quamvis accidens dependeat a substantia.
Quod non pendet ex alio, seorsum ab alio quandoque existere valet. Igitur potest substantia quaedam seorsum ab accidentium conditionibus limitibusque existere.
Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume I: Book II
p. 183God has a will, and through it brings forth everything outside himself.
Every cause acts through some form and produces its effect in a form somehow like itself; hence the effect's form must be contained in its cause. Since God is the cause of all things, the forms of all things must be in him. God is therefore an essence containing every form. Hence the Orphic saying, Ζεὺς εἶδος πάντων, that is, ‘Jupiter, the form of all things.’ Just as all natural forms are present in pure potency—that is, in matter—according to a certain confused potency, so in pure act—that is, in God—all forms must be present according to distinct actuality. But are these forms distinct in God after some manner of nature, as light, heat, dryness, and lightness are in fire, so that he acts through them under the compulsion of a certain necessity of his nature? Not at all.
First argument. Since God makes all things, if he works through forms of this kind, he will be far more manifold and composite than any other cause, whether those forms in him are essential or accidental. Yet he must be the simplest of all things. They cannot, therefore, be essential, for no essence anywhere would be less one in itself than the divine essence; nor, again, can they be accidental.
For how could God receive qualities? Not from elsewhere, since he cannot undergo anything from another; nor from himself. For if he receives them from himself, insofar as he gives them he assumes the part of an efficient cause, but insofar as he receives them he assumes the part of a subject.
But the first agent and pure act, to which all things are subject, cannot assume the condition of a subject. Moreover, substance does not depend upon accident, although accident depends upon substance.
What does not depend upon another can at some time exist apart from that other. Some substance can therefore exist apart from the conditions and limits of accidents.
Socrates
Reading Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume I · Book II · II.11.1–II.11.5
Ask about a concept, passage, contradiction, or connection.
Socrates will begin with this book and its sources.About This Reading Edition
Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology places the immortality of the soul at the center of an extended philosophical ascent through body, soul, angel, and God. This exact page-aligned Renaissance edition presents the authorial Proem and Books I–IV in a newly established Latin reading text with an independent English translation prepared by Diotimos Editions.
Historical Text and Translation
The Latin reading text is based on the Florence editio princeps printed by Antonio Miscomini on 7 November 1482 and principally collated against the Paris 1559 printing, with a 1641 Opera printing used only as a late control and OCR aid. Abbreviations are expanded, spelling and punctuation are conservatively normalized, and substantive departures among the witnesses are documented in the edition’s apparatus.
About Diotimos Editions
Diotimos Editions prepared this independently worded English translation in house. It aims for a dignified but readable modern register while preserving Ficino’s argumentative sequence, metaphors, technical distinctions, repetitions, conditions, purpose clauses, and direct appeals; long periods are divided only where clarity requires it.
Rights
Ficino’s Latin source work is in the public domain. The 2026 English translation and Diotimos editorial matter are original to this edition and remain © 2026 Diotimos.