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Marsilio Ficino

Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume I

Proem and Books I–IV · Latin with an independent English translation

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Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume IBook II · Chapter 9 · §§ 16–20

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Latin Page · Branch 85 of 174

Book II · Chapter 9 · §§ 16–20

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Latin

p. 172

Cuiusque enim rei cognitio appetibilis est tamquam bonum aliquod; bonum vero nullum deest Deo. Adde quod virtus superior debet nosse quicquid inferior, et aliquid ultra, quod in animis nostris apparet. Quae enim singuli quinque sensus accipiunt singulatim, phantasia summatim discernit, et aliquid excellentius: quod phantasia videt in pluribus imaginibus, intellectus in una videt et clarius videt singula quam et phantasia; videt insuper rerum rationes universales, quas illa nescit. Ita Deus unica virtute cognoscit quicquid nos tribus virtutibus, id est, sensibus, phantasia et intellectu cognoscimus.

Ergo et universalia intuetur et singula. Intuetur, inquam, omnes essendi modos, qui originem videt essendi et totam comprehendit ipsius esse naturam. Si ita est, inspicit utique singula, quae per varios essendi modos invicem distinguuntur. Hinc Orpheus.

καὶ Διὸς ὄμμα τέλειον, ἐπεὶ γ’ ὅσα γίγνεται ἡμῖν μοῖρά τε, καὶ Διὸς οἶδε νόος διὰ παντὸς ἅπαντα, id est, Iovis perfectus oculus.

Quoniam quaecumque apud nos fiunt, fatum Iovisque mens per universum inspicit omnia.

Nemo igitur Epicuro et Averroi fidem adhibeat dicentibus rerum vilissimarum notitiam maiestate divina indignam esse. Deus enim res non in se ipsis, sed in se ipso, non per earum imagines, sed per suam essentiam intuetur. Non distrahitur circa plurima, sed cuncta conspicit tamquam unum. Non laborat umquam, quia non quaerit, sed possidet. Non divertitur a gravioribus ut consideret leviora.

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Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Volume I: Book II

p. 173

For knowledge of every thing is desirable as some good, and no good is lacking from God. Add that a higher power must know whatever a lower power knows, and something beyond it, as appears in our own souls. What each of the five senses receives separately, imagination discerns collectively, together with something higher. What imagination sees in many images, intellect sees in one; it also sees individual things more clearly than imagination does, and sees besides the universal principles of things, which imagination does not know. Thus by one power God knows whatever we know by three powers: sense, imagination, and intellect.

He therefore beholds both universals and individual things. He who sees the origin of being and comprehends the whole nature of being itself beholds, I say, every mode of being. If this is so, he surely beholds individual things, which are distinguished from one another by their various modes of being. Hence Orpheus.

καὶ Διὸς ὄμμα τέλειον, ἐπεὶ γ’ ὅσα γίγνεται ἡμῖν μοῖρά τε, καὶ Διὸς οἶδε νόος διὰ παντὸς ἅπαντα; that is, “the perfect eye of Jove.”

For whatever comes to pass among us, fate and the mind of Jove survey all things throughout the universe.

Let no one, then, give credence to Epicurus and Averroes when they say that knowledge of the basest things is unworthy of divine majesty. For God beholds things not in themselves but in himself, not through images of them but through his own essence. He is not distracted among a multiplicity, but sees all things as one. He never labors, because he does not seek but possesses. Nor does he turn aside from weightier things in order to consider lesser ones.

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About This Reading Edition

Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology places the immortality of the soul at the center of an extended philosophical ascent through body, soul, angel, and God. This exact page-aligned Renaissance edition presents the authorial Proem and Books I–IV in a newly established Latin reading text with an independent English translation prepared by Diotimos Editions.

Discussion Questions

Historical Text and Translation

The Latin reading text is based on the Florence editio princeps printed by Antonio Miscomini on 7 November 1482 and principally collated against the Paris 1559 printing, with a 1641 Opera printing used only as a late control and OCR aid. Abbreviations are expanded, spelling and punctuation are conservatively normalized, and substantive departures among the witnesses are documented in the edition’s apparatus.

About Diotimos Editions

Diotimos Editions prepared this independently worded English translation in house. It aims for a dignified but readable modern register while preserving Ficino’s argumentative sequence, metaphors, technical distinctions, repetitions, conditions, purpose clauses, and direct appeals; long periods are divided only where clarity requires it.

Rights

Ficino’s Latin source work is in the public domain. The 2026 English translation and Diotimos editorial matter are original to this edition and remain © 2026 Diotimos.